Electronic workplace surveillance and employee privacy : a comparative analysis of privacy protection in Australia and the United States

More than a century ago in their definitive work “The Right to Privacy” Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis highlighted the challenges posed to individual privacy by advancing technology. Today’s workplace is characterised by its reliance on computer technology, particularly the use of email and the Internet to perform critical business functions. Increasingly these and other workplace activities are the focus of monitoring by employers. There is little formal regulation of electronic monitoring in Australian or United States workplaces. Without reasonable limits or controls, this has the potential to adversely affect employees’ privacy rights. Australia has a history of legislating to protect privacy rights, whereas the United States has relied on a combination of constitutional guarantees, federal and state statutes, and the common law. This thesis examines a number of existing and proposed statutory and other workplace privacy laws in Australia and the United States. The analysis demonstrates that existing measures fail to adequately regulate monitoring or provide employees with suitable remedies where unjustifiable intrusions occur. The thesis ultimately supports the view that enacting uniform legislation at the national level provides a more effective and comprehensive solution for both employers and employees. Chapter One provides a general introduction and briefly discusses issues relevant to electronic monitoring in the workplace. Chapter Two contains an overview of privacy law as it relates to electronic monitoring in Australian and United States workplaces. In Chapter Three there is an examination of the complaint process and remedies available to a hypothetical employee (Mary) who is concerned about protecting her privacy rights at work. Chapter Four provides an analysis of the major themes emerging from the research, and also discusses the draft national uniform legislation. Chapter Five details the proposed legislation in the form of the Workplace Surveillance and Monitoring Act, and Chapter Six contains the conclusion.

The impact of “empirical facts” on legal scholarship and legal research training

Lawyers have traditionally viewed law as a closed system, and doctrinal research has been the research methodology used most widely in the profession. This reflects traditional concepts of legal reasoning. There is a wealth of reliable and valid social science data available to lawyers and judges. Judges in fact often refer to general facts about the world, society, institutions and human behaviour (‘empirical facts’). Legal education needs to prepare our students for this broader legal context. This paper examines how ‘empirical facts’ are used in Australian and other common law courts. Specifically, the paper argues that there is a need for enhanced training in non-doctrinal research methodologies across the law school curriculum. This should encompass a broad introduction to social science methods, with more attention being paid to a cross-section of methodologies such as content analysis, comparative law and surveys that are best applied to law.

Beyond charity : outlines of a jurisprudence for civil society

There is not a single, coherent, jurisprudence for civil society organisations. Pressure for a clearly enuciated body of law applying to the whole of this sector of society continues to increase. The rise of third sector scholarship, the retreat of the welfare state, the rediscovery of the concept of civil society and pressures to strengthen social capital have all contributed to an ongoing stream of inquiry into the laws that regulate and favour civil society organisations. There have been almost thirty inquiries over the last sixty years into the doctrine of charitable purpose in common law countries. Those inquiries have established that problems with the law applying to civil society organisations are rooted in the common law adopting a ‘technical’ definition of charitable purpose and the failure of this body of law to develop in response to societal changes. Even though it is now well recognised that problems with law reform stem from problems inherent in the doctrine of charitable purpose, statutory reforms have merely ‘bolted on’ additions to the flawed ‘technical’ definition. In this way the scope of operation of the law has been incrementally expanded to include a larger number of civil society organisations. This piecemeal approach continues the exclusion of most civil society organisations from the law of charities discourse, and fails to address the underlying jurisprudential problems. Comprehensive reform requires revisiting the foundational problems embedded in the doctrine of charitable purpose, being informed by recent scholarship, and a paradigm shift that extends the doctrine to include all civil society organisations. Scholarly inquiry into civil society organisations, particularly from within the discipline of neoclassical economics, has elucidated insights that can inform legal theory development. This theory development requires decoupling the two distinct functions performed by the doctrine of charitable purpose which are: setting the scope of regulation, and determining entitlement to favours, such as tax exemption. If the two different functions of the doctrine are considered separately in the light of theoretical insights from other disciplines, the architecture for a jurisprudence emerges that facilitates regulation, but does not necessarily favour all civil society organisations. Informed by that broader discourse it is argued that when determining the scope of regulation, civil society organisations are identified by reference to charitable purposes that are not technically defined. These charitable purposes are in essence purposes which are: Altruistic, for public Benefit, pursued without Coercion. These charitable puposes differentiate civil society organisations from organisations in the three other sectors namely; Business, which is manifest in lack of altruism; Government, which is characterised by coercion; and Family, which is characterised by benefits being private not public. When determining entitlement to favour, it is theorised that it is the extent or nature of the public benefit evident in the pursuit of a charitable purpose that justifies entitlement to favour. Entitlement to favour based on the extent of public benefit is the theoretically simpler – the greater the public benefit the greater the justification for favour. To be entitled to favour based on the nature of a purpose being charitable the purpose must fall within one of three categories developed from the first three heads of Pemsel’s case (the landmark categorisation case on taxation favour). The three categories proposed are: Dealing with Disadvantage, Encouraging Edification; and Facilitating Freedom. In this alternative paradigm a recast doctrine of charitable purpose underpins a jurisprudence for civil society in a way similar to the way contract underpins the jurisprudence for the business sector, the way that freedom from arbitrary coercion underpins the jurisprudence of the government sector and the way that equity within families underpins succession and family law jurisprudence for the family sector. This alternative architecture for the common law, developed from the doctrine of charitable purpose but inclusive of all civil society purposes, is argued to cover the field of the law applying to civil society organisations and warrants its own third space as a body of law between public law and private law in jurisprudence.

Regulating non-executive directors in Australia : a socio-legal approach

Discusses the role of legislation and codes of conduct in influencing the behaviour of non-executive directors. Outlines the functions of a board of directors and considers the role on non-executive directors in particular. Traces the development of standards of skill required on non-executive directors both under the Australian Corporations Act 2001 and under common law. Questions whether these have brought about a real change in behaviour. Considers whether professionalisation of directorship could be more effective.

Advance Directives Refusing Treatment as an Expression of Autonomy: Do the Courts Practise What They Preach?

The principle of autonomy is at the heart of the right of a competent individual to make an advance directive that refuses life-sustaining medical treatment, and to have that directive complied with by medical professionals. That right is protected by both the common law and, to an extent, by legislation that has been enacted in the United Kingdom and many jurisdictions in Australia. The courts have a critical role in protecting that autonomy, both in those jurisdictions in which the common law continues to operate, and in those jurisdictions which are now governed by statute, and in which judicial determinations will need to be made about legislative provisions. The problem explored in this article is that while the judiciary espouses the importance of autonomy in its judgments, that rhetoric is frequently not reflected in the decisions that are reached. In the United Kingdom and Australia, there is a relatively small number of decisions that consider the validity and applicability of advance directives that refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. This article critically evaluates all of the publicly available decisions and concludes that there is cause for concern. In some cases, there has been an unprincipled evolution of common law principles, while in others there has been inappropriate adjudication through operational irregularities or failure to apply correct legal principles. Further, some decisions appear to be based on a strained interpretation of the facts of the case. The apparent reluctance of some members of the judiciary to give effect to advance directives that refuse treatment is also evidenced by the language used in the judgments. While the focus of this article is on common law decisions, reference will also be made to legislation and the extent to which it has addressed some of the problems identified in this article.

Adults who lack capacity : substitute decision-making

• Mechanisms to facilitate consent to healthcare for adults who lack capacity are necessary to ensure that these adults can lawfully receive appropriate medical treatment when needed. • In Australia, the common law plays only a limited role in this context, through its recognition of advance directives and through the parens patriae jurisdiction of superior courts. • Substitute decision-making for adults who lack capacity is facilitated primarily by guardianship and other related legislation. This legislation, which has been enacted in all Australian States and Territories, permits a range of decision-makers to make different types of healthcare decisions. • Substitute decision-makers can be appointed by the adult or by a guardianship or other tribunal. Where there is no appointed decision-maker, legislation generally empowers those close to the adult to make the relevant decision. Most Australian jurisdictions have also provided for statutory advance directives. • For the most serious of decisions, such as non-therapeutic sterilisations, consent can only be provided by a Tribunal. Other decisions can generally be made by a range of substitute decision-makers. Some treatment, such as very minor treatment or that which is needed in an emergency, can be provided without consent. • Guardianship legislation generally establishes a set of principles and/or other criteria to guide healthcare decisions. Mechanisms to resolve disputes as to who is the appropriate decision-maker and how a decision should be made have also been established.

Withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment

• At common law, a competent adult can refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, either contemporaneously or through an advance directive which will operate at a later time when the adult’s capacity is lost. • Legislation in most Australian jurisdictions also provides for a competent adult to complete an advance directive that refuses life-sustaining medical treatment. • At common law, a court exercising its parens patriae jurisdiction can consent to, or authorise, the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining medical treatment from an adult or child who lacks capacity if that is in the best interests of the person. A court may also declare that the withholding or withdrawal of treatment is lawful. • Guardianship legislation in most jurisdictions allows a substitute decision-maker, in an appropriate case, to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment for an adult who lacks capacity. • In terms of children, a parent may refuse life-sustaining medical treatment for his or her child if it is in the child’s best interests. • While a refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment by a competent child may be valid, this decision can be overturned by a court. • At common law and generally under guardianship statutes, demand for futile treatment need not be complied with by doctors.

The doctrine of double effect

• The doctrine of double effect is an exception to the general rule that taking active steps that end life is unlawful. • The essence of the doctrine at common law is intention. • Hastening a patient’s death through palliative care will be lawful provided the primary intention is to relieve pain, and not cause death, even if that death is foreseen. • Some States have enacted legislative excuses that deal with the provision of palliative care. • These statutory excuses tend to be stricter than the common law as they impose other requirements in addition to having an appropriate intent, such as adherence to some level of recognised medical practice.

Stakeholder perspectives regarding the mandatory notification of Australian data breaches

The advent of data breach notification laws in the United States (US) has unearthed a significant problem involving the mismanagement of personal information by a range of public and private sector organisations. At present, there is currently no statutory obligation under Australian law requiring public or private sector organisations to report a data breach of personal information to law enforcement agencies or affected persons. However, following a comprehensive review of Australian privacy law, the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) has recommended the introduction of a mandatory data breach notification scheme. The issue of data breach notification has ignited fierce debate amongst stakeholders, especially larger private sector entities. The purpose of this article is to document the perspectives of key industry and government representatives to identify their standpoints regarding an appropriate regulatory approach to data breach notification in Australia.

Proof of causation in informed consent cases : establishing what the plaintiff would have done

A degree of judicial caution in accepting the assertion of a plaintiff as to what he or she would have done, if fully informed of risks, is clearly evident upon a review of decisions applying the common law. Civil liability legislation in some jurisdictions now precludes assertion evidence by a plaintiff. Although this legislative change was seen as creating a significant challenge for plaintiffs seeking to discharge the onus of proof of establishing causation in such cases, recent decisions suggest a more limited practical effect. While a plaintiff’s ex post facto assertions as to what he or she would have done if fully informed of risks may now be inadmissible, objective and subjective evidence as to the surrounding facts and circumstances, in particular the plaintiff’s prior attitudes and conduct, and the assertion evidence of others remains admissible. Given the court’s reliance on both objective and subjective evidence, statistical evidence may be of increasing importance.

Government : charity boundaries

The Preamble1 was the initial legislative statement of matters construed by government to constitute charitable purposes in a common law context. It provided an outline of what was to become the core agenda for government’s relationship with charity. The resulting implied partnership, as viewed by government, endured for four centuries and in many different cultural contexts across the common law world. During that period, judicial mediation on the balance to be struck between government interest in acquiring value for granting tax exempt privileges and the right of individuals to freely dispose of property in accordance with their particular altruistic wishes steadily broadened the range of purposes deemed to be charitable, the vagaries of donor choice often prevailing over government interest in acquiring value for tax exemption.

Legal responses to climate change

The challenges of climate change pose problems requiring new and innovative legal responses by legal practitioners, government officials and corporate officers. This book addresses a broad range of topic areas where climate change has impact and systematically analyses the key legal responses to climate change, both at the international level and within Australia at federal, State and local levels. In particular, it critically examines: •the rights, duties and market mechanisms established under the international climate change regime •the effect of climate change policies on the implementation of environmental and planning laws •new regimes for the implementation of renewable energy and energy efficiency initiatives •legal frameworks for the implementation of biological and geological sequestration projects (including forest projects and carbon rights); and •legal principles for the design of an effective carbon trading scheme for Australia It also considers the role of the common law including: •the likely response of the law of torts to emerging forms of climate change harm; and •potential liabilities for professionals who must take climate change into account in their decision-making and advice

The regulation of insurance intermediaries in the Australian financial services market

The insurance industry discharges a critical role in the Australian economy and is a significant part of the Australian financial services market. The industry relies upon intermediaries, the principal types being brokers and agents, to promote, arrange and distribute their products and services in the market. The pivotal role that they play in this context and sensitivities associated with the consumer oriented products, such as house and contents insurance, has ensured close regulatory attention. Of particular importance was the passage of the Insurance (Agents and Brokers) Act 1984 (Cth), a comprehensive attempt to address the responsibilities of intermediaries as well as particular problem areas associated with the handling of money. However, with the introduction of financial services and market reform early in the new millennium this insurance intermediary specific regulatory approach was abandoned in favour of a market-wide strategy; that is, market reform was based upon across-the-board licensing, disclosure, conduct and fairness standards, and all financial products and services are now regulated at a generic level under Ch 7 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). This article briefly explores the categories of insurance intermediaries and the relevant distinctions between them but focuses mainly upon the regulatory context in which they operate. This context transcends a strictly legal framework as the regulatory body, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), has sought to inform and guide the market through Policy Statements and Regulatory Guides. The usefulness of these guides as an adjunct to the legislation in explaining the scope and operation of regulatory framework is examined. In addition, the article looks at the self-regulatory and dispute resolution practices in this area and their impact. In conclusion an assessment of this across-the-board regulatory regime is advanced.

Should funds invest in socially responsible investments during downturns?

Purpose: This paper investigates whether Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) is less sensitive to market downturns than conventional investments; the legal implications for fund managers and trustees; and possible legislative reforms to allow conventional funds more scope to invest in SRI. ----- ----- Design/methodology/approach: The paper uses the market model to estimate betas over the past 15 years for SRI funds and conventional investment funds during economic downturns, as distinct from during more ‘normal’ (non-recessionary) economic times. ----- ----- Findings: The beta risk of SRI, both in Australia and internationally, increases more than that of conventional investment during economic downturns. Traditional fund managers and trustees in Australia are therefore likely to breach their fiduciary duties if they go long - or remain long - in SRI funds during economic downturns, unless relevant legislation is reformed. ----- ----- Research limitations/implications: The methodology assumes that alpha and beta in the market model are constant. This is the subject of ongoing research. Second, it categorises the state of the market into ‘normal’ economic conditions and downturns using dummy variables. More sophisticated techniques could be used in future research. ----- ----- Practical implications: The current law would prevent conventional funds from investing in SRI. If SRI is viewed as socially desirable, useful legislative reforms could include explicitly overriding the common law to allow conventional funds to invest in SRI; introducing a 150% tax deduction or investment allowance for SRI; and allowing SRI sub-funds to obtain Deductible Gift Recipient status from the Australian Tax Office and other taxation authorities. ----- ----- Originality/value: The accurate assessment of risk in SRIs is an area which, despite its serious legal implications, is yet to be subjected to rigorous empirical investigation. Keywords - SRI, market model, GARCH, trust fund, fiduciary duties, market downturns, Australia.