Access to protection for 'Offshore Entry Persons' aka asylum seekers

In 2001, amendments to the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) made possible the offshore processing of protection claims. The same amendments also foreshadowed the processing of claims by ‘offshore entry persons’ in Australia according to non-statutory procedures. After disbanding offshore processing the then Rudd Labor Government commenced processing of protection claims by ‘offshore entry persons’ in Australia under the Refugee Status Assessment process (RSA). The RSA process sought to substitute well established legislative criteria for the grant of a protection visa, as interpreted by the courts, with administrative guidelines and decision-making immune from judicial review. This approach was rejected by the High Court in the cases M61 and M69. This article analyses these developments in light of Australia’s international protection obligations, as well as considering the practical obstacles that continue to confront offshore entry persons as they pursue judicial review of adverse refugee status determinations after the High Court’s decision.

Points of convergence and divergence : normative, institutional and operational relationships between R2P and POC

As an international norm, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has gained substantial influence and institutional presence—and created no small controversy—in the ten years since its first conceptualisation. Conversely, the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (PoC) has a longer pedigree and enjoys a less contested reputation. Yet UN Security Council action in Libya in 2011 has thrown into sharp relief the relationship between the two. UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 follow exactly the process envisaged by R2P in response to imminent atrocity crimes, yet the operative paragraphs of the resolutions themselves invoke only PoC. This article argues that, while the agendas of PoC and R2P converge with respect to Security Council action in cases like Libya, outside this narrow context it is important to keep the two norms distinct. Peacekeepers, humanitarian actors, international lawyers, individual states and regional organisations are required to act differently with respect to the separate agendas and contexts covered by R2P and PoC. While overlap between the two does occur in highly visible cases like Libya, neither R2P nor PoC collapses normatively, institutionally or operationally into the other.

Capacity-building workshops on the responsibility to protect (R2P) and the protection of civilians (POC) in armed conflict - Summary Report

In June 2011, a research project team from the Institute for Ethics, Governance and Law (IEGL), Queensland University of Technology, the United Nations University, and the Australian Government’s Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence (APCMCOE) held three Capacity-Building Workshops (the Workshops) on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the Protection of Civilians (POC) in Armed Conflict in Manila, Kuala Lumpur, and Jakarta. The research project is funded by the Australian Responsibility to Protect Fund, with support from APCMCOE. Developments in Libya and Cote d’Ivoire and the actions of the United Nations Security Council have given new significance to the relationship between R2P and POC, providing impetus to the relevance and application of the POC principle recognised in numerous Security Council resolutions, and the R2P principle, which was recognised by the United Nations General Assembly in 2005 and, now, by the Security Council. The Workshops considered the relationship between R2P and POC. The project team presented the preliminary findings of their study and sought contributions and feedback from Workshop participants. Prior to the Workshops, members of the project team undertook interviews with UN offices and agencies, international organisations (IOs) and non-government organisations (NGOs) in Geneva and New York as part of the process of mapping the relationship between R2P and POC. Initial findings were considered at an Academic-Practitioner Workshop held at the University of Sydney in November 2010. In addition to an extensive literature review and a series of academic publications, the project team is preparing a practical guidance text (the Guide) on the relationship between R2P and POC to assist the United Nations, governments, regional bodies, IOs and NGOs in considering and applying appropriate protection strategies. It is intended that the Guide be presented to the United Nations Secretariat in New York in early 2012. The primary aim of the Workshops was to test the project’s initial findings among an audience of diplomats, military, police, civilian policy-makers, practitioners, researchers and experts from within the region. Through dialogue and discussion, the project team gathered feedback – comments, questions, critique and suggestions – to help shape the development of practical guidance about when, how and by whom R2P and POC might be implemented.

An attack on Iran: the legal basis, or lack thereof

Talk of a possible Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities has re-ignited debate over the right of self-defence under international law. Some academics, including Anthony D'Amato and Alan Dershowitz, have claimed that an attack on Iran would be a permissible act of self-defence. Others, such as Kevin Jon Heller, argue that such action would be a clear breach of international law. So, who is correct? Would military action against Iran be legal or illegal?

China and the "Responsibility to Protect" : the implications of the Libyan intervention

The emerging principle of a “responsibility to protect” (R2P) presents a direct challenge to China’s traditional emphasis on the twin principles of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states and non-use of military force. This paper considers the evolution of China’s relationship with R2P over the past ten years. In particular, it examines how China engaged with R2P during the recent Libyan crisis, and considers what impact this conflict may have first, on Chinese attitudes to R2P, and second, on the future development and implementation of the doctrine itself. This paper argues that China’s decision to allow the passage of Security Council resolution 1973, authorising force in Libya, was shaped by an unusual set of political and factual circumstances, and should not be viewed as evidence of a dramatic shift in Chinese attitudes towards R2P. More broadly, controversy over the scope of NATO’s military action in Libya has raised questions about R2P’s legitimacy, which have contributed to a lack of timely international action in Syria. In the short term at least, this post-Libya backlash against R2P is likely to constrain the Security Council’s ability to respond decisively to other civilian protection situations.

Cross-border insolvency

Panellist commentary on delivered conference papers on the topic of Cross-border Insolvency.

The emerging framework of cross-border insolvency in and around Australia : Saad Investments, Japan Airlines and Lehman Brothers – part one

Recent decades have witnessed a global acceleration of legislative and private sector initiatives to deal with Cross-Border insolvency. Legislative institutions include the various national implementations of the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (Model Law) published by the United Nations Commission on International Trade (UNCITRAL).3 Private mechanisms include Cross-Border protocols developed and utilised by insolvency professionals and their advisers (often with the imprimatur of the judiciary), on both general and ad hoc bases. The Asia Pacific region has not escaped the effect of those developments, and the economic turmoil of the past few years has provided an early test for some of the emerging initiatives in that region. This two-part article explores the operation of those institutions through the medium of three recent cases.

The emerging framework of cross-border insolvency in and around Australia : Saad Investments, Japan Airlines and Lehman Brothers – Part Two

Recent decades have witnessed a global acceleration of legislative and private sector initiatives to deal with Cross-Border insolvency. Legislative institutions include the various national implementations of the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (Model Law) published by the United Nations Commission on International Trade (UNCITRAL).3 Private mechanisms include Cross-Border protocols developed and utilised by insolvency professionals and their advisers (often with the imprimatur of the judiciary), on both general and ad hoc bases. The Asia Pacific region has not escaped the effect of those developments, and the economic turmoil of the past few years has provided an early test for some of the emerging initiatives in that region. This two-part article explores the operation of those institutions through the medium of three recent cases.

The legal nature of justice in REDD+

Formation of Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) policy within the international climate regime has raised a number of discussions about ‘justice’. REDD+ aims to provide an incentive for developing countries to preserve or increase the amount of carbon stored in their forested areas. Governance of REDD+ is multi-layered: at the international level, a guiding framework must be determined; at the national level, strong legal frameworks are a pre-requisite to ensure both public and private investor confidence and at the sub-national level, forest-dependent peoples need to agree to participate as stewards of forest carbon project areas. At the international level the overall objective of REDD+ is yet to be determined, with competing mitigation, biological and justice agendas. Existing international law pertaining to the environment (international environmental principles and law, IEL) and human rights (international human rights law, IHRL) should inform the development of international and national REDD+ policy especially in relation to ensuring the environmental integrity of projects and participation and benefit-sharing rights for forest dependent communities. National laws applicable to REDD+ must accommodate the needs of all stakeholders and articulate boundaries which define their interactions, paying particular attention to ensuring that vulnerable groups are protected. This paper i) examines justice theories and IEL and IHRL to inform our understanding of what ‘justice’ means in the context of REDD+, and ii) applies international law to create a reference tool for policy-makers dealing with the complex sub-debates within this emerging climate policy. We achieve this by: 1) Briefly outlining theories of justice (for example – perspectives offered by anthropogenic and ecocentric approaches, and views from ‘green economics’). 2) Commenting on what ‘climate justice’ means in the context of REDD+. 3) Outlining a selection of IEL and IHRL principles and laws to inform our understanding of ‘justice’ in this policy realm (for example – common but differentiated responsibilities, the precautionary principle, sovereignty and prevention drawn from the principles of IEL, the UNFCCC and CBD as relevant conventions of international environmental law; and UNDRIP and the Declaration on the Right to Development as applicable international human rights instruments) 4) Noting how this informs what ‘justice’ is for different REDD+ stakeholders 5) Considering how current law-making (at both the international and national levels) reflects these principles and rules drawn from international law 6) Presenting how international law can inform policy-making by providing a reference tool of applicable international law and how it could be applied to different issues linked to REDD+. As such, this paper will help scholars and policy-makers to understand how international law can assist us to both conceptualise and embody ‘justice’ within frameworks for REDD+ at both the international and national levels.