Keeping clear on costs: Geatches v Anglo Coal (Moranbah North Management Pty Ltd) [2014] QSC 106

In Geatches v Anglo Coal (Moranbah North Management Pty Ltd [2014] QSC 106, a dispute arose in the context of an assessment of costs as to the meaning to be attributed to particular terms of settlement and discharge signed by the parties. The court was required to consider the implications of those documents, and of a subsequent consent order intended to reflect the agreed settlement. Recovery of costs - terms of settlement and discharge exclude recovery of costs against one party and require other party to pay costs of claim against it - whether only subsequent consent order should be construed - implications where costs were common and mixed costs - whether costs should be apportioned

The implication of a term of good faith in commercial leases

Much has been written in the past decade on the subject of the implication of a term of good faith in contracts in Australia, particularly since the judgment Priestley JA in Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minister for Public Works (1992) 26 NSWLR 234. Except for an early article by Rachael Mulheron, 'Good Faith and Commercial Leases: New Opportunities for the Tenant' (1996) 4 APLJ 223, very little else has been written with respect to the possible application of the doctrine to the commercial leases.With the advent of two later New South Wales Supreme Court decisions Alcatel Australia Ltd v Scarcella (1998) 44 NSWLR 349 and, more recently, Advance Fitness v Bondi Diggers [1999] NSWSC 264, the question of the application of the doctrine in the commercial leasing context has been examined. This article briefly considers the nature and substance of the doctrine against the background of the relationship of lessor and lessee and examines in some depth the Australian decisions on commercial leases where it has been sought, unsuccessfully, to apply the doctrine. The article concludes by suggesting that as a standard commercial lease usually covers the field of agreement between lessor and lessee and as a lessee has a high degree of statutory protection derived from equitable principles, there may be little room for the operation of the doctrine in this legal environment.

Foreseeability of pure economic loss and causation

In Bonny Glen Pty Ltd v Country Energy [2009] NSWCA 26 (24 February 2009) the New South Wales Court of Appeal held that the pure economic loss suffered by the appellant was recoverable. However, rather than arguments as to whether the appellant was vulnerable and a member of an ascertainable class, whether the respondent had knowledge of the risk to the appellant and was in a position of control and considerations as to indeterminate liability as in Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180, the arguments raised related to the foreseeability of the loss and causation.

Artful determination : "state of the art" and PCME Ltd v. Goyen COntrols Co. UK Ltd

In a recent decision by Mr Justice Laddie, a patent was held anticipated by, inter alia, prior use of a device which fell within the claims of the patent in suit, even though its circuitry was enclosed in resin. The anticipating invention had been "made available to the public" within the terms of section 2 (2) of the Patents Act 1977 because its essential integers would have been revealed by an interesting character, the "skilled forensic engineer".

Further notes on the application of zero-inflated models in highway safety

The intent of this note is to succinctly articulate additional points that were not provided in the original paper (Lord et al., 2005) and to help clarify a collective reluctance to adopt zero-inflated (ZI) models for modeling highway safety data. A dialogue on this important issue, just one of many important safety modeling issues, is healthy discourse on the path towards improved safety modeling. This note first provides a summary of prior findings and conclusions of the original paper. It then presents two critical and relevant issues: the maximizing statistical fit fallacy and logic problems with the ZI model in highway safety modeling. Finally, we provide brief conclusions.

Queensland requirements (old and new) for the appointment of a real estate agent

In Moneywood Pty Ltd v Salamon Nominees Pty Ltd 1 the High Court of Australia considered an appeal from the Queensland Court of Appeal in relation to the correct interpretation of s76 (1)(c) Auctioneers and Agents Act 1971 (Qld). In paraphrase, s76(1)(c) provides that a real estate agent shall not be entitled to sue for or recover any commission unless “the engagement or appointment to act as …..real estate agent ….. in respect of such transaction is in writing signed by the person to be charged with such…..commission…..or the person’s agent or representative” (“the statutory requirement”).

Beware the doctrine of election!

The operation of the doctrine of election, as it applies in a conveyancing context, was recently considered by the Queensland Court of Appeal (McMurdo P and White and Fryberg JJ) in Barooga Projects (Investments) Pty Ltd v Duncan [2004] QCA 149.

Compensation for compulsory acquisition of a licensed car parking space

The Acquisition of Land Act 1967 (Qld) (‘the Act’) deals with the acquisition of land by the State for public purposes and provides for compensation. The issue that arose for determination in Sorrento Medical Service Pty Ltd v Chief Executive, Dept of Main Roads [2007] QCA 73 was whether the appellant was entitled to claim compensation under the Act in respect of land resumed by the Main Roads Department over which the appellant had an exclusive contractual licence for car parking spaces for use in association with a medical centre leased by the appellant. At first instance, it was held by the Land Court that the appellant was not entitled to compensation for the resumption of the car parking spaces. The basis for this decision by the Land Court was that a right to compensation only exists where resumption has taken some proprietary interest of the claimant in the land. Following an appeal to the Land Appeal Court being dismissed, the appellant instituted the present appeal to the Queensland Court of Appeal (McMurdo P, Holmes JA and Chesterman J).

Cranes, claims and a statutory right of user

In larger developments there is potential for construction cranes to encroach into the airspace of neighbouring properties. To resolve issues of this nature, a statutory right of user may be sought under s 180 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld). Section 180 allows the court to impose a statutory right of user on servient land where it is reasonably necessary in the interests of effective use in any reasonable manner of the dominant land. Such an order will not be made unless the court is satisfied that it is consistent with public interest, the owner of the servient land can be adequately recompensed for any loss or disadvantage which may be suffered from the imposition and the owner of the servient land has refused unreasonably to agree to accept the imposition of that obligation. In applying the statutory provision, a key practical concern for legal advisers will be the basis for assessment of compensation. A recent decision of the Queensland Supreme Court (Douglas J) provides guidance concerning matters relevant to this assessment. The decision is Lang Parade Pty Ltd v Peluso [2005] QSC 112.

Queensland Court of Appeal opines on the meaning of 'material prejudice'

The decision of Wilson J in Wilson v Mirvac Queensland Pty Ltd was the subject of an article in an earlier edition of this journal. At that time, it was foreshadowed that the decision was to be taken on appeal. The decision of the Court of Appeal in Mirvac Queensland Pty Ltd v Wilson is considered in this article.

Statutory right of user imposed for landlocked land

The decision of McMurdo J in Pacific Coast Investments Pty Ltd v Cowlishaw [2005] QSC 259 concerned an application under s 180 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) for a statutory right of user.

The requirement to 'Start a Proceeding' to prevent the lapse of a caveat

Section 126 of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) regulates whether, and if so, when a caveat will lapse. While certain caveats will not lapse due to the operation of s 126(1), if a caveator does not wish a caveat to which the section applies to lapse, the caveator must start a proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction to establish the interest claimed under the caveat within the time limits specified in, and otherwise comply with the obligations imposed by, s 126(4). The requirement, in s 126(4), to “start a proceeding” was the subject of judicial examination by the Court of Appeal (McMurdo P, Holmes JA and MacKenzie J) in Cousins Securities Pty Ltd v CEC Group Ltd [2007] QCA 192.

Unreasonable withholding of consent?

In Cathmark Pty Ltd v NetherCott Constructions Pty Ltd [2011] QSC 86, Cullinane J was asked to consider whether a landlord had unreasonably withheld consent to a tenant’s proposed assignment of lease. In reaching a conclusion that the landlord had acted unreasonably, the decision provides useful guidance on an issue that is common in a proposed sale of business context.

The taxation of international maritime leasing profits : has the commissioners ship come in?

In light of McDermott Industries (AUST) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation, and Draft Taxation Ruling TR 2006/D8, this article considers the current Australian taxation position of profits arising from the cross-border leasing of vessels in the maritime industry. It focuses on the tax treaties to which Australia is a party, in particular the application of the business profits provisions of those treaties, and the deemed existence of a permanent establishment where substantial equipment, owned by a fiscal non-resident, is used within Australian waters.