The Law of Real Property Mortgages

This book examines the principles and practice of real estate mortgages in an easily accessible text referenced to all the Australian States. It specifically deals with the major theoretical and practical aspects of the land mortgage including vitiating factors in formation, mortgagees powers and duties and mortgagors’ rights both statutory and other, assignment, insurance and discharge. As a successor to Mortgages Law in Australia, this book adopts an exclusive focus on real estate mortgages in Australia and provides a thorough account of the law through analysis of the plethora of court decisions and statutory provisions in this area. Duncan and Dixon analyse the substance of the mortgage transaction from creation through to rights of enforcement. This analysis includes detailed consideration of the rights and obligations of both mortgagors and mortgagees covering topics such as priorities and tacking, insurance, variation and assignment, rights of discharge, entry into possession, foreclosure and power of sale. In addition, the book contains a separate chapter on factors that may affect the validity and enforcement of a mortgage together with separate consideration of a mortgagee’s right to enforce a guarantee provided on behalf of a mortgagor and the rights and liabilities associated with a receivership regime initiated by a mortgagee. Written for the national market, the book is one of the few substantial works on this subject for practitioners throughout Australia. It is a very accessible text which enables readers to decide whether or not they have a problem and provides primary guidance to its solution. The book has been deliberately, heavily referenced to incorporate statutory references from across Australia and contains extensive case analysis in order to satisfy both these objectives.

Managing wetlands sustainably as ecosystems : The contribution of the law (part 1)

The ways in which a society set standards of behaviour and of conduct for its members vary hugely. For example, accepted practices, recognised customs, spiritually or morally inspired norms, judicially declared rules, executively formulated edicts, formal legislative enactments or constitutionally embedded rights and duties. Whatever form they assume, these standards are the artificial construction of the human mind. Accordingly the law - whatever its form - can do no more and no less than regulate or set standards for human behaviour, human conduct, and human decision-making. The law cannot regulate the environment. It can only regulate human activities that impact directly or indirectly upon the environment. This applies as much to wetlands as components of the environment as it does to any other components of the environment or the environment at large. The capacity of the law to protect the environment and therefore wetlands is thus totally dependent upon the capacity of the law to regulate human behaviour, human conduct and human decision-making. At the same time the law needs to reflect the specific nature, functions and locations of wetlands. A wetland is an ecosystem by itself; it comprises a range of ecosystems within it; and it is part of a wider set of ecosystems. Hence, the significant ecological functions performed by wetlands. Then there are the benefits flowing to humans from wetlands. These may be social, economic, cultural, aesthetic, or a combination of some or of all of these. It is a challenge for a society acting through its legal system to find the appropriate balance between these ecological and these human values. But that is what sustainability requires.The ways in which a society set standards of behaviour and of conduct for its members vary hugely. For example, accepted practices, recognised customs, spiritually or morally inspired norms, judicially declared rules, executively formulated edicts, formal legislative enactments or constitutionally embedded rights and duties. Whatever form they assume, these standards are the artificial construction of the human mind. Accordingly the law - whatever its form - can do no more and no less than regulate or set standards for human behaviour, human conduct, and human decision-making. The law cannot regulate the environment. It can only regulate human activities that impact directly or indirectly upon the environment. This applies as much to wetlands as components of the environment as it does to any other components of the environment or the environment at large. The capacity of the law to protect the environment and therefore wetlands is thus totally dependent upon the capacity of the law to regulate human behaviour, human conduct and human decision-making. At the same time the law needs to reflect the specific nature, functions and locations of wetlands. A wetland is an ecosystem by itself; it comprises a range of ecosystems within it; and it is part of a wider set of ecosystems. Hence, the significant ecological functions performed by wetlands. Then there are the benefits flowing to humans from wetlands. These may be social, economic, cultural, aesthetic, or a combination of some or of all of these. It is a challenge for a society acting through its legal system to find the appropriate balance between these ecological and these human values. But that is what sustainability requires.

Managing Wetlands Sustainably as Ecosystems: The Contribution of the Law (Part 2)

In this Part 2 attention is turned towards the legal arrangements in nation states for managing wetlands. These national arrangements have effect within the international arrangements already mentioned and any regional arrangements that are relevant. However, each national system is a reflection of its own historical, cultural, political and constitutional background. It is the purpose of this Part 2 to review and assess the national approaches to wetlands management. This involves an analysis of a range of instruments. These are: constitutional rules; strategic rules; regulatory rules; and management rules. Each of these sets of rules performs different functions, assumes different forms and is differentially capable of enforcement.

Drug law enforcement : a review of the evaluation literature

This article describes the results of a systematic review of drug law enforcement evaluations. The authors describe the search procedures and document the results in five main categories: international/national interventions (e.g., interdiction and drug seizure), reactive/ directed interventions (e.g., crackdowns, raids, buy-busts, saturation patrol, etc.), proactive/ partnership interventions (e.g., third-party policing, problem-oriented policing, community policing, drug nuisance abatement, etc.), individualized interventions (e.g., arrest referral and diversion), or interventions that used a combination of reactive/directed and proactive/ partnership strategies. Results indicate that proactive interventions involving partnerships between the police and third parties and/or community entities appear to be more effective at reducing both drug and nondrug problems in drug problem places than are reactive/ directed approaches. But the general quality of research in drug law enforcement is poor, the range of interventions that have been evaluated is limited, and more high-quality research is needed across a greater variety of drug interventions.

Is there a physicality requirement at Common Law? : a survey of the Pre-NRDC cases discussing ‘Manufacture’

One of the fundamental issues that remains unresolved in patent law today, both in Australia and in other jurisdictions, is whether an invention must produce a physical effect or cause a physical transformation of matter to be patentable, or whether it is sufficient that an invention involves a specific practical application of an idea or principle to achieve a useful result. In short, the question is whether Australian patent law contains a physicality requirement. Despite being recently considered by the Federal Court, this is arguably an issue that has yet to be satisfactorily resolved in Australia. In its 2006 decision in Grant v Commissioner of Patents, the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia found that the patentable subject matter standard is rooted in the physical, when it held that an invention must involve a physical effect or transformation to be patent eligible. That decision, however, has been the subject of scrutiny in the academic literature. This article seeks to add to the existing literature written in response to the Grant decision by examining in detail the key common law cases decided prior to the High Court’s watershed decision in National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents, which is the undisputed authoritative statement of principle in regards to the patentable subject matter standard in Australia. This article, in conjunction with others written by the author, questions the Federal Court’s assertion in Grant that the physicality requirement it established is consistent with existing law.

International law and the regulation of violence : shifting perceptions of the legitimacy of the jus ad bellum?

International law’s capacity to influence state behaviour by regulating recourse to violence has been a longstanding source of debate among international lawyers and political scientists. On the one hand, sceptics assert that frequent violations of the prohibition on the use of force have rendered article 2(4) of the UN Charter redundant. They contend that national self-interest, rather than international law, is the key determinant of state behaviour regarding the use of force. On the other hand, defenders of article 2(4) argue first, that most states comply with the Charter framework, and second, that state rhetoric continues to acknowledge the existence of the jus ad bellum. In particular, the fact that violators go to considerable lengths to offer legal or factual justifications for their conduct – typically by relying on the right of self-defence – is advanced as evidence that the prohibition on the use of force retains legitimacy in the eyes of states. This paper identifies two potentially significant features of state practice since 2006 which may signal a shift in states’ perceptions of the normative authority of article 2(4). The first aspect is the recent failure by several states to offer explicit legal justifications for their use or force, or to report action taken in self-defence to the Security Council in accordance with Article 51. Four incidents linked to the global “war on terror” are examined here: Israeli airstrikes in Syria in 2007 and in Sudan in 2009, Turkey’s 2006-2008 incursions into northern Iraq, and Ethiopia’s 2006 intervention in Somalia. The second, more troubling feature is the international community’s apparent lack of concern over the legality of these incidents. Each use of force is difficult to reconcile with the strict requirements of the jus ad bellum; yet none attracted genuine legal scrutiny or debate among other states. While it is too early to conclude that these relatively minor incidents presage long term shifts in state practice, viewed together the two developments identified here suggest a possible downgrading of the role of international law in discussions over the use of force, at least in conflicts linked to the “war on terror”. This, in turn, may represent a declining perception of the normative authority of the jus ad bellum, and a concomitant admission of the limits of international law in regulating violence.

Insurance and the law of negligence : an influential or irrelevant persuader?

This article examines, from both within and outside the context of compulsory third party motor vehicle insurance, the different academic and judicial perspectives regarding the relevance of insurance to the imposition of negligence liability via the formulation of legal principle. In particular, the utility of insurance in setting the standard of care held owing by a learner driver to an instructor in Imbree v McNeilly is analysed and the implications of this High Court decision, in light of current jurisprudential argument and for other principles of negligence liability, namely claimant vulnerability, are considered. It concludes that ultimately one’s stance as to the relevance, or otherwise, of insurance to the development of the common law of negligence will be predominately influenced by normative views of torts’ function as an instrument of corrective or distributive justice.

Section 64 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) and the reluctant buyer

The decision of the Court of Appeal in Dunworth v Mirvac Qld Pty Ltd [2011] QCA 200 arose from unusual circumstances associated with the flood in Brisbane earlier this year. Maris Dunworth (‘the buyer’) agreed to purchase a ground floor residential apartment located beside the Brisbane River at Tennyson from Mirvac Queensland Pty Ltd (‘Mirvac’). The original date for completion was 12 May 2009. In earlier proceedings, the buyer had alleged that she had been induced to purchase the apartment by false, misleading and deceptive representations. This claim was dismissed and an order for specific performance was made with a new completion date of 8 February 2011...

Murray-Darling basin governance : the focus of the law

The legal arrangements for the management of the Murray-Darling Basin in Australia have changed significantly over the years. The Constitution of the Commonwealth has led to the legal arrangements for the management of the Murray-Darling Basin. The Water Act 2000 of Queensland aimed at advancing sustainable management and efficient use of water and other resources by establishing a system for the planning, allocation and use of water. The Water Management Act 2000 of New South Wales ensures the sustainable and integrated management of the water resources of the state benefiting the present and future generations. The Natural Resources Management Act 2004 of South Australia applies to water resources and to other natural resources. The Act aimed at assisting the achievement of ecologically sustainable development in the state.

Impact of the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act 1999 on initial public offering prospectus earnings forecasts

Commencing 13 March 2000, the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act 1999 (Cth) introduced changes to the regulation of corporate fundraising in Australia. In particular, it effected a reduction in the litigation risk associated with initial public offering prospectus disclosure.We find that the change is associated with a reduction in forecast frequency and an increase in forecast value relevance, but not with forecast error or bias. These results confirm previous findings that changes in litigation risk affect the level but not the quality of disclosure. They also suggest that the reforms’ objectives of reducing fundraising costs while improving investor protection, have been achieved.

Work-integrated learning as a component of the capstone experience in undergraduate law

There is currently little guidance in the Australian literature in relation to how to design an effective capstone experience. As a result, universities often fail to provide students with a genuine culminating experience in the final year of their degree. This paper will consider the key objectives of capstone experiences – closure and transition – and will examine how these objectives can be met by a work-integrated learning (WIL) experience. This paper presents an argument for the inclusion of WIL as a component of a capstone experience. WIL is consistent with capstone objectives in focusing on the transition to professional practice. However, the capacity of WIL to meet all of the objectives of capstones may be limited. The paper posits that while WIL should be considered as a potential component of a capstone experience, educators should ensure that WIL is not equated with a capstone experience unless it is carefully designed to ensure that all the objectives of capstones are met.