Insurance : The Laws of Australia

Insurance - the laws of Australia provides insurance practitioners, insurance companies and students with a principles-based, practical guide to insurance law in Australia. It provides comprehensive coverage and analysis of common law principles relating to, and the statutory regulation of, insurance contracts and the operation of an insurance business. The common law and statutory provisions are dealt within the context of marine, life and general insurance.

Are the financial services external complaints resolution schemes subject to judicial review?

In Australia seven schemes (apart from the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal) provide alternative dispute resolution services for complaints brought by consumers against financial services industry members. Recently the Supreme Court of New South Wales held that the decisions of one scheme were amenable to judicial review at the suit of a financial services provider member and the Supreme Court of Victoria has since taken a similar approach. This article examines the juristic basis for such a challenge and contends that judicial review is not available, either at common law or under statutory provisions. This is particularly the case since Financial Industry Complaints Service Ltd v Deakin Financial Services Pty Ltd (2006) 157 FCR 229; 60 ACSR 372 decided that the jurisdiction of a scheme is derived from a contract made with its members. The article goes on to contend that the schemes are required to give procedural fairness and that equitable remedies are available if that duty is breached.

Juvenile justice in Queensland and Canada : new legislation reflecting new directions

Due to their similar colonial histories and common law heritage, Australia and Canada provide an ideal comparative context for examining legislation reflecting new directions in the field of juvenile justice. Toward this end, this article compares the revised juvenile justice legislation which came into force in Queensland and Canada in 2003 (Canada, Youth Criminal Justice Act, enacted on 19 February 2002 and proclaimed in force 1 April 2003; Queensland, Juvenile Justice Act, amended 2003). There are a series of questions that could be addressed including: How similar and how sweeping have been the legislative changes introduced in each jurisdiction?; What are likely to be some of the effects of the implementation of these new legislative regimes?; and, how well does the legislation enacted in either jurisdiction address the fundamental difficulties experienced by children who have been caught up in juvenile justice systems? This article addresses mainly the first of these questions, offering a systematic comparison of recent Queensland and Canadian legislative changes. Although, due to the recentness of these changes, there is no data available to assess long-term effects, anecdotal evidence and preliminary research findings from our comparative study are offered to provide a start at answering the second question. We also offer critical yet sympathetic comments on the ability of legislation to address the fundamental difficulties experienced by children caught up in juvenile justice systems. Specifically, we conclude that while more than simple legislative responses are required to address the difficulties faced by youth offenders, and especially overrepresented Indigenous young offenders, the amended Queensland and new Canadian legislation appear to provide some needed reforms that can be used to help address some of these fundamental difficulties.

Beyond charity : outlines of a jurisprudence for civil society

There is not a single, coherent, jurisprudence for civil society organisations. Pressure for a clearly enuciated body of law applying to the whole of this sector of society continues to increase. The rise of third sector scholarship, the retreat of the welfare state, the rediscovery of the concept of civil society and pressures to strengthen social capital have all contributed to an ongoing stream of inquiry into the laws that regulate and favour civil society organisations. There have been almost thirty inquiries over the last sixty years into the doctrine of charitable purpose in common law countries. Those inquiries have established that problems with the law applying to civil society organisations are rooted in the common law adopting a ‘technical’ definition of charitable purpose and the failure of this body of law to develop in response to societal changes. Even though it is now well recognised that problems with law reform stem from problems inherent in the doctrine of charitable purpose, statutory reforms have merely ‘bolted on’ additions to the flawed ‘technical’ definition. In this way the scope of operation of the law has been incrementally expanded to include a larger number of civil society organisations. This piecemeal approach continues the exclusion of most civil society organisations from the law of charities discourse, and fails to address the underlying jurisprudential problems. Comprehensive reform requires revisiting the foundational problems embedded in the doctrine of charitable purpose, being informed by recent scholarship, and a paradigm shift that extends the doctrine to include all civil society organisations. Scholarly inquiry into civil society organisations, particularly from within the discipline of neoclassical economics, has elucidated insights that can inform legal theory development. This theory development requires decoupling the two distinct functions performed by the doctrine of charitable purpose which are: setting the scope of regulation, and determining entitlement to favours, such as tax exemption. If the two different functions of the doctrine are considered separately in the light of theoretical insights from other disciplines, the architecture for a jurisprudence emerges that facilitates regulation, but does not necessarily favour all civil society organisations. Informed by that broader discourse it is argued that when determining the scope of regulation, civil society organisations are identified by reference to charitable purposes that are not technically defined. These charitable purposes are in essence purposes which are: Altruistic, for public Benefit, pursued without Coercion. These charitable puposes differentiate civil society organisations from organisations in the three other sectors namely; Business, which is manifest in lack of altruism; Government, which is characterised by coercion; and Family, which is characterised by benefits being private not public. When determining entitlement to favour, it is theorised that it is the extent or nature of the public benefit evident in the pursuit of a charitable purpose that justifies entitlement to favour. Entitlement to favour based on the extent of public benefit is the theoretically simpler – the greater the public benefit the greater the justification for favour. To be entitled to favour based on the nature of a purpose being charitable the purpose must fall within one of three categories developed from the first three heads of Pemsel’s case (the landmark categorisation case on taxation favour). The three categories proposed are: Dealing with Disadvantage, Encouraging Edification; and Facilitating Freedom. In this alternative paradigm a recast doctrine of charitable purpose underpins a jurisprudence for civil society in a way similar to the way contract underpins the jurisprudence for the business sector, the way that freedom from arbitrary coercion underpins the jurisprudence of the government sector and the way that equity within families underpins succession and family law jurisprudence for the family sector. This alternative architecture for the common law, developed from the doctrine of charitable purpose but inclusive of all civil society purposes, is argued to cover the field of the law applying to civil society organisations and warrants its own third space as a body of law between public law and private law in jurisprudence.

Respecting contractual intentions : balancing consumer expectations with the sanctity of contract in the context of standard form insurance contracts

It is the purpose of this article to examine the means curently available to judges to achieve a workable balance between providing appropriate consumer protection to signatories of standard form contractors while still retaining adequate respect for the sanctity of contract, and, based on this analysis, to determine whether a significantly greater scope of contract (re)construction is likely to become the norm in most common law jurisdictions in the coming decades.

A comparative overview of "know-how" protection in Japan and Australia

"Know How" protection varies enormously from country to country and is a complex equation of legal, political, cultural and economic factors. A contrast between Japan and Australia serves to highlight some of these factors. For the purposes of this article, a working definition of "know how" is required. In Australia and other common law systems, no statutory definition of "know how" exists, "confidential information" proving the closest comparative term in Australia ('trade secret law' in the United States).

The insured's non-disclosure in the formation of insurance contracts : a comparative perspective

The requirements that an insured disclose all facts material to a transaction as well as not misrepresent material facts in the formation of an insurance contract are universal requirements of insurance law. The nature and extent of these obligations varies from one jurisdiction to the next. Disclosure in the insurance context is distinct from the general approach in commercial contracts, and in others between persons dealing at arm's length. It is the purpose of this article therefore to examine, on a comparative basis, the approaches adopted in the Anglo-Commonwealth context of England, Australia New Zealand and Singapore to the resolution of disclose issues in the formation of insurance contracts. Particular attention is focused on the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Australia) as this statue effects the most significant overhaul of the common law and the National Consumer Council in the United Kingdom has advocated that similar reforms be adopted.

Regulating non-executive directors in Australia : a socio-legal approach

Discusses the role of legislation and codes of conduct in influencing the behaviour of non-executive directors. Outlines the functions of a board of directors and considers the role on non-executive directors in particular. Traces the development of standards of skill required on non-executive directors both under the Australian Corporations Act 2001 and under common law. Questions whether these have brought about a real change in behaviour. Considers whether professionalisation of directorship could be more effective.

The home stigma : adverse selection in ADRs and the home capital market environment

We investigate whether characteristics of the home country capital environment, such as information disclosure and investor rights protection continue to affect ADRs cross-listed in the U.S. Using microstructure measures as proxies for adverse selection, we find that characteristics of the home markets continue to be relevant, especially for emerging market firms. Less transparent disclosure, poorer protection of investor rights and weaker legal institutions are associated with higher levels of information asymmetry. Developed market firms appear to be affected by whether or not home business laws are common law or civil law legal origin. Our finding contributes to the bonding literature. It suggests that cross-listing in the U.S. should not be viewed as a substitute for improvement in the quality of local institutions, and attention must be paid to improve investor protection in order to achieve the full benefits of improved disclosure. Improvement in the domestic capital market environment can attract more investors even for U.S. cross-listed firms.

Advance Directives and the Promotion of Autonomy: a Comparative Australian Statutory Analysis

Legislation regulating advance directives exists in six Australian jurisdictions. In all of these jurisdictions, legislation was enacted to enshrine the common law right of a competent adult to refuse treatment in advance, even if that treatment was required to sustain life. It was thought that enshrining the common law would also enshrine the principle of autonomy on which the common law was based. This article explores whether this is the case by examining the legislative restrictions that are imposed on a competent adult who wishes to complete an advance directive refusing treatment. The article reviews the legislation in all Australian jurisdictions and concludes that, while many of the legislative restrictions can be justified, many cannot as they effectively erode rather than promote the right of a competent adult to refuse treatment.

Advance Directives Refusing Treatment as an Expression of Autonomy: Do the Courts Practise What They Preach?

The principle of autonomy is at the heart of the right of a competent individual to make an advance directive that refuses life-sustaining medical treatment, and to have that directive complied with by medical professionals. That right is protected by both the common law and, to an extent, by legislation that has been enacted in the United Kingdom and many jurisdictions in Australia. The courts have a critical role in protecting that autonomy, both in those jurisdictions in which the common law continues to operate, and in those jurisdictions which are now governed by statute, and in which judicial determinations will need to be made about legislative provisions. The problem explored in this article is that while the judiciary espouses the importance of autonomy in its judgments, that rhetoric is frequently not reflected in the decisions that are reached. In the United Kingdom and Australia, there is a relatively small number of decisions that consider the validity and applicability of advance directives that refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. This article critically evaluates all of the publicly available decisions and concludes that there is cause for concern. In some cases, there has been an unprincipled evolution of common law principles, while in others there has been inappropriate adjudication through operational irregularities or failure to apply correct legal principles. Further, some decisions appear to be based on a strained interpretation of the facts of the case. The apparent reluctance of some members of the judiciary to give effect to advance directives that refuse treatment is also evidenced by the language used in the judgments. While the focus of this article is on common law decisions, reference will also be made to legislation and the extent to which it has addressed some of the problems identified in this article.

Adults who lack capacity : substitute decision-making

• Mechanisms to facilitate consent to healthcare for adults who lack capacity are necessary to ensure that these adults can lawfully receive appropriate medical treatment when needed. • In Australia, the common law plays only a limited role in this context, through its recognition of advance directives and through the parens patriae jurisdiction of superior courts. • Substitute decision-making for adults who lack capacity is facilitated primarily by guardianship and other related legislation. This legislation, which has been enacted in all Australian States and Territories, permits a range of decision-makers to make different types of healthcare decisions. • Substitute decision-makers can be appointed by the adult or by a guardianship or other tribunal. Where there is no appointed decision-maker, legislation generally empowers those close to the adult to make the relevant decision. Most Australian jurisdictions have also provided for statutory advance directives. • For the most serious of decisions, such as non-therapeutic sterilisations, consent can only be provided by a Tribunal. Other decisions can generally be made by a range of substitute decision-makers. Some treatment, such as very minor treatment or that which is needed in an emergency, can be provided without consent. • Guardianship legislation generally establishes a set of principles and/or other criteria to guide healthcare decisions. Mechanisms to resolve disputes as to who is the appropriate decision-maker and how a decision should be made have also been established.

Withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment

• At common law, a competent adult can refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, either contemporaneously or through an advance directive which will operate at a later time when the adult’s capacity is lost. • Legislation in most Australian jurisdictions also provides for a competent adult to complete an advance directive that refuses life-sustaining medical treatment. • At common law, a court exercising its parens patriae jurisdiction can consent to, or authorise, the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining medical treatment from an adult or child who lacks capacity if that is in the best interests of the person. A court may also declare that the withholding or withdrawal of treatment is lawful. • Guardianship legislation in most jurisdictions allows a substitute decision-maker, in an appropriate case, to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment for an adult who lacks capacity. • In terms of children, a parent may refuse life-sustaining medical treatment for his or her child if it is in the child’s best interests. • While a refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment by a competent child may be valid, this decision can be overturned by a court. • At common law and generally under guardianship statutes, demand for futile treatment need not be complied with by doctors.

The doctrine of double effect

• The doctrine of double effect is an exception to the general rule that taking active steps that end life is unlawful. • The essence of the doctrine at common law is intention. • Hastening a patient’s death through palliative care will be lawful provided the primary intention is to relieve pain, and not cause death, even if that death is foreseen. • Some States have enacted legislative excuses that deal with the provision of palliative care. • These statutory excuses tend to be stricter than the common law as they impose other requirements in addition to having an appropriate intent, such as adherence to some level of recognised medical practice.

Socially responsible investment in market downturns : implications for the fiduciary responsibilities of investment fund trustees

This paper investigates whether Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) is more or less sensitive to market downturns than conventional investment, and examines the legal implications for fund managers and trustees. Using a market model methodology, we find that over the past 15 years, the beta risk of SRI, both in Australia and internationally, increased more than that of conventional investment during economic downturns. This implies that companies acting as fund trustees, managed investment schemes and traditional institutional fund managers risk breaching their fiduciary or statutory duties if they go long - or remain long - in SRI funds during market downturns, unless perhaps relevant legislation is reformed. If reform is viewed as desirable, possible reforms could include explicitly overriding the common law to allow all traditional funds to invest in SRI; granting immunity to directors of trustee companies from potential personal liability under sections 197 or 588G et seq of the Corporations Act; allowing companies acting as trustees, managed investment schemes and traditional institutional fund managers and trustees to invest in SRI without triggering a substantial capital gains tax liability through trust resettlement; tax concessions for SRI (eg. introducing a 150% tax deduction or investment allowance for SRI); and allowing SRI sub-funds to obtain “deductible gift recipient” status or the equivalent from relevant taxation authorities. The research is important and original insofar as the assessment of risk in SRIs during market downturns is an area which has hitherto not been subjected to rigorous empirical investigation, despite its serious legal implications.