Does Chinese traditional values matter in regulating China's company directors? Preliminary findings from surveys in Hong Kong

Much has been said about Chinese corporate governance and the new laws on companies. While most literature focuses on either the political or the legal doctrinal issues, this paper argues that Chinese traditional values do matter in Chinese corporate governance. The object of this paper is to report on the preliminary findings of a project supported by the General Research Fund in Hong Kong (HK). Thus far the survey results from HK respondents support our hypothesis. As such, traditional Chinese values should be on the agenda of the next round of company law reforms in China.

Notification of data breaches under the continuous disclosure regime

Consumer personal information is now a valuable commodity for most corporations. Concomitant with increased value is the expansion of new legal obligations to protect personal information. Mandatory data breach notification laws are an important new development in this regard. Such laws require a corporation that has suffered a data breach, which involves personal information, such as a computer hacking incident, to notify those persons who may have been affected by the breach. Regulators may also need to be notified. Australia currently does not have a mandatory data breach notification law but this may be about to change. The Australian Law Reform Commission has suggested that a data breach notification scheme be implemented through the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). However, the notification of data breaches may already be required under the continuous disclosure regime stipulated by the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Listing Rules. Accordingly, this article examines whether the notification of data breaches is a statutory requirement of the existing continuous disclosure regime and whether the ASX should therefore be notified of such incidents.

The application of the statutory derivative action in Pt 2F.1A of the Corporations Act to companies in liquidation under Ch 5 : Well oiled machine or is Pt 2F.1A in need of a tune up?

The statutory derivative action was introduced in Australia in 2000. This right of action has been debated in the literature and introduced in a number of other jurisdictions as well. However, it is by no means clear that all issues have been resolved despite its operation in Australia for over 10 years. This article considers the application of Pt 2F.1A of the Corporations Act to companies in liquidation under Ch 5. It demonstrates that the application involves consideration of not only proper statutory interpretation but also policy matters around the role and the supervision by the court of a liquidator once a company has entered liquidation.

Demanding a change : time to act on statutory demands

The statutory demand procedure has been a part of our corporate law from its earliest modern formulations and it has been suggested, albeit anecdotally, that under the current regime, it gives rise to more litigation than any other part of the Corporations Act. Despite this there has been a lack of consideration of the underlying policy behind the procedure in both the case law and literature; both of which are largely centred on the technical aspects of the process. The purpose of this article is to examine briefly the process of the statutory demand in the context of the current insolvency law in Australia. This paper argues that robust analysis of the statutory demand regime is overdue. The paper first sets out to discover if there is a policy justification for the process and to articulate what that may be. Second, it will briefly examine the current legislation and argue that the structure actually encourages litigation which is arguably undesirable in the context of insolvency. In particular we will ask if the current rigid legal regime is appropriate for dealing efficiently with the highly charged atmosphere of contested insolvency. Third, it will examine suggested reforms in this area as to whether they might be a way forward.

Mandatory auditor rotation : Australian evidence

A key part of the auditor independence reforms in Australia, as represented by Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 (Cth) (CLERP 9), mandates audit partner rotation. The change was criticised predominantly due to the costs imposed on both the audit firms and the audit clients. This study examines the Australian experience post-CLERP 9 with mandated auditor rotation. Based on data of audit partner rotation over 2003–2009 (on average 1200 listed Australian companies over the sample period), we show that audit partner tenure sat at a median of 2–3 years, but that the maximum audit partner tenure was as high as 20 years in the pre-CLERP 9 period. For around 85% of the market, audit partner rotation occurred voluntarily at between 1–5 years. The interesting result is that for 15% of the market, the mandated audit partner rotation had a significant impact on corporate governance practice. There is also a greater observed impact of mandatory rotation on audit engagements involving the non-global auditing firms. These findings inform the debate as to the ‘costliness’ of the law reform.

Regulatory responses to auditor independence dilemmas – who takes the stronger line?

A key part of corporate governance reforms in Australia, as represented by CLERP 9, addresses concerns over the audit function and the role of independent auditors in monitoring managers and providing useful information to stakeholders about the financial position of the company. In comparing the regulatory responses to auditor independence dilemmas, there have been claims that CLERP 9 is less ‘stringent’ than the reforms imposed by the Sarbanes Oxley Act in the US. This paper looks at three particular situations that have been the subject of recent reform to strengthen independence: the mandatory rotation of auditors, recruitment of former auditors as board members, and provision of non-audit services to clients. In each case, we compare the similarities and differences of the regulatory response between Australia and US, to distil the efficacy of the CLERP 9 approach.

The non-binding vote on executive pay : a review of the CLERP 9 reform

Directors’ and executives’ remuneration, including levels of pay, accountability and transparency, is controversial. Section 250R of the CLERP (Audit Reform & Disclosure) Act 2004 that was not greatly anticipated, requires the holding of a non-binding resolution on board remuneration at companies’ annual general meetings. The reform has been criticised on the basis that, inter alia, it blurs the respective roles of shareholders and directors. This article identifies possible motivations for the imposition of the non-binding resolution in Australia. These are evaluated with reference to sources of corporate governance policy and the current state of Australia’s relevant corporate governance structures. We speculate that the non-binding vote will not amount to a substantive addition to the corporate governance regime.

Securities market regulators’ use of the ‘please explain’ queries sanction and its power of compliance

The aim of this study is to investigate the compliance impact of price queries issued by a securities market operator to its participating firms. Market operators in Australia and New Zealand, such as the Australian Securities Exchange and the New Zealand Securities Exchange, have the regulatory power in their rules to issue queries to its market participants to explain unusual fluctuations in trading price or volume in the market. The operator will issue a price query where it believes that the market has not been fully informed as to price relevant information. Responsive regulation has informed much of the regulatory debate in securities laws in our region. We posit that price queries are one strategy that a market operator can use in communicating its enforcement expectations to its stakeholder. However, whilst responsive regulation informs regulatory choices, an alternate view seeks to explain why participants respond to these regulatory strategies, and we use disclosure behaviour after price queries to test compliance behaviour

Demanding a change : time to act on statutory demands

The statutory demand procedure has been a part of our corporate law from its earliest modern formulations and it has been suggested, albeit anecdotally, that under the current regime, it gives rise to more litigation than any other part of the Corporations Act. Despite this there has been a lack of consideration of the underlying policy behind the procedure in both the case law and literature; both of which are largely centred on the technical aspects of the process. The purpose of this article is to examine briefly the process of the statutory demand in the context of the current insolvency law in Australia.

The 'two strikes' rule on the remuneration report : threats and opportunities for boards

This article examines the fast moving debate on the law and policy surrounding shareholder voting on their companies’ remuneration report, at the AGM. Recently, Australia has moved from the ‘non-binding’ vote provided to shareholders, to the more prescriptive ‘two strikes rule’; that is, two negative shareholder resolutions after 1 July 2011 may result in a board re-election. While much commentary has focused on the potential threats— impacts on remuneration reports and the potential costs to the company — we discuss another potential consequence: an opportunity for board recruitment. At a time when companies are also expected to comment on their diversity policies, planning for a threatened ‘spill’ creates an opportunity for board composition planning and succession. The arguments presented are also placed in the context of the UK debate, where recent proposals advocate for wider stakeholder engagement and diversity in remuneration planning.

Meta-regulation approach to raise social accountability In global supply firms

This Article proposes a meta-regulation approach to address the gap between the objectives, commitment, practice and outcome in the accountability practice of the global supply chain in the developing countries. The literatures on the accountability practice in the global supply chains typically focuses on the strategies for raising corporate social accountability standards in multinational buying firms and seldom focuses on this strategies in the outsourced firms in the developing countries. This article tries to fill this void by examining the situation in Bangladesh, the third largest RMG supply country in the world. It conceptualizes a meta-regulation approach with the aim of raising social accountability practice in this industry. It shows that this regulation approach is suitable to effectively raise this practice standard in a perspective where the non-legal drivers are meagrely low, global buying firms are highly profit driven and the governmental agencies are either inadequate or highly corrupt.

The conundrum of phoenix activity in Australia: Is further reform necessary?

Corporate phoenixing activity is estimated to cost the Australian economy $1-3 billion dollars annually. Significant questions arise as to whether existing legal frameworks are adequate to deal with phoenix activity, and whether further reform is necessary. Bills proposing reform appear to be languishing amid doubts as to their potential effectiveness. This paper will examine the conundrum presented by phoenix activity, the importance of further reform and the impact of the lack of a statutory definition of ‘phoenix activity’ on a regulatory environment that not only uses the term, but punishes offenders accused of it.

The conundrum of phoenix activity: Is further reform necessary?

Phoenix activity presents a conundrum for the law and its regulators. While there is economic cost associated with all phoenix activity, the underlying behaviour is not always illegal. A transaction with indicators of phoenix activity may be an entirely innocent and well-intentioned display of entrepreneurial spirit, albeit one that has ended in failure. Restructuring post business failure is not illegal per se. Recent reforms targeting phoenix activity fail to grapple with the vast range of behaviour that can be described as phoenix activity since they do not differentiate between legal and illegal activity. This article explores the importance of the distinction between legal and illegal phoenix activity, the extent to which the existing law captures a range of behaviour that can be described as illegal phoenix activity and the response of key regulators and governmental bodies to the absence of single law that attempts to define illegal phoenix activity.

Economic theory informing approaches to phoenix activity in small business: A neo-Schumpeterian analysis

The adequacy and efficiency of existing legal and regulatory frameworks dealing with corporate phoenix activity have been repeatedly called into question over the past two decades through various reviews, inquiries, targeted regulatory operations and the implementation of piecemeal legislative reform. Despite these efforts, phoenix activity does not appear to have abated. While there is no law in Australia that declares ‘phoenix activity’ to be illegal, the behaviour that tends to manifest in phoenix activity can be capable of transgressing a vast array of law, including for example, corporate law, tax law, and employment law. This paper explores the notion that the persistence of phoenix activity despite the sheer extent of this law suggests that the law is not acting as powerfully as it might as a deterrent. Economic theories of entrepreneurship and innovation can to some extent explain why this is the case and also offer a sound basis for the evaluation and reconsideration of the existing law. The challenges facing key regulators are significant. Phoenix activity is not limited to particular corporate demographic: it occurs in SMEs, large companies and in corporate groups. The range of behaviour that can amount to phoenix activity is so broad, that not all phoenix activity is illegal. This paper will consider regulatory approaches to these challenges via analysis of approaches to detection and enforcement of the underlying law capturing illegal phoenix activity. Remedying the mischief of phoenix activity is of practical importance. The benefits include continued confidence in our economy, law that inspires best practice among directors, and law that is articulated in a manner such that penalties act as a sufficient deterrent and the regulatory system is able to detect offenders and bring them to account. Any further reforms must accommodate and tolerate legal phoenix activity, at least to some extent. Even then, phoenix activity pushes tolerance of repeated entrepreneurial failure to its absolute limit. The more limited liability is misused and abused, the stronger the argument to place some restrictions on access to limited liability. This paper proposes that such an approach is a legitimate next step for a robust and mature capitalist economy.

Rethinking corporate governance and law in China : the theories, rules and practices

Economic reforms have transformed China into a modern economy - this requires greater emphasis on regulating markets and governing corporations to ensure economic growth continues. Yet, legal reforms are not as straightforward as transplanting Western models; more modification to suit Chinese political land cultural considerations needs to be incorporated. Likewise privatisation of the telecommuications sector does not mean that government influence in the new corporations cease. This is not necessarily negative as long as safeguards are in place. Plainly further reforms to the law and governance will be needed. Given that Confucian philosophy continues to play a central role in Chinese society and values, developing laws and governance practices from Confucian principles will arguably be appropriate for modern China.