Examining corporate governance disclosures of listed companies in Fiji

In 2009, the Capital Markets Development Authority (CMDA) - Fiji’s capital market regulator - introduced the Code of Corporate Governance (the Code). The Code is ‘principle-based’ and requires companies listed on the South Pacific Stock Exchange (SPSE) and the financial intermediaries to disclose their compliance with the Code’s principles. While compliance with the Code is mandatory, the nature and extent of disclosure is at the discretion of the complying entities. Agency theory and signalling theory suggest that firms with higher expected levels of agency costs will provide greater levels of voluntary disclosures as signals of strong corporate governance. Thus, the study seeks to test these theories by examining the heterogeneity of corporate governance disclosures by firms listed on SPSE, and determining the characteristics of firms that provide similar levels of disclosures. We conducted a content analysis of corporate governance disclosures on the annual reports of firms from 2008-2012. The study finds that large, non-family owned firms with high levels of shareholder dispersion provide greater quantity and higher quality corporate governance disclosures. For firms that are relatively smaller, family owned and have low levels of shareholder dispersion, the quantity and quality of corporate governance disclosures are much lower. Some of these firms provide boilerplate disclosures with minimal changes in the following years. These findings support the propositions of agency and signalling theory, which suggest that firms with higher separation between agents and principals will provide more voluntary disclosures to reduce expected agency costs transfers. Semi-structured interviews conducted with key stakeholders further reinforce the findings. The interviews also reveal that complying entities positively perceive the introduction of the Code. Furthermore, while compliance with Code brought about additional costs, they believed that most of these costs were minimal and one-off, and the benefits of greater corporate disclosure to improve user decision making outweighed the costs. The study contributes to the literature as it provides insight into the experience of a small capital market with introducing a ‘principle-based’ Code that attempts to encourage corporate governance practices through enhanced disclosure. The study also assists policy makers better understand complying entities’ motivations for compliance and the extent of compliance.

Invisible ties : implicit contracting and its implications for the agency relationship in corporate governance research

Research that applies agency theory to boards of directors suffers from being quite narrow as it does not recognize the true legal relationships between directors, managers and shareholders. Instead, the board of directors is best conceptualized as the principal, management as agents and stockholders’ relationships as a mix of legal and implicit contracts. We propose a recast agency relationship and develop a contingency approach that proposes (1) how a corporation’s goals vary with a board’s implicit contracting and (2) a reconceptualization of the agency problem facing boards.

Turnbull : generating undue expectations of the corporate governance role of audit committees

Following an initial consultation draft (Turnbull 1999a), the Internal control Working Party of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, chaired by Nigel Turnbull, executive director of Rank Group plc. has published Internal Control: Guidance for Directors of Listed companies Incorporated in the UK (Turnbull, 1999b). The guidance is commonly referred to as the Turnbull Report. This paper outlines the key recommendations of the report and discusses some of its implications, particularly in the context of the increasing emphasis on a broader corporate governance role for audit committees. The paper suggests that the increasing role envisaged of audit committees for example lately in the UK by Turnbull, may generate undue expectations are premised on an unsubstantiated notion of the contribution of audit committees.

The corporate governance effects of audit committees

Arguments associated with the promotion of audit committees in many countries are premised on their potential for alleviating weaknesses in corporate governance. This paper provides a synthesis and evaluation of empirical research on the governance effects associated with audit committees. Given recent policy recommendations in several countries aimed at strengthening these committees, it is important to establish what research evidence demonstrates about their existing governance contribution. A framework for analyzing the impact of audit committees is described, identifying potential perceived effects which may have led to their adoption and documented effects on aspects of the audit function, on financial reporting quality and on corporate performance. It is argued that there is only limited and mixed evidence of effects to support claims and perceptions about the value of audit committees for these elements of governance. It is also shown that most of the existing research has focused on factors associated with audit committee existence, characteristics and measures of activity and there is very little evidence on the processes associated with the operation of audit committees and the manner in which they influence organizational behaviour. It is clear that there is no automatic relationship between the adoption of audit committee structures or characteristics and the achievement of particular governance effects, and caution may be needed over expectations that greater codification around factors such as audit committee members’ independence and expertise as the means of ‘‘correcting’’ past weaknesses in the arrangements for audit committees. The most fundamental question concerning what difference audit committees make in practice continues to be an important area for research development. For future research we suggest: (i) greater consideration of the organizational and institutional contexts in which audit committees operate; (ii) explicit theorization of the processes associated with audit committee operation; (iii) complementing extant research methods with field studie, and; (iv) investigation of unintended (behavioural) as well as expected consequences of audit committees.

On the efficacy of key corporate governance recommendations in mid-tier companies : window-dressing or value-adding?

This paper examins the relationship between firm performance and key board and audit committee variables in a sample of mid-tier listed Australian firms. Unlike the UK where the corporate governance Code specifically outlines special arrangements for companies outside the FTSE 350 index, the ASX Corporate Governance recommendations make no special provisions for mid-tier companies. Consequently, mid-tier Australian companies may be expending scarce resources in conforming with recommendations that are not value-creating.

Institutional investors, risk/return and corporate governance : practical lessons from the Global Financial Crisis

The global grown in institutional investors means that firms can no longer ignore their influence in capital markets. However, not all institutional investors have the same motives to influence the firms they invest in. Institution investors' ability to influence management depends on the size of their investment and whether they have any business relations with the firm. Using a sample of Australian firms from 2006 to 2008, our empirical results show that the proportion of a company's shares held by institutional investors is positively associated with firm governance ratings, risk and profitability. This study shows that a positive association between risk and return is associated with large active institutional ownership, which we interpret as shareholders with sufficient power to pressure management to increase short-term profits.

Convergence in European corporate governance : the audit committee concept

This paper analyses recent corporate governance codes issued by 20 countries for evidence of convergence in corporate governance systems in Europe. The analysis shows that there has been a degree of convergence towards an Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance as the audit committee concept is widely accepted in countries with both unitary and two-tier governance systems. Further, the latest audit committee recommendations in countries that have issued several governance codes show a strengthening of the recommendations for an audit committee over time in line with the Anglo-Saxon audit committee concept and convergence with the debate in the US and UK on issues such as the independence and financial expertise of members. However, consistent with the literature on the convergence of European corporate governance systems, at an operational level there is limited consistency in the recommended structure and role of audit committees.

Corporate governance and bankruptcy risk

We examine how firm characteristics, particularly the degree of firm complexity and the firm’s need for specialty knowledge, affect the relationship between corporate governance and the risk of bankruptcy. We find that having larger boards reduces the risk of bankruptcy only for complex firms. Our results also suggest that the proportion of inside directors on the board is inversely associated with the risk of bankruptcy in firms that require more specialist knowledge, and that the reverse is true in technically unsophisticated firms. The results further reveal that the additional explanatory power from corporate governance variables becomes stronger as the time to bankruptcy is increased, implying that although corporate governance variables are important predictors, governance changes are likely to be too late to save a firm on the verge of bankruptcy.

Corporate governance quality, audit fees and non-audit services fees

This paper extends prior research on the relationship between governance quality and auditor remuneration.We examine the influence of audit committee effectiveness (ACE), a proxy for governance quality, on audit fees (AF) and non-audit services fees (NASF) using a new composite measure comprising audit committee independence, expertise, diligence and size. We find that after controlling for board of director characteristics, there is a significant positive association between ACE and AF only for larger clients. Our results indicate that effective audit committees undertake more monitoring which results in wider audit scope and higher audit fees. Contrary to our expectations, we find the association between ACE and NASF to be positive and significant, especially for larger clients. This suggests that larger clients are more likely to purchase non-audit services (NAS) even in the presence of effective audit committees probably due to the complexity of their activities. Overall, our findings support regulatory initiatives aimed at improving corporate governance quality.

The Corporate Governance Effects of Audit Committee

This chapter provides a synthesis and evaluation of empirical research on the governance effects associated with audit committees. Given recent policy recommendations in several countries aimed at strengthening these committees, it is important to establish what research evidence demonstrates about their existing governance contribution. A framework for analyzing the impact of audit committees is described, identifying potential perceived effects which may have led to their adoption and documented effects on aspects of the audit function, on financial reporting quality and on corporate performance. It is also shown that most of the existing research has focused on factors associated with audit committee existence, characteristics, and measures of activity and there is very little evidence on the processes associated with the operation of audit committees and the manner in which they influence organizational behavior. It is clear that there is no automatic relationship between the adoption of audit committee structures or characteristics and the achievement of particular governance effects, and caution may be needed over expectations that greater codification around factors such as audit committee members’ independence and expertise as the means of ‘‘correcting’’ past weaknesses in the arrangements for audit committees. The most fundamental question concerning what difference audit committees make in practice continues to be an important area for research development. For future research we suggest: (1) greater consideration of the organizational and institutional contexts in which audit committees operate; (2) explicit theorization of the processes associated with audit committee operation; (3) complementing extant research methods with field studies; and (4) investigation of unintended as well as expected consequences of audit committees.

Corporate governance in 2010 : what will change?

2010 is expected to see the publication of a new UK Code on Corporate Governance, replacing the Combined Code. Why is a new code being issued? What significant changes are proposed? WIll it change the corporate governance world?

Institutional investors, risk/performance and corporate governance

Modern portfolio theory suggests that investors minimize risk for a given level of expected return by carefully choosing the proportions of various assets. This study sets out to determine the role of the institutional investor in monitoring risk and firm performance. Using a sample of Australian firms from 2006 to 2008, our empirical study shows a positive association between firm-specific risk, risk-management policy, and performance for firms with increasing institutional shareholdings. The study also finds that the significance of this association depends on the institutional investor's ability to influence management, which in turn depends on the size of ownership and whether the investee firm does not have potential business dealings with the investor. We also find that when firms are financially distressed, institutional investors engage in promoting short-term performance or exit rather than support long-term value creation. The results are robust while controlling the potential for endogeneity and using sensitivity tests to control for variants of performance and risk. These findings add to the growing body of literature examining institutional ownership and the importance of understanding the role of risk-management in the risk and return relation.

Corporate Governance in the 21st Century: Japan's Gradual Transformation

The 'lost' decade of economic stagnation in Japan during the 1990s has become a 'found decade' for regulatory and institutional reform. With nearly all areas of the 'law in the books' reviewed, revised and rewritten, the Japanese legal system is no longer the system that foreign commentators felt they were finally starting to understand by the 1980s. Nowhere is this more evident than in corporate governance. Corporate and securities legislation has been comprehensively revamped over 1993-2007, creating a more flexible and transparent regime for shareholders and managers. Financial markets law and regulatory institutions have changed, too, creating a new context for Japan's 'main banks' as alternative or additional outside monitors of managerial performance in borrowing firms. Even the legislation surrounding labour regulations has been amended, reinforcing the lifelong security privileges for elite employee-stakeholders, yet also hastening the growth of other atypical employment relationships. But how do such legislative reforms affecting key players in Japanese firms, covering areas central to the design of Japanese capitlaism, play out in the 'law in action'? Overall, this book argues that a significant gradual transformation has occurred. Although this is evident also in other advanced industrialised democracies, such as Germany, Japan reveals especially complex interactions in the various fields that sometimes emphasise different ways of achieving such transformation.

Introduction: Japan’s gradual transformation in corporate governance

Japan has recovered from a ‘lost decade’ of economic stagnation over the 1990s. Anyway, it has been a ‘found decade’ for civil and criminal justice law reform, especially in corporate and securities law. Yet, have liberalisation and globalisation in those fields led to major changes in the ‘law in action’? Does this represent ‘Americanisation’ of Japan’s corporate governance system, focusing on shareholders rather than other key stakeholders such as ‘main banks’, core employees, and partners within diffuse corporate groups (keiretsu)? This version of our introductory chapter explains how our forthcoming book argues for a more complex ‘gradual transformation’. Such shifts are also found in many other post-industrial economies, but Japan appears to give greater emphasis given to certain modes of achieving change. The book brings together contributions from academics and practitioners from Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States. An early chapter introduces methodology for effective cross-country comparisons and for evaluating the burgeoning but divergent literature on Japanese corporate governance. The concluding chapter compares continuities and changes in Japan’s largest companies now and two decades ago. Other chapters cover ‘lifelong employment’, main banks, the untold story of closely-held companies, the limited uptake of the Committee-based governance form, and the procedural, substantive and FDI policy dimensions of takeovers law and practice.