From rights to responsibilities : reconceptualising carbon sequestration rights in Australia

Biosequestration of carbon in trees, forests and vegetation is a key method for mitigating climate change in Australia. To facilitate this, all States have enacted legislation for carbon sequestration rights, separating commercial rights in carbon from ownership of the land, trees and vegetation in which the carbon is sequestered. Ownership of carbon sequestration rights under state law is a prerequisite for the issue of carbon credits to proponents of ‘eligible sequestration offsets projects’ under the Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011 (Cth) (‘Carbon Farming Act’). This article examines the extent to which current State carbon sequestration rights support the offsets regime established by the Carbon Farming Act. The Commonwealth Act is concerned with allocating responsibilities to ensure the maintenance of the carbon sequestration, while the State Acts confer commercial rights in the carbon and leave the responsibilities to be allocated by private agreements. The carbon sequestration rights as defined by state laws do not confer the rights of access and management over land that a project proponent needs in order to discharge its responsibilities to maintain the carbon sequestration.

Form prevailing over substance?

The decision of the Court of Appeal in Kellas-Sharpe v PSAL Ltd [2012] QCA 371 considered a not unusual provision in a loan agreement, being a provision whereby a lender agrees to accept a lower or concessional rate of interest in circumstances of prompt payment by the borrower. The loan agreement in question provided for the borrower to pay a standard rate of interest of 7.5% per month. However, if the borrower was not in default, the lender agreed to accept interest at a concessional rate of interest of 4% per month. The issue for determination by the Court of Appeal (McMurdo P, Gotterson JA and Fryberg J) was whether the clause was subject to the equitable jurisdiction to relieve against penalties, and, if so, if the interest rate provision should be treated as a penalty making the interest rate provision void. In mounting this argument, the borrower was seeking to overturn a long line of authority which has repeatedly upheld the semantic distinction between an increase in the rate of interest (which attracts the doctrine concerning penalties) and an incentive to the borrower by way of a reduction in the interest rate for prompt payment (which does not attract the doctrine)...