Statutory right of user imposed for landlocked land

The decision of McMurdo J in Pacific Coast Investments Pty Ltd v Cowlishaw [2005] QSC 259 concerned an application under s 180 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) for a statutory right of user.

The impact of location on contribution schedule lot entitlements

Should the owner of a penthouse unit pay more in body corporate levies than the ground floor unit owner? A decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal (McPherson JA, Chesterman and Atkinson JJ) will be of great interest to those seeking to challenge contribution schedule lot entitlements imposed under the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) (‘the Act’). The decision is Fischer v Body Corporate for Centrepoint Community Title Scheme 7779 [2004] QCA 214.

Attach the correct warning statement

Practitioners will be aware that s 366 (1) of the Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 provides that a relevant contract must have attached, as its first or top sheet, a warning statement in the approved form. A failure to attach a warning statement in the prescribed manner triggers a right of termination in the buyer. The factual circumstances in Devine Ltd v Timbs [2004] QSC 24 are indicative of the problems that may arise in the construction of this statutory provision. The application concerned put and call option agreements entered into concerning 4 lots. The agreements, in identical terms, were signed before the applicant seller had completed a proposed residential apartment building. In each case the option agreement provided that the agreement was not binding on the seller until and unless the purchaser returned to the seller, amongst other things, two copies of the warning statement under the Property Agents and Motor Dealers Ac 2000 signed by the purchaser and two copies of the contract document signed by the purchaser. The seller was required to hold the contract documentation in escrow and was forbidden to sign it until and unless either option was exercised.

The requirement to 'Start a Proceeding' to prevent the lapse of a caveat

Section 126 of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) regulates whether, and if so, when a caveat will lapse. While certain caveats will not lapse due to the operation of s 126(1), if a caveator does not wish a caveat to which the section applies to lapse, the caveator must start a proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction to establish the interest claimed under the caveat within the time limits specified in, and otherwise comply with the obligations imposed by, s 126(4). The requirement, in s 126(4), to “start a proceeding” was the subject of judicial examination by the Court of Appeal (McMurdo P, Holmes JA and MacKenzie J) in Cousins Securities Pty Ltd v CEC Group Ltd [2007] QCA 192.

Statutory fraud or not?

The possibility of fraud lurks easily in the context of a mortgage transaction (as recently exemplified by the decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal in Young v Hoger [2001] QCA 461). A relatively novel issue, involving an allegation of fraudulent behaviour, arose for consideration by Justice Wilson in Unic v Quartermain Holdings Pty Ltd [2001] QSC 403

Waiver in the Court of Appeal

The vagaries inherent in the operation of special conditions in land sale contracts have commonly required judicial interpretation. A further illustration is provided by the recent decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal (Jerrard, Keane JJA and Philip McMurdo J) in Donaldson and Donaldson v Bexton and Bexton [2006] QCA 559.

Encroachment: what cost a pool with ocean views?

In Shadbolt v Wise [2002] QSC 348 the applicants were seeking relief under s184 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) in respect of an encroachment that they constructed on land belonging to the adjacent owner. The encroachment in question consisted of slightly less than one half of an elaborate pool and pool enclosure (the area of the encroachment being approximately 108 square metres). The land upon which the encroachment was situated was elevated with distant ocean views.

Land Sales Act 1984: The time limit for an application for exemption

The decision of Wilson J in Wan and Ors v NPD Property Development Pty Ltd [2004] QSC 232 also concerned the operation of the Land Sales Act 1984 (Qld) (‘the Act’). As previously noted, s 8(1) of the Act provides that a proposed allotment of freehold land might be sold only in certain circumstances. An agreement made in contravention of s 8(1) is void. Section 19 allows a purchaser (and others) to apply for an exemption from any of the provisions of Pt 2. By s 19(6), notwithstanding s 8, a person may agree to sell a proposed allotment if the instrument that binds a person to purchase the proposed allotment is conditional upon the grant of an exemption. By s 19(7) an application for exemption must be made ‘within 30 days after the event that marks the entry of a purchaser upon the purchase of the proposed allotment.’

Unreasonable withholding of consent?

In Cathmark Pty Ltd v NetherCott Constructions Pty Ltd [2011] QSC 86, Cullinane J was asked to consider whether a landlord had unreasonably withheld consent to a tenant’s proposed assignment of lease. In reaching a conclusion that the landlord had acted unreasonably, the decision provides useful guidance on an issue that is common in a proposed sale of business context.

Beware the second offer!

In conveyancing of all types, it is very common that a contract will only be formed after often lengthy negotiations which may involve a counter-offer or multiple counter-offers. At common law, the laws of contract that govern these arrangements are well known and well understood. However, the legislative overlay imposed by the requirements of the Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 (Qld) (‘PAMDA’) can create difficulties as illustrated by the result in Rice v Ray [2009] QDC 275.

Ready willing and able or not?

A recent decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal (Keane JA, Fryberg and Applegarth JJ) will be of considerable interest to conveyancers. The decision is Davidson v Bucknell [2009] QCA 383.

Can compensation be claimed under the standard commercial land and building contract where the property sold has no legally enforceable vehicular access?

This was the question that confronted Wilson J in Jarema Pty Ltd v Michihiko Kato [2004] QSC 451. Facts The plaintiff was the buyer of a commercial property at Bundall. The property comprised a 6 storey office building with a basement car park with 54 car parking spaces. The property was sold for $5 million with the contract being the standard REIQ/QLS form for Commercial Land and Buildings (2nd ed GST reprint). The contract provided for a “due diligence” period. During this period, the buyer’s solicitors discovered that there was no direct access from a public road to the car park entrance. Access to the car park was over a lot of which the Gold Coast City Council was the registered owner under a nomination of trustees, the Council holding the property on trust for car parking and town planning purposes. Due to the absence of a registered easement over the Council’s land, the buyer’s solicitors sought a reduction in the purchase price. The seller would not agree to this. Finally the sale was completed with the buyer reserving its rights to seek compensation.

A superannuation fund as a buyer?

In Bennett v Stewart McMurdo J considered the operation of a contract where the buyer was described as a superannuation fund. The Bennetts signed a standard REIQ contract as buyers of the Stewarts’ house and land. However, the reference schedule to the contract document contained these words next to the word ‘buyer’: ‘Bennett Superannuation Fund’ The Bennetts wished to enforce the contract. In response, the Stewarts (the sellers) raised two issues: • As the ‘Bennett Superannuation Fund’ was a trust and not a distinct legal entity capable of making a contract, the contract did not specify who was the buyer, so that the contract was void for uncertainty; and • The contract was unenforceable as there was no sufficient note or memorandum for the purposes of s 59 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) as s 59 requires, amongst other things, an identification of the parties. McMurdo J did not accept either of these arguments and made an order for specific performance in favour of the Bennetts. Looking at each issue separately: