Encroachment: what cost a pool with ocean views?

In Shadbolt v Wise [2002] QSC 348 the applicants were seeking relief under s184 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) in respect of an encroachment that they constructed on land belonging to the adjacent owner. The encroachment in question consisted of slightly less than one half of an elaborate pool and pool enclosure (the area of the encroachment being approximately 108 square metres). The land upon which the encroachment was situated was elevated with distant ocean views.

Land Sales Act 1984: The time limit for an application for exemption

The decision of Wilson J in Wan and Ors v NPD Property Development Pty Ltd [2004] QSC 232 also concerned the operation of the Land Sales Act 1984 (Qld) (‘the Act’). As previously noted, s 8(1) of the Act provides that a proposed allotment of freehold land might be sold only in certain circumstances. An agreement made in contravention of s 8(1) is void. Section 19 allows a purchaser (and others) to apply for an exemption from any of the provisions of Pt 2. By s 19(6), notwithstanding s 8, a person may agree to sell a proposed allotment if the instrument that binds a person to purchase the proposed allotment is conditional upon the grant of an exemption. By s 19(7) an application for exemption must be made ‘within 30 days after the event that marks the entry of a purchaser upon the purchase of the proposed allotment.’

Unreasonable withholding of consent?

In Cathmark Pty Ltd v NetherCott Constructions Pty Ltd [2011] QSC 86, Cullinane J was asked to consider whether a landlord had unreasonably withheld consent to a tenant’s proposed assignment of lease. In reaching a conclusion that the landlord had acted unreasonably, the decision provides useful guidance on an issue that is common in a proposed sale of business context.

Ready willing and able or not?

A recent decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal (Keane JA, Fryberg and Applegarth JJ) will be of considerable interest to conveyancers. The decision is Davidson v Bucknell [2009] QCA 383.

Joinder to a later unsigned document?

It is well known that a statutory requirement of formality is associated with contracts concerning land. In this regard, s 59 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) provides: No action may be brought upon any contract for the sale or other disposition of land or any interest in land unless the contract upon which such action is brought, or some memorandum or note of the contract, is in writing, and signed by the party to be charged, or by some person by the party lawfully authorised. In addition to the possibility of a formal contract, the statutory wording clearly contemplates reliance on an informal note or memorandum. To constitute a sufficient note or memorandum for the purposes of the statute, the signed note or memorandum must contain details of the parties to the contract, an adequate description of the property, the price and any other essential terms. It is also accepted that the doctrine of joinder may be invoked in circumstances where the document signed by the party to be charged contains an express or implied reference to any other document. In this way, a sufficient note or memorandum may be constituted by the joinder of a number of documents.

Can compensation be claimed under the standard commercial land and building contract where the property sold has no legally enforceable vehicular access?

This was the question that confronted Wilson J in Jarema Pty Ltd v Michihiko Kato [2004] QSC 451. Facts The plaintiff was the buyer of a commercial property at Bundall. The property comprised a 6 storey office building with a basement car park with 54 car parking spaces. The property was sold for $5 million with the contract being the standard REIQ/QLS form for Commercial Land and Buildings (2nd ed GST reprint). The contract provided for a “due diligence” period. During this period, the buyer’s solicitors discovered that there was no direct access from a public road to the car park entrance. Access to the car park was over a lot of which the Gold Coast City Council was the registered owner under a nomination of trustees, the Council holding the property on trust for car parking and town planning purposes. Due to the absence of a registered easement over the Council’s land, the buyer’s solicitors sought a reduction in the purchase price. The seller would not agree to this. Finally the sale was completed with the buyer reserving its rights to seek compensation.

A superannuation fund as a buyer?

In Bennett v Stewart McMurdo J considered the operation of a contract where the buyer was described as a superannuation fund. The Bennetts signed a standard REIQ contract as buyers of the Stewarts’ house and land. However, the reference schedule to the contract document contained these words next to the word ‘buyer’: ‘Bennett Superannuation Fund’ The Bennetts wished to enforce the contract. In response, the Stewarts (the sellers) raised two issues: • As the ‘Bennett Superannuation Fund’ was a trust and not a distinct legal entity capable of making a contract, the contract did not specify who was the buyer, so that the contract was void for uncertainty; and • The contract was unenforceable as there was no sufficient note or memorandum for the purposes of s 59 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) as s 59 requires, amongst other things, an identification of the parties. McMurdo J did not accept either of these arguments and made an order for specific performance in favour of the Bennetts. Looking at each issue separately:

Loss of chance in medical negligence claims now a lost cause?

The question whether the loss of chance of a better medical outcome in cases of medical negligence should be recognised as actionable damage is ‘a question which has divided courts and commentators throughout the common law world.’ In April 2010, the High Court handed down its anticipated decision in the case of Tabet (by her Tutor Sheiban) v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537. The issue considered by the court was whether the appellant could claim in negligence for the loss of a chance of a better medical outcome. This issue had not been considered by the High Court previously, the most relevant cases being Rufo v Hosking (2004) 61 NSWLR 678 and Gavalas v Singh (2001) 3 VLR 404. Claiming for a loss of chance in a personal injury action raises questions as to recognised damage and causation, and the members of the High Court considered both of these.

Civil Liability and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2010 (Qld)

On 17 March 2010, the Civil Liability and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2010 (Qld) was assented to.

Section 64 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) and the reluctant buyer

The decision of the Court of Appeal in Dunworth v Mirvac Qld Pty Ltd [2011] QCA 200 arose from unusual circumstances associated with the flood in Brisbane earlier this year. Maris Dunworth (‘the buyer’) agreed to purchase a ground floor residential apartment located beside the Brisbane River at Tennyson from Mirvac Queensland Pty Ltd (‘Mirvac’). The original date for completion was 12 May 2009. In earlier proceedings, the buyer had alleged that she had been induced to purchase the apartment by false, misleading and deceptive representations. This claim was dismissed and an order for specific performance was made with a new completion date of 8 February 2011...

Pool safety in Queensland

This article examines recent changes to the Building Act 1975 (Qld) intended to promote pool safety in Queensland. The impact of these statutory changes is considered in relation to both compliance obligations and disclosure obligations associated with sale and leasing transactions. The interrelationship of these changes with the operation of standard contractual provisions in Queensland is also examined.

Parental responsibility and removal of life sustaining treatment : Re Baby D

The case of Re Baby D (No. 2) has been described as a “landmark decision” as to whether parents themselves can authorise medical staff to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from their child or are required to seek the permission of a court or tribunal. The reasons for the decision that the removal of an endotracheal tube from the airway of Baby D was to treat “a bodily malfunction or disease” and therefore could be authorised by the parents will be explored.