Judicial and legislative considerations in the taxation of compensation receipts : an international comparison

In 1995, the Federal Commissioner of Taxation released Taxation Ruling TR 95/35 in an attempt to comprehensively address the appropriate capital gains tax treatment of a receipt of compensation, awarded either by the courts or via a settlement. The ruling was in response to the numerous, somewhat contradictory, court decisions of the early 1990s. Despite the release of TR 95/35, there still appears to be a lack of consensus as to the appropriate treatment of such awards. It has been suggested that the only way a taxpayer can, with any certainty, determine their liability is to obtain a private binding ruling, a far from satisfactory situation. In an attempt to clarify what the capital gains tax consequences of a compensation receipt should be, this article examines the Australian position and explores the comparative jurisprudence of the United Kingdom and Canada to ascertain whether the Australian attitude is consistent with these international jurisdictions. This article concludes that while the jurisdictions, through differing approaches, achieve a similar result, there is still a need to address the uncertainties that remain.

Framing perspectives on design and ethics

This chapter discusses design thinking and design as a process which spans all spheres of everyday life.

Engaging Noemi Lakmeier's living installations : the ethics of embarrassment

In Exercise in Losing Control (2007) and We Are for You Because We are Against Them (2010), Austrian-born artist Noemi Lakmaier represents Otherness – and, in particular, the experience of Otherness as one of being vulnerable, dependent or visibly different from everyone else in a social situation – by placing first herself then a group of participants in big circular balls she calls ‘Weebles’. In doing so, Lakmaier depicts Otherness as an absurd, ambiguous or illegible element in otherwise everyday ‘living installations’ in which people meet, converse, dine and connect with spectators and passersby on the street. In this paper I analyse the way spectators and passersby respond to the weeble-wearers. Not surprisingly, responses vary – from people who hurry away, to people who try to talk to the weeble-wearer, to people who try to kick or tip the weeble to test its reality. The not-quite-normal situation, and the visibility of the spectators in the situation, asks spectators to rehearse their response to corporeal differences that might be encountered in day-to-day life. As the range of comments, confrontations and struggles show, the situation transfers the ill-at-ease, embarrassed and awkward aspects of dealing with corporeal difference from the disabled performer to the able spectator-become-performer. In this paper, I theorise some of the self-conscious spectatorial responses this sort of work can provoke in terms of an ethics of embarrassment. As the Latin roots of the word attest, embarrassment is born of a block, barrier or obstacle to move smoothly through a social or communicative encounter. In Lakmaier’s work, a range of potential blocks present themselves. The spectators’ responses – from ignoring the weeble, to querying the weeble, to asking visual, verbal or physical questions about how the weeble works, and so on – are ways of managing the interruption and moving forward. They are, I argue, strategies for moving from confusion to comprehension, or from what Emmanuel Levinas would call an encounter with the unknown to back into the horizon of the known, classified and classifiable. They flag the potential for what Levinas would call an ethical face-to-face encounter with the Other in which spectators and passersby may unexpectedly find themselves in a vulnerable position.

"Are there any right or wrong answers in teaching philosophy": ethics, epistemology, and philosophy in the classroom

This article assesses undergraduate teaching students’ assertion that there are no right and wrong answers in teaching philosophy. When asked questions about their experiences of philosophy in the classroom for primary children, their unanimous declaration that teaching philosophy has ‘no right and wrong answers’ is critically examined across the three sub-disciplinary areas to which they were generally referring, namely, pedagogy, ethics, and epistemology. From a pedagogical point of view, it is argued that some teaching approaches may indeed be more effective than others, and some pupils’ opinions less defensible, but pedagogically, in terms of managing the power relations in the classroom, it is counter-productive to continually insist on notions of truth and falsity at every point. From an ethical point of view, it is contended that anti-realist approaches to meta-ethics may represent a viable intellectual position, but from the point of view of normative ethics, notions of right and wrong still retain significant currency. From an epistemological point of view, it is argued using Karl Poppers’ work that while it may be difficult to determine what constitutes a right answer, determining a wrong one is far more straightforward. In conclusion, it is clear that prospective teachers engaging in philosophy in the classroom, and also future teachers in general, require a far more nuanced philosophical understanding of the notions of right and wrong and truth and falsity. In view of this situation, it we wish to promote the effective teaching of philosophical thinking to children, or produce educators who can understand the conceptual limits of the claims they make and their very real and often serious practical and social consequences, it is recommended that philosophy be reinstated to a fundamental, foundational place within the pre-service teaching curriculum.

Countering the ADHD epidemic : a question of ethics?

Recently in Australia, another media skirmish has erupted over the problem we currently call “Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder”. This particular event was precipitated by the comments of a respected District Court judge. His claim that doctors are creating a generation of violent juvenile offenders by prescribing Ritalin to young children created a great deal of excitement, attracting the attention of election-conscious politicians who appear blissfully unaware of the role played by educational policy in creating and maintaining the problem. Given the short (election-driven) attention span of government policymakers, I bypass government to question what those at the front line can do to circumvent the questionable practice of diagnosing and medicating young children for difficulties they experience in schools and with learning.

The Role of the Judiciary in Earth Jurisprudence : An Analysis of Judicial Approaches to Standing in Climate Change and Environmental Justice Litigation

The role of the judiciary in common law systems is to create law, interpret law and uphold the law. As such decisions by courts on matters related to ecologically sustainable development, natural resource use and management and climate change make an important contribution to earth jurisprudence. There are examples where judicial decisions further the goals of earth jurisprudence and examples where decisions go against the principles of earth jurisprudence. This presentation will explore judicial approaches to standing in Australia and America. The paper will explore two trends in each jurisdiction. Approaches by American courts to standing will be examined in reference to climate change and environmental justice litigation. While Australian approaches to standing will be examined in the context of public interest litigation and environmental criminal negligence cases. The presentation will draw some conclusions about the role of standing in each of these cases and implications of this for earth jurisprudence.

Education for social responsibility: Ethics and imagination for engaging students and teachers in educational reform

In this chapter we make assumptions about the primary role of education for the life of its beneficiaries and for society. Undoubtedly, formal education plays an important role in enhancing the likelihood for participation in future social life, including enjoyment and employment, by the student as well as the development of the well being of society in general. Similarly, education is often seen as a main means for intergenerational transmission of knowledge and culture. However, as Dewey (1916) argues, in liberal societies, education has the capacity of enhancing democratic participation in society that goes beyond passive participation by its members. One can argue that the achievement of the ideals of democracy demands a free and strong education system. In other words, while education can function as an instrument to integrate students into the present society, it also has the potential to become an instrument for its transformation by means of which citizens can develop an understanding of how their society functions and a sense of agency towards its transformation. Arguably, this is what Freire (1985) meant when he talked about the role of education to “read and write” the world. A stream of progressive educators (e.g., Apple (2004), Freire, (1985), Giroux (2001) and McLaren (2002)) taught us that the reading of the world that is capable of leading into writing the world is a critical reading; i.e., a reading that poses “Why” questions and imagines “What else can be” (Carr & Kemmis, 1987).

Design + ethics

The socio-cultural purpose of the university has been de-emphasised in recent decades, however, various community engagement projects that have been undertaken by design schools in higher education institutions are bringing this back into focus. Through the design skills of academic staff and students, a number of projects have been identified and undertaken in partnership with communities as well as the public and private sectors. The 2008 ‘Linking Karumba’ project, among others, shows that academy-based design and education professionals can contribute to social development through making good design accessible to disadvantaged communities.

Judicial intervention in the affairs of unincorporated religious associations in New South Wales

The leading Australian High Court case of Cameron v Hogan (1934) 51 CLR 358 confirmed that associations which are 'social, sporting, political, scientific, religious, artistic or humanitarian in character’, and not formed ‘for private gain or material advantage’, are usually formed on a basis of mutual consent. Unless there is some clear, positive indication that the members wish to relate to each other in a legal fashion, the rules of the association will not be treated as an enforceable contract in contrast to the rules of incorporated bodies. Australian unincorporated associations experiencing internal disputes, like those in most other common law jurisdictions, have found courts reluctant to provide a remedy unless there is a proprietary interest or trust to protect. This is further compounded by the judicial view that an unincorporated association has no legal recognition as a ‘juristic person’. The right to hold property and the ability to sue and be sued are incidences of this recognition. By contrast, the law recognises ‘artificial’ legal persons such as corporations, who are given rights to hold property and to sue and be sued. However, when a number of individuals associate together for a non-commercial, lawful purpose, but not by way of a corporate structure, legal recognition ‘as a group’ is denied. Since 1934, a significant number of cases have distinguished or otherwise declined to follow this precedent of the High Court. A trenchant criticism is found in McKinnon v Grogan [1974] 1 NSWLR 295, 298 where Wootten J said that ‘citizens are entitled to look to the courts for the same assistance in resolving disputes about the conduct of sporting, political and social organisations as they can expect in relation to commercial institutions’. According to Wootten J at 298, if disputes are not settled by the courts, this would create a ‘legal-no-man's land, in which disputes are settled not in accordance with justice and the fulfilment of deliberately undertaken obligations, but by deceit, craftiness, and an arrogant disregard of rights’. Cameron v Hogan was decided in 1934. There is an increasing volume of first instance cases which distinguish or, in the words of Palmer J, ‘just pay lip service’ to this High Court decision. (Coleman v Liberal Party of Australia (2007) 212 FLR 271, 278). The dissenting cases seem to call for a judicial policy initiative. This would require recognition by judges that voluntary associations play a significant role in society and that members have a legitimate, enforceable expectation that the rules of the association will be observed by members and in the last resort, enforced by the courts without the need to prove contractual intention, the existence of a trust or the existence of a right of a proprietary nature. This thesis asks: what legal, as distinct from political, redress does an ordinary member have, when a rule is made or a process followed which is contrary to the underlying doctrines and philosophies embodied in the constitutional documents of an unincorporated religious association? When, if at all, will a court intervene to ensure doctrinal purity or to supervise the daily life of a large unincorporated religious association? My research objective is to examine and analyse leading cases and relevant legislation on the enforceability of the constitutions of large, unincorporated, religious associations with particular reference to the Anglican Church in New South Wales. Given its numerical size, wide geographical spread and presence since the foundation of New South Wales, the Anglican Church in New South Wales, contains a sufficient variety of ‘real life’ situations to be representative of the legal issues posed by Cameron v Hogan which may be faced by other large, unincorporated, religious associations in New South Wales. In contemporary society, large, unincorporated, religious associations play an important community role. The resolution of internal disputes in such associations should not remain captive to legal doctrines of an earlier age.

Feminist ethics and menopause : autonomy and decision-making in primary medical care

The construction of menopause as a long-term risk to health and the adoption of discourses of prevention has made necessary a decision by women about medical treatment; specifically regarding the use of hormone replacement therapy. In a study of general practitioners’ accounts of menopause and treatment in Australia, women's ‘choice’, ‘informed decision-making’ and ‘empowerment’ were key themes through which primary medical care for women at menopause was presented. These accounts create a position for women defined by the concept of individual choice and an ethic of autonomy. These data are a basis for theorising more generally in this paper. We critically examine the construct of ‘informed decision-making’ in relation to several approaches to ethics including bioethics and a range of feminist ethics. We identify the intensification of power relations produced by an ethic of autonomy and discuss the ways these considerations inform a feminist ethics of decision-making by women. We argue that an ‘ethic of autonomy’ and an ‘offer of choice’ in relation to health care for women at menopause, far from being emancipatory, serves to intensify power relations. The dichotomy of choice, to take or not to take hormone replacement therapy, is required to be a choice and is embedded in relations of power and bioethical discourse that construct meanings about what constitutes decision-making at menopause. The deployment of the principle of autonomy in medical practice limits decision-making by women precisely because it is detached from the construction of meaning and the self and makes invisible the relations of power of which it is a part.