Using relationship mapping to understand sustainable housing stakeholders’ actions

The production of sustainable housing requires the cooperation of a variety of participants with different goals, needs, levels of commitment and cultures. To achieve mainstream net zero energy housing objectives, there is arguably a need for a non-linear network of collaboration between all the stakeholders. In order to create and improve such collaborative networks between stakeholders, we first need to map stakeholders’ relationships, processes, and practices. This paper discusses compares and contrasts maps of the sustainable housing production life-cycle in Australia, developed from different perspectives. The paper highlights the strengths and weaknesses of each visualization, clarifying where gaps in connectivity exist within existing industry networks. Understanding these gaps will help researchers and practitioners identify how to improve the collaboration between participants in the housing industry. This in turn may improve decision making across all stakeholder groups, leading to mainstream implementation of sustainability into the housing industry.

Small firm internationalisation and the objective characteristics of managers: An importer's relationship marketing perspective

As a result of competitive pressures, firms are transitioning to international sourcing and initiating complex relationships with suppliers. Despite a lack of inward internationalisation research, there is progressive support for the importance of importing. Heavier focus has been placed on downstream efforts in past years, despite the fact that many factors affecting exporting also influence importing. For small and medium sized enterprises (SME), the psychic distance construct is especially important for internationalisation behaviour but there is little evidence on how perceptual psychic distance, that is the individual’s experiences, influences the buyer-seller relationship. This study draws on internationalisation process theory and commitment-trust theory, in an effort to describe the relationship between objective characteristics (i.e. language, cultural background, education and international experience) and relationship marketing (trust and commitment). The study utilises a holistic, multiple case study design to gain a deeper understanding of the inherent complexities of the relationships in dyads and how objective characteristics, which reduce psychic distance, can facilitate trust and commitment development between importers and exporters.

Standardization efforts: The relationship between knowledge dimensions, search processes and innovation outcomes

We explore how a standardization effort (i.e., when a firm pursues standards to further innovation) involves different search processes for knowledge and innovation outcomes. Using an inductive case study of Vanke, a leading Chinese property developer, we show how varying degrees of knowledge complexity and codification combine to produce a typology of four types of search process: active, integrative, decentralized and passive, resulting in four types of innovation outcome: modular, radical, incremental and architectural. We argue that when the standardization effort in a firm involves highly codified knowledge, incremental and architectural innovation outcomes are fostered, while modular and radical innovations are hindered. We discuss how standardization efforts can result in a second-order innovation capability, and conclude by calling for comparative research in other settings to understand how standardization efforts can be suited to different types of search process in different industry contexts.

Altruism, Trade Policy, and the Optimality of Foreign Aid

There are many studies in the literature that deal with the welfare effects of income transfers between nations in a general equilibrium setting. An important impetus for this extensive literature was the demonstration of the transfer paradox; that the donor country could actually gain from a transfer of income to another, and that the recipient could lose as a result of the gift. The reason for this paradoxical result is that the transfer gives rise to a terms-of-trade effect that may be especially beneficial to the donor and detrimental to the recipient. Subsequently, many papers have established conditions under which this paradox will or will not occur. Early work by Samuelson (1954) was followed by demonstrations of paradoxes by Gale (1974), Ohyama (1974), Brecher and Bhagwati (1982) and Bhagwati, Brecher and Hatta 1983, 1985, and Dixit (1983)) among others.1 More recently, many studies have examined whether or not foreign aid — tied and untied — can be welfare improving for both the donor and the recipient (see, for example, Turunen-Red and Woodland (1988), Kemp and Wong (1993), Schweinberger (1990), Hatzipanayotou and Michael (1995), Lahiri and Raimondos-Moller 1995, 1997, Djajić, Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller 1996a, 1996b, and Lahiri, Raimondos-Møller, Wong and Woodland 1997.2

Competition for aid and trade policy

This paper considers the optimal allocation of a given amount of foreign aid between two recipient countries. It is shown that, given consumer preferences, a country following a more restrictive trade policy would receive a smaller share of the aid if the donor country maximises its own welfare in allocating aid. If, on the other hand, the donor country allocates aid in order to maximize the sum of the welfare of the two recipient countries, the result is just the opposite. Finally, we analyze the situation where the recipient countries compete with each other for the given amount of aid. It is shown that this competition tends to lower the level of optimal tariffs in the recipient countries.

Donor strategy under the fungibility of foreign aid

We develop a political–economic model of aid fungibility: a part of aid is diverted away from its intended target by lobby groups. The size of this diversion – the degree of aid fungibility – is determined endogenously by the recipient government. The donor can affect the equilibrium degree of fungibility by choosing both the size of aid and the timing of its decision. We derive a condition under which the donor's reaction to fungibility is to reduce the amount of aid. Under this condition, if the donor acts as a follower, both the donor and the target group are better off.

Food aid and food production: A theoretical analysis

It has been claimed that food aid leads to permanent dependency as it depresses domestic food prices and thus farmers find it profitable to take land out of food production and into more lucrative activities. This paper develops two alternative scenarios under which the hypothesis about the damaging effect of food aid may not be true. Under the first scenario, it is argued that food production in developing countries is often low due to unfavourable trade policies and if food aid is tied to the removal of bias against the agricultural sector, food aid will not have any disincentive effect on food production. The second exercise argues that the revenue raised by the recipient government by selling aid could be used for R and D in agricultural production.

Foreign aid, domestic investment and welfare

This paper examines the welfare implications of temporary foreign aid in a simple two-period, two-country model of trade. Domestic investment is endogenous, providing an important link between aid in period one and the terms of trade in periods one and two. Transfer-induced changes in the terms of trade redistribute present and future income between the donor and the recipient. In the presence of barriers to international borrowing and lending, such redistribution gives rise to the possibility of temporary aid being both potentially and strictly Pareto improving.

Lobbying by ethnic groups and aid allocation

We develop a political-economic model of foreign aid allocation. Each ethnic group in the donor country lobbies the government to allocate more aid to its country of origin, and the government accepts political contributions from lobby groups. Initial per-capita income of the recipients and those of the ethnic groups are shown to be important determinants of the solution of the political equilibrium. We also examine the effects of changes in the degree of corruption, aid fatigue, and ethnic composition, in the donor country on the allocation of aid.

Logic of aid in an intertemporal setting

The paper studies the welfare implications of temporary foreign aid in the context of a simple two-country model of trade. In addition to its usual effects, a transfer of income in one period is assumed to influence the preferences of the recipient country in the following period. The implied changes in the terms of trade over the two periods are consistent with a number of possible outcomes with respect to the intertemporal welfare of the donor, the recipient, and the world as a whole. Particular attention is devoted to the conditions for strict Pareto improvement and the circumstances under which temporary aid transactions are likely to occur.

On the tying of aid to tariff reform

This paper considers the welfare effects of foreign aid that is tied to changes in the recipient's tariff. By constructing a three-country model with tariffs, and by allowing for changes both in the amount of aid and in the tariff rates, we are able to consider the welfare implications of two different rules of aid conditionality: (i) a rule which leaves the donor's welfare unchanged, and (ii) a rule which leaves the recipient government's total revenue unchanged. It is shown that the tying of aid to a tariff reform can, inter alia, be used to ensure Pareto improvement.

Optimal foreign aid and tariffs

This paper investigates the optimal choice of foreign aid when trade policies are decided in a non-cooperative fashion. Three alternative scenarios, depending on the timing of the actions and on whether aid is tied, are analyzed. It is shown that, in the case where aid is decided before tariffs, untied aid can lead to the reduction of the recipient's optimal trade tax. When the donor can tie the aid to a reduction in the recipient's tariff, the optimal aid level is always positive and the world can always achieve a Pareto-efficient equilibrium.

The politics of foreign aid: A median voter perspective

The paper presents a model where the median voter in the donor country determines the support of foreign aid. It is first established that an individual in the donor country is affected by the direct benefits (due to altruism) and costs (due to taxes) of giving aid, and by the indirect benefits or costs of a change in the terms of trade. Then it is shown that the latter effect works through changing both the donor country's average income and its distribution of income. Given the stylized facts of a capital-abundant donor country and relatively capital-poor median voter, it is shown how redistribution-of-income effects soften the impact of terms-of-trade changes on the political support for foreign aid.