Effects of transit quality of service characteristics on daily bus ridership

A case study of Brisbane, the capital city of Queensland, Australia, explored how explicit measures of transit quality of service (e.g., service frequency, service span, and travel time ratio) and implicit environmental predictors (e.g., topographic grade factor) influenced bus ridership. The primary hypothesis tested was that bus ridership was higher in suburbs with high transit quality of service than in suburbs with limited service quality. Multiple linear regression, used to identify a strong positive relationship between route intensity (bus-km/h-km2) and bus ridership, indicated that both increased service frequency and spatial route density corresponded to higher bus ridership. Additionally, the travel time ratio (i.e., the ratio of in-vehicle transit travel time to in-vehicle automobile travel time) had a significant negative association with suburban ridership: transit use declined as travel time ratio increased. In contrast, topographic grade and service span did not significantly affect suburban bus ridership. The study findings enhance the fundamental understanding of traveler behavior, which is informative to urban transportation policy, planning, and provision.

Public good provision and the welfare effects of indirect tax harmonisation

The paper considers the welfare effect of the harmonisation of indirect taxes in two open economies. The revenue from taxation is used for the production of a non-tradeable public good. The welfare levels are affected via two channels: (i) changes in the levels of public good provision, and (ii) changes in deadweight loss associated with the taxes. We develop a number of rules of harmonisation and derive conditions under which they lead to potential Pareto improvement.

Welfare effects of aid under quantitative trade restrictions

The paper examines the effects of tied-aid on the welfare of both the donor and the recipient countries. We depart from the previous literature by assuming preexistence of quantitative trade distortions. To mitigate these distortions the donor country provides aid that is tied to the rationed good. Conditions for the presence of the transfer paradox and of the enrichment of both countries are derived and interpreted under the stability of the system. Furthermore, we show that whereas untied aid cannot increase global welfare, tied-aid unambiguously does so.