Multiple roles of transfer prices: One vs. two books

This paper investigates multiple roles of transfer prices for shipments of goods and services between entities of a multinational enterprise. At the center is the role of transfer pricing (TP) in tax manipulation, but other roles having to do with internal operations or strategic delegation, etc. are also considered. The interesting question is to what extent and how the different roles of TPs interfere with each other. The answer depends on whether companies use one or two books, i.e. whether they (can) apply different TPs for different purposes. We illustrate, in a stylized model, the competing aims of tax manipulation and strategic delegation. Finally, we briefly look at selected reform proposals, concluding that either TP problems are not addressed, or else new distortions will be introduced instead.

Non-preferential trading clubs

This paper examines the welfare implications of non-discriminatory tariff reforms by a subset of countries, which we term a non-preferential trading club. We show that there exist coordinated tariff reforms, accompanied by appropriate income transfers between the member countries, that unambiguously increase the welfare of these countries while leaving the welfare of non-members unaltered. In terms of economic policy implications, our results show that there exist regional, MFN-consistent arrangements that lead to Pareto improvements in world welfare.

On the Todaro paradox

This paper presents a version of the Harris-Todaro model in which the rural labour market is characterised by monopsonistic behaviour. It is shown that the ‘Todaro paradox’, i.e. that the creation of jobs in the urban sector actually increases urban unemployment, does not hold if the urban employed outnumber the urban unemployed. The latter is the rule in all LDCs.

On the tying of aid to tariff reform

This paper considers the welfare effects of foreign aid that is tied to changes in the recipient's tariff. By constructing a three-country model with tariffs, and by allowing for changes both in the amount of aid and in the tariff rates, we are able to consider the welfare implications of two different rules of aid conditionality: (i) a rule which leaves the donor's welfare unchanged, and (ii) a rule which leaves the recipient government's total revenue unchanged. It is shown that the tying of aid to a tariff reform can, inter alia, be used to ensure Pareto improvement.

Optimal foreign aid and tariffs

This paper investigates the optimal choice of foreign aid when trade policies are decided in a non-cooperative fashion. Three alternative scenarios, depending on the timing of the actions and on whether aid is tied, are analyzed. It is shown that, in the case where aid is decided before tariffs, untied aid can lead to the reduction of the recipient's optimal trade tax. When the donor can tie the aid to a reduction in the recipient's tariff, the optimal aid level is always positive and the world can always achieve a Pareto-efficient equilibrium.

The politics of foreign aid: A median voter perspective

The paper presents a model where the median voter in the donor country determines the support of foreign aid. It is first established that an individual in the donor country is affected by the direct benefits (due to altruism) and costs (due to taxes) of giving aid, and by the indirect benefits or costs of a change in the terms of trade. Then it is shown that the latter effect works through changing both the donor country's average income and its distribution of income. Given the stylized facts of a capital-abundant donor country and relatively capital-poor median voter, it is shown how redistribution-of-income effects soften the impact of terms-of-trade changes on the political support for foreign aid.

Public good provision and the welfare effects of indirect tax harmonisation

The paper considers the welfare effect of the harmonisation of indirect taxes in two open economies. The revenue from taxation is used for the production of a non-tradeable public good. The welfare levels are affected via two channels: (i) changes in the levels of public good provision, and (ii) changes in deadweight loss associated with the taxes. We develop a number of rules of harmonisation and derive conditions under which they lead to potential Pareto improvement.

Steepest ascent tariff reform

The policy reform literature is primarily concerned with the construction of reforms that yield welfare gains. By contrast, this paper’s contribution is to develop a theoretical concept for which the focus is upon the sizes of welfare gains accruing from policy reforms rather than upon their signs. In undertaking this task, and by focusing on tariff reforms, we introduce the concept of a steepest ascent policy reform, which is a locally optimal reform in the sense that it achieves the highest marginal gain in utility of any feasible local reform. We argue that this reform presents itself as a natural benchmark for the evaluation of the welfare effectiveness of other popular tariff reforms such as the proportional tariff reduction and the concertina rules, since it provides the maximal welfare gain of all possible local reforms. We derive properties of the steepest ascent tariff reform, construct an index to measure the relative welfare effectiveness of any given tariff reform, determine conditions under which proportional and concertina reforms are locally optimal and provide illustrative examples.

Transfer pricing rules and competing governments

The literature on the regulation of multinationals' transfer prices has not considered the possibility that governments may use transfer pricing rules strategically when they compete with other governments. The present paper analyses this case and shows that, even in the absence of agency considerations, a non‐cooperative equilibrium is characterised by above‐optimal levels of effective taxation. We then derive conditions under which harmonization of transfer pricing rules lead to a Pareto improvement, and show that harmonization according to the ‘arm's length’ principle—the form of harmonization advocated by the OECD—may not be Pareto improving.

The transfer problem and the intertemporal terms of trade

In this paper the effects of a transfer on the intertemporal terms of trade are examined in the context of a simple two-country, two-period model. When intertemporal trade occurs because the two economies have different rates of time preference, a transfer improves the terms of trade of the paying country. Alternatively, when trade occurs owing to international differences in the endowments of goods over the two periods, the effect of a transfer depends on (a) the relationship between the interest rate and the rates of time preference of the two countries and (b) the relationship between their elasticities of intertemporal consumption substitution.

Welfare effects of aid under quantitative trade restrictions

The paper examines the effects of tied-aid on the welfare of both the donor and the recipient countries. We depart from the previous literature by assuming preexistence of quantitative trade distortions. To mitigate these distortions the donor country provides aid that is tied to the rationed good. Conditions for the presence of the transfer paradox and of the enrichment of both countries are derived and interpreted under the stability of the system. Furthermore, we show that whereas untied aid cannot increase global welfare, tied-aid unambiguously does so.

Determinants of online sperm donor success: How women choose

Because the worldwide demand for sperm donors is much higher than the actual supply available through fertility clinics, an informal online market has emerged for sperm donation. Very little empirical evidence exists, however, on this newly formed market and even less on the characteristics that lead to donor success. This article therefore explores the determinants of online sperm donors’ selection success, which leads to the production of offspring via informal donation. We find that donor age and income play a significant role in donor success as measured by the number of times selected, even though there is no requirement for ongoing paternal investment. Donors with less extroverted and lively personality traits who are more intellectual, shy and systematic are more successful in realizing offspring via informal donation. These results contribute to both the economic literature on human behaviour and on large-scale decision-making.

Interdependence between Greece and other European stock markets: A comparison of wavelet and VMD copula, and the portfolio implications

The interdependence of Greece and other European stock markets and the subsequent portfolio implications are examined in wavelet and variational mode decomposition domain. In applying the decomposition techniques, we analyze the structural properties of data and distinguish between short and long term dynamics of stock market returns. First, the GARCH-type models are fitted to obtain the standardized residuals. Next, different copula functions are evaluated, and based on the conventional information criteria and time varying parameter, Joe-Clayton copula is chosen to model the tail dependence between the stock markets. The short-run lower tail dependence time paths show a sudden increase in comovement during the global financial crises. The results of the long-run dependence suggest that European stock markets have higher interdependence with Greece stock market. Individual country’s Value at Risk (VaR) separates the countries into two distinct groups. Finally, the two-asset portfolio VaR measures provide potential markets for Greece stock market investment diversification.