Strategically Pleading Intentional Torts in medical cases

The opportunities and challenges faced by litigants who strategically plead intentional torts are borne out by two recent medical cases. Both arose out of dental treatment. Dean v Phung established some key principles which were clarified in White v Johnston. Before considering those two cases it is worth examining the environment in which such intentional torts claims now exist. Following the Ipp Review of the Law of Negligence, non-uniform legislative changes to the law of negligence were introduced across Australia which have imposed limitations on liability and quantum of damages in cases where a person has been injured through the fault of another. While it seems that, given the limitation of the scope of the review and recommendations to negligently caused damage, the Ipp Review reforms were meant to be limited to injury resulting from negligent acts rather than intentional torts, the extent to which the civil liability legislation applies to intentional torts differs across Australia.

Copyright, fair use and the Australian Constitution

There has been much debate over recent years about whether Australian copyright law should adopt a fair use doctrine. In this chapter we argue by pointing to the historical record that the incorporation of the term 'copyrights' in the Australian Constitution embeds a notion of balance and fair use in Australian law and that this should be taken into account when interpreting the Australian Copyright Act 1968. English case law in the 18th and 19th centuries developed a principle that copyright infringement did not occur where a person had made a fair use of a work. Fair use was generally established where the defendant had made a productive use that did more than alter the original work for the purpose of evading liability, and where the defendant had made an original contribution to the resulting work. Additionally, fairness was shown by a use that did not supersede or prejudice the market for the original work. At the time of including the copyright power in the Constitution, the UK Parliament’s understanding of “copyrights” included the notion of fair use as it had been developed in U.K. precedent. In this chapter we argue that the work “copyrights” in the Australia Constitution takes its definition from copyright in 1900 and as it has evolved since. Importantly, the word “copyrights” is infused with a particular meaning that incorporates the principle of copyright balance. The constitutional notion of copyright, therefore, is not that of an unlimited power to prevent all copying. Rather, copyright distinguishes between infringing copying and non-infringing copying and grants to the copyright owner only the power to control the former. Non-infringing copying includes well-accepted limitations on the copyright owner’s rights, including the copying of ideas, the copying of public domain works and the copying of insubstantial parts of copyrighted works. In this chapter we argue that non-infringing copying also includes copying to make a fair use of a work. The sections that distinguish infringing copying from non-infringing copying in the Copyright Act 1968 are sections 36(1) and 101(1), which define infringement as the doing, without licence, of an “act comprised in the copyright”. An infringing copy is an act comprised the copyright, whereas a non-infringing copy is not. We argue that space for fair uses of copyrighted works is built into the Copyright Act 1968 through these sections, because a fair use will not produce an infringing copy and so is not an act comprised in the copyright.

Recent developments in DNA evidence

DNA evidence has made a significant contribution to criminal investigations in Australia and around the world since it was widely adopted in the 1990s (Gans & Urbas 2002). The direct matching of DNA profiles, such as comparing one obtained from a crime scene with one obtained from a suspect or database, remains a widely used technique in criminal investigations. A range of new DNA profiling techniques continues to be developed and applied in criminal investigations around the world (Smith & Urbas 2012). This paper is the third in a series by the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) on DNA evidence. The first, published in 1990 when the technology was in its relative infancy, outlined the scientific background for DNA evidence, considered early issues such as scientific reliability and privacy and described its application in early criminal cases (Easteal & Easteal 1990). The second, published in 2002, expanded on the scientific background and discussed a significant number of Australian cases in a 12-year period, illustrating issues that had arisen in investigations, at trial and in the use of DNA in the review of convictions and acquittals (Gans & Urbas 2002). There have been some significant developments in the science and technology behind DNA evidence in the 13 years since 2002 that have important implications for law enforcement and the legal system. These are discussed through a review of relevant legal cases and the latest empirical evidence. This paper is structured in three sections. The first examines the scientific techniques and how they have been applied in police investigations, drawing on a number of recent cases to illustrate them. The second considers empirical research evaluating DNA evidence and databases and the impact DNA has on investigative and court outcomes. The final section discusses significant cases that establish legal precedent relating to DNA evidence in criminal trials where significant issues have arisen or new techniques have been applied that have not yet been widely discussed in the literature. The paper concludes by reflecting on implications for policy and practice.

Res Communis? A critical legal geography of outer space, Antarctica, and the deep seabed

This chapter provides a critical legal geography of outer Space, charting the topography of the debates and struggles around its definition, management, and possession. As the emerging field of critical legal geography demonstrates, law is not a neutral organiser of space, but is instead a powerful cultural technology of spatial production. Drawing on legal documents such as the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty, as well as on the analogous and precedent-setting legal geographies of Antarctica and the deep seabed, the chapter addresses key questions about the legal geography of outer Space, questions which are of growing importance as Space’s available satellite spaces in the geostationary orbit diminish, Space weapons and mining become increasingly viable, Space colonisation and tourism emerge, and questions about Space’s legal status grow in intensity. Who owns outer Space? Who, and whose rules, govern what may or may not (literally) take place there? Is the geostationary orbit the sovereign property of the equatorial states it supertends, as these states argued in the 1970s? Or is it a part of the res communis, or common property of humanity, which currently legally characterises outer Space? Does Space belong to no one, or to everyone? As challenges to the existing legal spatiality of outer Space emerge from spacefaring states, companies, and non-spacefaring states, it is particularly critical that the current spatiality of Space is understood and considered.

Spotless decided per incuriam? - A contrary view

The article considers the implications of the decision of the High Court in Spotless Services Pty Ltd (1996) 141 ALR 92; 34 ATR 183. It argues in particular that the decision was made per incuriam.