The Politics and Legality of Prisoner Disenfranchisement in Australian Federal Elections

To remove the right of prisoners to vote does many things. … It signals that whatever the prisoner says is not of interest to those at the top, that you are not interested in talking to them or even listening to them, that you want to exclude them and that you have no interest in knowing about them. INTRODUCTION In June 2006, Australia passed legislation disenfranchising all prisoners serving full-time custodial sentences from voting in federal elections. This followed a succession of changes dating from 1983 that alternately extended and restricted the prisoner franchise. In 1989 and 1995, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) federal government prepared draft legislation removing any restrictions on prisoner voting rights in federal elections; the measures were defeated and withdrawn. With the 2006 legislation, the Howard Coalition government (composed of the Liberal and National parties) successfully achieved the total disenfranchisement it first sought in 1998. This chapter examines the politics and legality of the 2006 disenfranchisement. This will be approached, first, by briefly outlining the key provisions of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, offering a short legislative history of prisoner franchise, and examining some of the key constitutional issues. Second, the 2006 disenfranchisement introduced in the Electoral and Referendum (Electoral Integrity and Other Measures) Act 2006 will be examined in greater detail, particularly in terms of the manner in which it was achieved and the arguments that were mobilized both in support of and against the change.

‘Only a pawn in their game’ : crime, risk and politics in the case of Robert Fardon

In 2003 Robert Fardon was the first prisoner to be detained under the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld), the first of the new generation preventive detention laws enacted in Australia and directed at keeping sex offenders in prison or under supervision beyond the expiry of their sentences where a court decides, on the basis of psychiatric assessments, that unconditional release would create an unacceptable risk to the community. A careful examination of Fardon’s case shows the extent to which the administration of the regime was from the outset governed by politics and political calculation rather than the logic of risk management and community protection. In 2003 Robert Fardon was the first person detained under the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) (hereafter DPSOA), a newly enacted Queensland law aimed at the preventive detention of sex offenders. It was the first of a new generation of such laws introduced in Australia, now also in force in NSW, Western Australia and Victoria. The laws have been widely criticized by lawyers, academics and others (Keyzer and McSherry 2009; Edgely 2007). In this article I want to focus on the details of how the Queensland law was administered in Fardon’s case, he being perhaps the most well-known prisoner detained under such laws and certainly the longest held. It will show, I hope, that seemingly abstract rule of law principles invoked by other critics are not simply abstract: they afford a crucial practical safeguard against the corruption of criminal justice in which the ends both of community protection and of justice give way to opportunistic exploitation of ‘the mythic resonance of crime and punishment for electoral purposes’ (Scheingold 1998: 888).

May the best Tweeter win : The Twitter strategies of key campaign accounts in the 2012 US election

The 2008 US election has been heralded as the first presidential election of the social media era, but took place at a time when social media were still in a state of comparative infancy; so much so that the most important platform was not Facebook or Twitter, but the purpose-built campaign site my.barackobama.com, which became the central vehicle for the most successful electoral fundraising campaign in American history. By 2012, the social media landscape had changed: Facebook and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Twitter are now well-established as the leading social media platforms in the United States, and were used extensively by the campaign organisations of both candidates. As third-party spaces controlled by independent commercial entities, however, their use necessarily differs from that of home-grown, party-controlled sites: from the point of view of the platform itself, a @BarackObama or @MittRomney is technically no different from any other account, except for the very high follower count and an exceptional volume of @mentions. In spite of the significant social media experience which Democrat and Republican campaign strategists had already accumulated during the 2008 campaign, therefore, the translation of such experience to the use of Facebook and Twitter in their 2012 incarnations still required a substantial amount of new work, experimentation, and evaluation. This chapter examines the Twitter strategies of the leading accounts operated by both campaign headquarters: the ‘personal’ candidate accounts @BarackObama and @MittRomney as well as @JoeBiden and @PaulRyanVP, and the campaign accounts @Obama2012 and @TeamRomney. Drawing on datasets which capture all tweets from and at these accounts during the final months of the campaign (from early September 2012 to the immediate aftermath of the election night), we reconstruct the campaigns’ approaches to using Twitter for electioneering from the quantitative and qualitative patterns of their activities, and explore the resonance which these accounts have found with the wider Twitter userbase. A particular focus of our investigation in this context will be on the tweeting styles of these accounts: the mixture of original messages, @replies, and retweets, and the level and nature of engagement with everyday Twitter followers. We will examine whether the accounts chose to respond (by @replying) to the messages of support or criticism which were directed at them, whether they retweeted any such messages (and whether there was any preferential retweeting of influential or – alternatively – demonstratively ordinary users), and/or whether they were used mainly to broadcast and disseminate prepared campaign messages. Our analysis will highlight any significant differences between the accounts we examine, trace changes in style over the course of the final campaign months, and correlate such stylistic differences with the respective electoral positioning of the candidates. Further, we examine the use of these accounts during moments of heightened attention (such as the presidential and vice-presidential debates, or in the context of controversies such as that caused by the publication of the Romney “47%” video; additional case studies may emerge over the remainder of the campaign) to explore how they were used to present or defend key talking points, and exploit or avert damage from campaign gaffes. A complementary analysis of the messages directed at the campaign accounts (in the form of @replies or retweets) will also provide further evidence for the extent to which these talking points were picked up and disseminated by the wider Twitter population. Finally, we also explore the use of external materials (links to articles, images, videos, and other content on the campaign sites themselves, in the mainstream media, or on other platforms) by the campaign accounts, and the resonance which these materials had with the wider follower base of these accounts. This provides an indication of the integration of Twitter into the overall campaigning process, by highlighting how the platform was used as a means of encouraging the viral spread of campaign propaganda (such as advertising materials) or of directing user attention towards favourable media coverage. By building on comprehensive, large datasets of Twitter activity (as of early October, our combined datasets comprise some 3.8 million tweets) which we process and analyse using custom-designed social media analytics tools, and by using our initial quantitative analysis to guide further qualitative evaluation of Twitter activity around these campaign accounts, we are able to provide an in-depth picture of the use of Twitter in political campaigning during the 2012 US election which will provide detailed new insights social media use in contemporary elections. This analysis will then also be able to serve as a touchstone for the analysis of social media use in subsequent elections, in the USA as well as in other developed nations where Twitter and other social media platforms are utilised in electioneering.

Valence and spatial explanations for voting in the 2013 Australian election

This paper examines the 2013 Australian federal election to test two competing models of vote choice: spatial politics and valence issues. Using data from the 2013 Australian Election Study, the analysis finds that spatial politics (measured by party identification and self-placement on the left-right spectrum) and valence issues both have significant effects on vote choice. However, spatial measures are more important than valence issues in explaining vote choice, in contrast with recent studies from Britain, Canada and the United States. Explanations for these differences are speculative, but may relate to Australia’s stable party and electoral system, including compulsory voting and the frequency of elections. The consequently high information burden faced by Australian voters may lead to a greater reliance on spatial heuristics than is found elsewhere.

Documenting the inevitable: Voting behaviour at the 2013 Australian election

This chapter uses data from the 2013 Australian Election Study (AES), conducted by Clive Bean, Ian McAllister, Juliet Pietsch and Rachel Gibson (Bean et al. 2014) to investigate political attitudes and voting behaviour in the election. The study was funded by the Australian Research Council and involved a national survey of political attitudes and behaviour using a self-completion questionnaire mailed to respondents on the day before the 7 September election. The sample was a systematic random sample of enrolled voters throughout Australia, drawn by the Australian Electoral Commission. Respondents were given the option of returning the completed questionnaire by reply-paid mail or completing the survey online. Non-respondents were sent several follow-up mailings and the final sample size was 3955, representing a response rate of 34 per cent. The data were weighted to reflect population parameters for gender, age, state and vote.

Image, Political

Political communication scholars, journalists, and political actors alike, argue that the political process, and deliberative democracy (democracy founded on informed discussion inclusive of citizens), have lost their rational authenticity in that image and media spectacle have become more central to public opinion formation and electoral outcomes than policy. This entry examines the validity of that perception, and the extent to which “image” has emerged as a more significant factor in the political process. And if image is so important in political culture, what the impacts might be on the functioning of democratic processes.