Managing wetlands sustainably as ecosystems : The contribution of the law (part 1)

The ways in which a society set standards of behaviour and of conduct for its members vary hugely. For example, accepted practices, recognised customs, spiritually or morally inspired norms, judicially declared rules, executively formulated edicts, formal legislative enactments or constitutionally embedded rights and duties. Whatever form they assume, these standards are the artificial construction of the human mind. Accordingly the law - whatever its form - can do no more and no less than regulate or set standards for human behaviour, human conduct, and human decision-making. The law cannot regulate the environment. It can only regulate human activities that impact directly or indirectly upon the environment. This applies as much to wetlands as components of the environment as it does to any other components of the environment or the environment at large. The capacity of the law to protect the environment and therefore wetlands is thus totally dependent upon the capacity of the law to regulate human behaviour, human conduct and human decision-making. At the same time the law needs to reflect the specific nature, functions and locations of wetlands. A wetland is an ecosystem by itself; it comprises a range of ecosystems within it; and it is part of a wider set of ecosystems. Hence, the significant ecological functions performed by wetlands. Then there are the benefits flowing to humans from wetlands. These may be social, economic, cultural, aesthetic, or a combination of some or of all of these. It is a challenge for a society acting through its legal system to find the appropriate balance between these ecological and these human values. But that is what sustainability requires.The ways in which a society set standards of behaviour and of conduct for its members vary hugely. For example, accepted practices, recognised customs, spiritually or morally inspired norms, judicially declared rules, executively formulated edicts, formal legislative enactments or constitutionally embedded rights and duties. Whatever form they assume, these standards are the artificial construction of the human mind. Accordingly the law - whatever its form - can do no more and no less than regulate or set standards for human behaviour, human conduct, and human decision-making. The law cannot regulate the environment. It can only regulate human activities that impact directly or indirectly upon the environment. This applies as much to wetlands as components of the environment as it does to any other components of the environment or the environment at large. The capacity of the law to protect the environment and therefore wetlands is thus totally dependent upon the capacity of the law to regulate human behaviour, human conduct and human decision-making. At the same time the law needs to reflect the specific nature, functions and locations of wetlands. A wetland is an ecosystem by itself; it comprises a range of ecosystems within it; and it is part of a wider set of ecosystems. Hence, the significant ecological functions performed by wetlands. Then there are the benefits flowing to humans from wetlands. These may be social, economic, cultural, aesthetic, or a combination of some or of all of these. It is a challenge for a society acting through its legal system to find the appropriate balance between these ecological and these human values. But that is what sustainability requires.

Managing Wetlands Sustainably as Ecosystems: The Contribution of the Law (Part 2)

In this Part 2 attention is turned towards the legal arrangements in nation states for managing wetlands. These national arrangements have effect within the international arrangements already mentioned and any regional arrangements that are relevant. However, each national system is a reflection of its own historical, cultural, political and constitutional background. It is the purpose of this Part 2 to review and assess the national approaches to wetlands management. This involves an analysis of a range of instruments. These are: constitutional rules; strategic rules; regulatory rules; and management rules. Each of these sets of rules performs different functions, assumes different forms and is differentially capable of enforcement.

An assessment of Georgia's National Integrity System : the GNISA project

Georgia’s ‘National Integrity Systems’ are the institutions, laws, procedures, practices and attitudes that encourage and support integrity in the exercise of power in modern Georgian society. Integrity systems function to ensure that power is exercised in a manner that is true to the values, purposes and duties for which that power is entrusted to, or held by, institutions and individual office-holders. This report presents the results of the Open Society Institute / Open Society – Georgia Foundation funded project Georgian National Integrity Systems Assessment (GNISA), conducted in 2005–2006 by Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, Transparency International Georgia, Georgian Young Lawyers Association, in close cooperation with Griffith University Institute for Ethics, Governance and Law (Australia), and Tiri Group (UK), into how different elements of integrity systems interact, which combinations of institutions and reforms make for a strong integrity system, and how Georgia’s integrity systems should evolve to ensure coherence, not chaos in the way public integrity is maintained. Nevertheless all participants of the research may not share some conclusions given in the GNISA report.

The legitimacy of graduated response schemes in copyright law

In an attempt to curb online copyright infringement, copyright owners are increasingly seeking to enlist the assistance of Internet Service Providers (‘ISPs’) to enforce copyright and impose sanctions on their users.1 Commonly termed ‘graduated response’ schemes, these measures generally require that the ISP take some action against users suspected of infringing copyright, ranging from issuing warnings, to collating allegations made against subscribers and reporting to copyright owners, to suspension and eventual termination of service.

Is there a physicality requirement at Common Law? : a survey of the Pre-NRDC cases discussing ‘Manufacture’

One of the fundamental issues that remains unresolved in patent law today, both in Australia and in other jurisdictions, is whether an invention must produce a physical effect or cause a physical transformation of matter to be patentable, or whether it is sufficient that an invention involves a specific practical application of an idea or principle to achieve a useful result. In short, the question is whether Australian patent law contains a physicality requirement. Despite being recently considered by the Federal Court, this is arguably an issue that has yet to be satisfactorily resolved in Australia. In its 2006 decision in Grant v Commissioner of Patents, the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia found that the patentable subject matter standard is rooted in the physical, when it held that an invention must involve a physical effect or transformation to be patent eligible. That decision, however, has been the subject of scrutiny in the academic literature. This article seeks to add to the existing literature written in response to the Grant decision by examining in detail the key common law cases decided prior to the High Court’s watershed decision in National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents, which is the undisputed authoritative statement of principle in regards to the patentable subject matter standard in Australia. This article, in conjunction with others written by the author, questions the Federal Court’s assertion in Grant that the physicality requirement it established is consistent with existing law.

Continuous and pedagogically sound assessment : A new economy of power relations in Australian Law schools

In recent decades, assessment practices within Australian law schools have moved from the overwhelming use of end-of-year closed-book examinations to an increase in the use of a wider range of techniques. This shift is often characterised as providing a ‘better’ learning environment for students, contributing more positively to their own ‘personal development’ within higher education, or, considered along the lines of critical legal thought, as ‘liberating’ them from the ‘conservatising’ and ‘indoctrinating’ effects of the power relations that operate in law schools. This paper seeks to render problematic such liberal-progressive narratives about these changes to law school assessment practices. It will do so by utilising the work of French historian and philosopher Michel Foucault on power, arguing that the current range of assessment techniques demonstrates a shift in the ‘economy’ of power relations within the law school. Rather than ‘liberating’ students from relations of power, these practices actually extend the power relations through which students are governed. This analysis is intended to inform legal education research and assessment practice by providing a far more nuanced conceptual framework than one that seeks to ‘free’ law students from these ‘repressive’ practices, or hopes to ‘objectively’ contribute to their ‘personal development’.

The rules of autogeddon : sex death and law in J G Ballard’s Crash

It was reported that the manuscript of Crash was returned to the publisher with a note reading ‘The author is beyond psychiatric help’. Ballard took the lay diagnosis as proof of complete artistic success. Crash conflates the Freudian tropes of libido and thanatos, overlaying these onto the twentieth century erotic icon, the car. Beyond mere incompetent adolescent copulatory fumblings in the back seat of the parental sedan or the clichéd phallic locomotor of the mid-life Ferrari, Ballard engages the full potentialities of the automobile as the locus and sine qua non of a perverse, though functional erotic. ‘Autoeroticism’ is transformed into automotive, traumatic or surgical paraphilia, driving Helmut Newton’s insipid photo-essays of BDSM and orthopædics into an entirely new dimension, dancing precisely where (but more crucially, because) the ‘body is bruised to pleasure soul’. The serendipity of quotidian accidental collisions is supplanted, in pursuit of the fetishised object, by contrived (though not simulated) recreations of iconographic celebrity deaths. Penetration remains as a guiding trope of sexuality, but it is confounded by a perversity of focus. Such an obsessive pursuit of this autoerotic-as-reality necessitates the rejection of the law of human sexual regulation, requiring the re-interpretation of what constitutes sex itself by looking beyond or through conventional sexuality into Ballard’s paraphiliac and nightmarish consensual Other. This Other allows for (if not demands) the tangled wreckage of a sportscar to function as a transformative sexual agent, creating, of woman, a being of ‘free and perverse sexuality, releasing within its dying chromium and leaking engine-parts, all the deviant possibilities of her sex’.

Obligatory dangerousness criteria in the involuntary commitment and treatment provisions of Australian mental health legislation

Abstract Objective Involuntary commitment and treatment (IC&T) of people affected by mental illness may have reference to considerations of dangerousness and/or need for care. While attempts have been made to classify mental health legislation according to whether IC&T has obligatory dangerousness criteria, there is no standardised procedure for making classification decisions. The aim of this study was to develop and trial a classification procedure and apply it to Australia's mental health legislation. Method We developed benchmarks for ‘need for care’ and ‘dangerousness’ and applied these benchmarks to classify the mental health legislation of Australia's 8 states and territories. Our focus was on civil commitment legislation rather than criminal commitment legislation. Results One state changed its legislation during the course of the study resulting in two classificatory exercises. In our initial classification, we were able to classify IC&T provisions in legislation from 6 of the 8 jurisdictions as being based on either ‘need for care’ or ‘dangerousness’. Two jurisdictions used a terminology that was outside the established benchmarks. In our second classification, we were also able to successfully classify IC&T provisions in 6 of the 8 jurisdictions. Of the 6 Acts that could be classified, all based IC&T on ‘need for care’ and none contained mandatory ‘dangerousness’ criteria. Conclusions The classification system developed for this study provided a transparent and probably reliable means of classifying 75% of Australia's mental health legislation. The inherent ambiguity of the terminology used in two jurisdictions means that further development of classification may not be possible until the meaning of the terms used has been addressed in case law. With respect to the 6 jurisdictions for which classification was possible, the findings suggest that Australia's mental health legislation relies on ‘need for care’ and not on ‘dangerousness’ as the guiding principle for IC&T. Keywords: Involuntary commitment; Mental health legislation; Dangerousness; Australia

International law and the regulation of violence : shifting perceptions of the legitimacy of the jus ad bellum?

International law’s capacity to influence state behaviour by regulating recourse to violence has been a longstanding source of debate among international lawyers and political scientists. On the one hand, sceptics assert that frequent violations of the prohibition on the use of force have rendered article 2(4) of the UN Charter redundant. They contend that national self-interest, rather than international law, is the key determinant of state behaviour regarding the use of force. On the other hand, defenders of article 2(4) argue first, that most states comply with the Charter framework, and second, that state rhetoric continues to acknowledge the existence of the jus ad bellum. In particular, the fact that violators go to considerable lengths to offer legal or factual justifications for their conduct – typically by relying on the right of self-defence – is advanced as evidence that the prohibition on the use of force retains legitimacy in the eyes of states. This paper identifies two potentially significant features of state practice since 2006 which may signal a shift in states’ perceptions of the normative authority of article 2(4). The first aspect is the recent failure by several states to offer explicit legal justifications for their use or force, or to report action taken in self-defence to the Security Council in accordance with Article 51. Four incidents linked to the global “war on terror” are examined here: Israeli airstrikes in Syria in 2007 and in Sudan in 2009, Turkey’s 2006-2008 incursions into northern Iraq, and Ethiopia’s 2006 intervention in Somalia. The second, more troubling feature is the international community’s apparent lack of concern over the legality of these incidents. Each use of force is difficult to reconcile with the strict requirements of the jus ad bellum; yet none attracted genuine legal scrutiny or debate among other states. While it is too early to conclude that these relatively minor incidents presage long term shifts in state practice, viewed together the two developments identified here suggest a possible downgrading of the role of international law in discussions over the use of force, at least in conflicts linked to the “war on terror”. This, in turn, may represent a declining perception of the normative authority of the jus ad bellum, and a concomitant admission of the limits of international law in regulating violence.

Defences in medical negligence : to what extent has tort law reform in Australia limited the liability of health professionals?

Tort law reform has resulted in legislation being passed by all Australian jurisdictions in the past decade implementing the recommendations contained in the Ipp Report. The report was in response to a perceived crisis in medical indemnity insurance. The objective was to restrict and limit liability in negligence actions. This paper will consider to what extent the reforms have impacted on the liability of health professionals in medical negligence actions. The reversal of the onus of proof through the obvious risk sections has attempted to extend the scope of the defence of voluntary assumption of risk. There is no liability for the materialisation of an inherent risk. Presumptions and mandatory reductions for contributory negligence have attempted to reduce the liability of defendants. It is now possible for reductions of 100% for contributory negligence. Apologies can be made with no admission of legal liability to encourage them being made and thereby reduce the number of actions being commenced. The peer acceptance defence has been introduced and enacted by legislation. There is protection for good samaritans even though the Ipp Report recommended against such protection. Limitation periods have been amended. Provisions relating to mental harm have been introduced re-instating the requirement of normal fortitude and direct perception. After an analysis of the legislation, it will be argued in this paper that while there has been some limitation and restriction, courts have generally interpreted the civil liability reforms in compliance with the common law. It has been the impact of statutory limits on the assessment of damages which has limited the liability of health professionals in medical negligence actions.

Expansion of support for first year law students : an overview from a first year coordinator

In the context of government funding and targets for increased participation in higher education and equity groups, as well as attrition rates, the literature on first year higher education highlights the importance of appropriate levels of support for students transitioning to higher education. In the law school context, support of first year students is also important in the response to the high levels of stress among law students. It is therefore necessary for universities to provide a variety of support to first year students from both a student perspective and a curriculum perspective. This paper explores the process of investigating the expansion of student support, including peer support programs, staff led programs, appointing a first year coordinator and developing a curriculum plan. These programs promote engagement and ensure a cohesive and integrated first year experience from both curriculum design and student experience perspectives. This paper will explain the process undertaken at QUT of expanding support for first year law students, overview the program details and will reflect on the feedback from students, peer facilitators and staff of expanding support for first year law students at QUT. The paper will conclude with recommendations for improvement to the program.