Practice & procedure : gratuitous services

In Carroll v Coomber [2006] QDC 146 the plainliff was injured in a motor vehicle accident on September 7, 2003. Liability was admitted and it remained to assess the plaintiff's damages. In light of the date of the accident, the damages were to be assessed under the Civil Liability Act 2003 (the act) and the Civil Liability Regulations.

Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 - obligation to disclose

In Turpin v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd (unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, S5216 of 2001), Mullins J, 17.10.2001) the plaintiff applied for a declaration that the respondent disclose pursuant to s47 of the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 copies of three statements referred to in a loss assessor's investigation report as "attached". The issue involved determination of whether the statements must be disclosed under s48(2) even though protected by legal professional privilege. The Court applied the decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal in James v Workcover Queensland.

UCPR r548 - requirement for report or proof of evidence intended to be relied on at trial

In Oates v Cootes Tanker Service Pty Ltd [2005] QSC 213, Fryberg J considered some interesting questions of construction in relation to the rule requiring the plaintiff to provide a statement of loss and damage in personal injuries proceedings (UCPR r 548) and the rule in relation to the giving of expert evidence (UCPR r427)

Practice and procedure : Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 s56

In Amos v Brisbane City Council [2005] QCA 433 the Queensland Court of Appeal was called upon to determine the scope of s56 of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002. The decision makes it clear that the section does not provide a complete code governing awards of damages and does not deprive the court of power to award costs against a plaintiff who fails to succeed on liability.

Supreme Court Act 1995 s48 - Interest on judgment for damages for personal injuries

The case of Flynn v The Maryborough Sugar Factory Limited [2003] QDC 446 the plaintiff had been awarded damages for personal injuries and there was a charge on those damages under a Commonwealth statute, with a provision in the statute that damages could not be satisfied until the Commonwealth had been paid. The Court considered the point of considerable practical significance of whether interest accrued on the judgment under s48 of the Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) before the defendant had obtained clearances under the Commonwealth legislation.

Duty and control in intermediary copyright liability: An Australian perspective

In the internet age, copyright owners are increasingly looking to online intermediaries to take steps to prevent copyright infringement. Sometimes these intermediaries are closely tied to the acts of infringement; sometimes – as in the case of ISPs – they are not. In 2012, the Australian High Court decided the Roadshow Films v iiNet case, in which it held that an Australian ISP was not liable under copyright’s authorization doctrine, which asks whether the intermediary has sanctioned, approved or countenanced the infringement. The Australian Copyright Act 1968 directs a court to consider, in these situations, whether the intermediary had the power to prevent the infringement and whether it took any reasonable steps to prevent or avoid the infringement. It is generally not difficult for a court to find the power to prevent infringement – power to prevent can include an unrefined technical ability to disconnect users from the copyright source, such as an ISP terminating users’ internet accounts. In the iiNet case, the High Court eschewed this broad approach in favor of focusing on a notion of control that was influenced by principles of tort law. In tort, when a plaintiff asserts that a defendant should be liable for failing to act to prevent harm caused to the plaintiff by a third party, there is a heavy burden on the plaintiff to show that the defendant had a duty to act. The duty must be clear and specific, and will often hinge on the degree of control that the defendant was able to exercise over the third party. Control in these circumstances relates directly to control over the third party’s actions in inflicting the harm. Thus, in iiNet’s case, the control would need to be directed to the third party’s infringing use of BitTorrent; control over a person’s ability to access the internet is too imprecise. Further, when considering omissions to act, tort law differentiates between the ability to control and the ability to hinder. The ability to control may establish a duty to act, and the court will then look to small measures taken to prevent the harm to determine whether these satisfy the duty. But the ability to hinder will not suffice to establish liability in the absence of control. This article argues that an inquiry grounded in control as defined in tort law would provide a more principled framework for assessing the liability of passive intermediaries in copyright. In particular, it would set a higher, more stable benchmark for determining the copyright liability of passive intermediaries, based on the degree of actual, direct control that the intermediary can exercise over the infringing actions of its users. This approach would provide greater clarity and consistency than has existed to date in this area of copyright law in Australia.

Receivers' future liability for costs

In Juniper Property Holdings No.15 Pty Ltd v Caltabiano [2015] QSC 95, Jackson J considered what he described as a 'novel point' as to whether the court had jurisdiction to make a determination of the liability of receivers and managers appointed to the plaintiff to pay any costs orders that may be made in favour of the defendant.

Can a court protect an ex-addict from themselves?

In Hewitt v Bayntum & Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd [2015] QSC 250 the court was asked to sanction a compromise of a proceeding by a plaintiff who, though a recovering drug addict, was able to give instructions and understand the proposed compromise.

Lawyers linked to litigation funding face court censure: Bolitho v Banksia Securities Limited (No.4) [2014] VSC 582

In Bolitho v Banksia Securities Limited (No 4) [2014] VSC 582 the Supreme Court of Victoria concluded that the proper administration of justice, including the appearance of justice, required that the lawyers representing the plaintiff in the group proceeding should be restrained from continuing to act for the plaintiff. This Victorian case illustrates how courts are likely to respond when lawyers attempt to circumvent the prohibition on contingency fees through litigation funding in which they have a financial interest.

An abuse of process - traditionally: Smith v Lucht [2014] QDC 302

In Smith v Lucht [2014] QDC 302 McGill DCJ considered whether in Queensland the concept of abuse of process was sufficiently broad as to encompass circumstances in which the resources of the court and the parties to be expended to determine the claim were out of all proportion to the interest at stake. Stay of proceedings - abuse of process - whether disproportionality between interest at stake and costs of litigating may amount to abuse of process - plaintiff with good cause of action entitled to pursue it.

Duty and Control in Intermediary Copyright Liability: An Australian Perspective

In the internet age, copyright owners are increasingly looking to online intermediaries to take steps to prevent copyright infringement. Sometimes these intermediaries are closely tied to the acts of infringement; sometimes – as in the case of ISPs – they are not. In 2012, the Australian High Court decided the Roadshow Films v iiNet case, in which it held that an Australian ISP was not liable under copyright’s authorization doctrine, which asks whether the intermediary has sanctioned, approved or countenanced the infringement. The Australian Copyright Act 1968 directs a court to consider, in these situations, whether the intermediary had the power to prevent the infringement and whether it took any reasonable steps to prevent or avoid the infringement. It is generally not difficult for a court to find the power to prevent infringement – power to prevent can include an unrefined technical ability to disconnect users from the copyright source, such as an ISP terminating users’ internet accounts. In the iiNet case, the High Court eschewed this broad approach in favor of focusing on a notion of control that was influenced by principles of tort law. In tort, when a plaintiff asserts that a defendant should be liable for failing to act to prevent harm caused to the plaintiff by a third party, there is a heavy burden on the plaintiff to show that the defendant had a duty to act. The duty must be clear and specific, and will often hinge on the degree of control that the defendant was able to exercise over the third party. Control in these circumstances relates directly to control over the third party’s actions in inflicting the harm. Thus, in iiNet’s case, the control would need to be directed to the third party’s infringing use of BitTorrent; control over a person’s ability to access the internet is too imprecise. Further, when considering omissions to act, tort law differentiates between the ability to control and the ability to hinder. The ability to control may establish a duty to act, and the court will then look to small measures taken to prevent the harm to determine whether these satisfy the duty. But the ability to hinder will not suffice to establish liability in the absence of control. This chapter argues that an inquiry grounded in control as defined in tort law would provide a more principled framework for assessing the liability of passive intermediaries in copyright. In particular, it would set a higher, more stable benchmark for determining the copyright liability of passive intermediaries, based on the degree of actual, direct control that the intermediary can exercise over the infringing actions of its users. This approach would provide greater clarity and consistency than has existed to date in this area of copyright law in Australia.

Safeguard your access to trial by jury

In Watney v Kencian & Wooley [2014] QDC 290 Morxone QC DCJ considered the implications for defendants who desired a trial by jury, but who had relied on the election for that mode of trial made by the plaintiff in the statement of claim.