Law as lore

Law is saturated with stories. People tell their stories to lawyers; lawyers tell their clients’ stories to courts; legislators develop regulation to respond to their constituents’ stories of injustice or inequality. In legal education, professors devise hypothetical scenarios to test student understanding of legal doctrine; in law examinations and assignments, students construct advice to fictional clients. The common law legal system derives many of its foundational principles from case law — in effect, stories with legal solutions — that have accumulated over time. The civil law system, despite a different design centred on legal codes, also relies on judicial story-telling to interpret the code provisions and flesh out the gaps.

Copyright, fair use and the Australian Constitution

There has been much debate over recent years about whether Australian copyright law should adopt a fair use doctrine. In this chapter we argue by pointing to the historical record that the incorporation of the term 'copyrights' in the Australian Constitution embeds a notion of balance and fair use in Australian law and that this should be taken into account when interpreting the Australian Copyright Act 1968. English case law in the 18th and 19th centuries developed a principle that copyright infringement did not occur where a person had made a fair use of a work. Fair use was generally established where the defendant had made a productive use that did more than alter the original work for the purpose of evading liability, and where the defendant had made an original contribution to the resulting work. Additionally, fairness was shown by a use that did not supersede or prejudice the market for the original work. At the time of including the copyright power in the Constitution, the UK Parliament’s understanding of “copyrights” included the notion of fair use as it had been developed in U.K. precedent. In this chapter we argue that the work “copyrights” in the Australia Constitution takes its definition from copyright in 1900 and as it has evolved since. Importantly, the word “copyrights” is infused with a particular meaning that incorporates the principle of copyright balance. The constitutional notion of copyright, therefore, is not that of an unlimited power to prevent all copying. Rather, copyright distinguishes between infringing copying and non-infringing copying and grants to the copyright owner only the power to control the former. Non-infringing copying includes well-accepted limitations on the copyright owner’s rights, including the copying of ideas, the copying of public domain works and the copying of insubstantial parts of copyrighted works. In this chapter we argue that non-infringing copying also includes copying to make a fair use of a work. The sections that distinguish infringing copying from non-infringing copying in the Copyright Act 1968 are sections 36(1) and 101(1), which define infringement as the doing, without licence, of an “act comprised in the copyright”. An infringing copy is an act comprised the copyright, whereas a non-infringing copy is not. We argue that space for fair uses of copyrighted works is built into the Copyright Act 1968 through these sections, because a fair use will not produce an infringing copy and so is not an act comprised in the copyright.

Neighbourliness and Australia’s contribution to regional migration strategies for climate displacement in the Pacific

The prospect of widespread displacement in the Pacific as a result of climate change is becoming increasingly likely and it is possible that many will eventually need to relocate to other countries. Regional migration strategies not only offer the potential to minimise the harms of relocation, while acknowledging existing relationships of friendship and regional cooperation. This article examines the use of the language of ‘neighbourliness’ in Australia’s regional climate change strategies and argues that, while it expresses friendship, such language can also be employed to avoid the creation of stronger obligations. The article considers the international doctrine of good neighbourliness and concludes that, while international legal obligations may not yet exist, Australia should nonetheless begin planning for regional migration within the Pacific to allow people to migrate with dignity.

Duty and Control in Intermediary Copyright Liability: An Australian Perspective

In the internet age, copyright owners are increasingly looking to online intermediaries to take steps to prevent copyright infringement. Sometimes these intermediaries are closely tied to the acts of infringement; sometimes – as in the case of ISPs – they are not. In 2012, the Australian High Court decided the Roadshow Films v iiNet case, in which it held that an Australian ISP was not liable under copyright’s authorization doctrine, which asks whether the intermediary has sanctioned, approved or countenanced the infringement. The Australian Copyright Act 1968 directs a court to consider, in these situations, whether the intermediary had the power to prevent the infringement and whether it took any reasonable steps to prevent or avoid the infringement. It is generally not difficult for a court to find the power to prevent infringement – power to prevent can include an unrefined technical ability to disconnect users from the copyright source, such as an ISP terminating users’ internet accounts. In the iiNet case, the High Court eschewed this broad approach in favor of focusing on a notion of control that was influenced by principles of tort law. In tort, when a plaintiff asserts that a defendant should be liable for failing to act to prevent harm caused to the plaintiff by a third party, there is a heavy burden on the plaintiff to show that the defendant had a duty to act. The duty must be clear and specific, and will often hinge on the degree of control that the defendant was able to exercise over the third party. Control in these circumstances relates directly to control over the third party’s actions in inflicting the harm. Thus, in iiNet’s case, the control would need to be directed to the third party’s infringing use of BitTorrent; control over a person’s ability to access the internet is too imprecise. Further, when considering omissions to act, tort law differentiates between the ability to control and the ability to hinder. The ability to control may establish a duty to act, and the court will then look to small measures taken to prevent the harm to determine whether these satisfy the duty. But the ability to hinder will not suffice to establish liability in the absence of control. This chapter argues that an inquiry grounded in control as defined in tort law would provide a more principled framework for assessing the liability of passive intermediaries in copyright. In particular, it would set a higher, more stable benchmark for determining the copyright liability of passive intermediaries, based on the degree of actual, direct control that the intermediary can exercise over the infringing actions of its users. This approach would provide greater clarity and consistency than has existed to date in this area of copyright law in Australia.