Judicial intervention in the affairs of unincorporated religious associations in New South Wales

The leading Australian High Court case of Cameron v Hogan (1934) 51 CLR 358 confirmed that associations which are 'social, sporting, political, scientific, religious, artistic or humanitarian in character’, and not formed ‘for private gain or material advantage’, are usually formed on a basis of mutual consent. Unless there is some clear, positive indication that the members wish to relate to each other in a legal fashion, the rules of the association will not be treated as an enforceable contract in contrast to the rules of incorporated bodies. Australian unincorporated associations experiencing internal disputes, like those in most other common law jurisdictions, have found courts reluctant to provide a remedy unless there is a proprietary interest or trust to protect. This is further compounded by the judicial view that an unincorporated association has no legal recognition as a ‘juristic person’. The right to hold property and the ability to sue and be sued are incidences of this recognition. By contrast, the law recognises ‘artificial’ legal persons such as corporations, who are given rights to hold property and to sue and be sued. However, when a number of individuals associate together for a non-commercial, lawful purpose, but not by way of a corporate structure, legal recognition ‘as a group’ is denied. Since 1934, a significant number of cases have distinguished or otherwise declined to follow this precedent of the High Court. A trenchant criticism is found in McKinnon v Grogan [1974] 1 NSWLR 295, 298 where Wootten J said that ‘citizens are entitled to look to the courts for the same assistance in resolving disputes about the conduct of sporting, political and social organisations as they can expect in relation to commercial institutions’. According to Wootten J at 298, if disputes are not settled by the courts, this would create a ‘legal-no-man's land, in which disputes are settled not in accordance with justice and the fulfilment of deliberately undertaken obligations, but by deceit, craftiness, and an arrogant disregard of rights’. Cameron v Hogan was decided in 1934. There is an increasing volume of first instance cases which distinguish or, in the words of Palmer J, ‘just pay lip service’ to this High Court decision. (Coleman v Liberal Party of Australia (2007) 212 FLR 271, 278). The dissenting cases seem to call for a judicial policy initiative. This would require recognition by judges that voluntary associations play a significant role in society and that members have a legitimate, enforceable expectation that the rules of the association will be observed by members and in the last resort, enforced by the courts without the need to prove contractual intention, the existence of a trust or the existence of a right of a proprietary nature. This thesis asks: what legal, as distinct from political, redress does an ordinary member have, when a rule is made or a process followed which is contrary to the underlying doctrines and philosophies embodied in the constitutional documents of an unincorporated religious association? When, if at all, will a court intervene to ensure doctrinal purity or to supervise the daily life of a large unincorporated religious association? My research objective is to examine and analyse leading cases and relevant legislation on the enforceability of the constitutions of large, unincorporated, religious associations with particular reference to the Anglican Church in New South Wales. Given its numerical size, wide geographical spread and presence since the foundation of New South Wales, the Anglican Church in New South Wales, contains a sufficient variety of ‘real life’ situations to be representative of the legal issues posed by Cameron v Hogan which may be faced by other large, unincorporated, religious associations in New South Wales. In contemporary society, large, unincorporated, religious associations play an important community role. The resolution of internal disputes in such associations should not remain captive to legal doctrines of an earlier age.

The Royal Commission into the NSW Police Service : process corruption and the limits of judicial reflexivity

This paper will offer an examination of the Reports of the Royal Commission into the NSW Police Service (Interim Report February 1996; Interim Report: Immediate Measures November 1996; Final Report Vol I: Corruption; Final Report Vol II: Reform; Final Report Vol III: Appendices May 1997) excluding the Report on Paedophilia, August 1997. The examination will be confined essentially to one question: to what extent do the published Reports consider the part played by the judiciary, prosecutors and lawyers, in the construction of a form of criminal justice revealed by the Commission itself, to be disfigured by serious process corruption? The examination will be conducted by way of a chronological trawl through the Reports of the Commission in an attempt to identify all references to the role of the judiciary, prosecutors and lawyers. The adequacy of any such treatment will then be considered. In order to set the scene a brief and generalised overview of the Wood Commission will be offered together with the Commission's definition of process corruption.

‘Structuring’ judicial sentencing discretion : consistency, guidance or pandering to the punitive?

Until quite recently, most Australian jurisdictions gave statutory force to the principle of imprisonment as a sanction of last resort, reflecting its status as the most punitive sentencing option open to the court.1 That principle gave primary discretion as to whether incarceration was the most appropriate means of achieving the purpose of a sentence to the sentencing court, which received all of the information relevant to the offence, the offender and any victim(s). The disestablishment of this principle is symptomatic of an increasing erosion of judicial discretion with respect to sentencing, which appears to be resulting in some extremely punitive consequences.

Withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment in a patient's best interests : Australian judicial deliberations

•Intractable disputes about withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from adults who lack capacity are rare but challenging. Judicial resolution may be needed in some of these cases. •A central concept for judicial (and clinical) decision making in this area is a patient's “best interests”. Yet what this term means is contested. •There is an emerging Supreme Court jurisprudence that sheds light on when life-sustaining treatment will, or will not, be judged to be in a patient's best interests. •Treatment that is either futile or overly burdensome is not in a patient's best interests. Although courts will consider patient and family wishes, they have generally deferred to the views of medical practitioners about treatment decisions.

Environmental Crime and Specialist Courts: The case for a ‘One-Stop (Judicial) Shop’ in Queensland

The increasing international political, public and scientific engagement in matters of environmental sustainability and development has produced a rapidly expanding body of environmental law and policy. The advent of international protocols, directives, and multilateral agreements has occurred concomitantly with the harmonisation of widespread environmental regimes of governance and enforcement within numerous domestic settings. This has created an unprecedented need for environmental legal apparatuses to manage, regulate and adjudicate legislation seeking to protect, sustain and develop global natural habitats. The evolving literature in green criminology continues to explore these developments within discourses of power, harm and justice. Such critiques have emphasised the role of dedicated environmental courts to address environmental crimes and injustices. In this article, we examine the important role of specialist courts in responding to environmental crime, with specific reference to the State of Queensland. We offer a critique of existing processes and practices for the adjudication of environmental crime and propose new jurisdictional and procedural approaches for enhancing justice. We conclude that specialist environmental courts endowed with broad civil and criminal jurisdiction are an integral part of an effective response to environmental crime.

A narrative analysis of judicial attitudes towards sexual harassment in Japan

This study applies a narrative analysis of the first two judicial decisions on sexual harassment in Japan to test claims of a culture of gender bias in Japanese judicial attitudes towards victims of sexual violence. Although the results do not provide an unambiguous support or rebuttal of gendered justice in Japan, they do reveal some of the dangers of narrative analysis as a basis for making generalizable claims about how law functions in Japanese society.

Recognition and enforcement in cross-border insolvency law: A proposal for judicial gap-filling

This Article analyzes the recognition and enforcement of cross-border insolvency judgments from the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia to determine whether the UNCITRAL Model Law’s goal of modified universalism is currently being practiced, and subjects the Model Law to analysis through the lens of international relations theories to elaborate a way forward. We posit that courts could use the express language of the Model Law text to confer recognition and enforcement of foreign insolvency judgments. The adoption of our proposal will reduce costs, maximize recovery for creditors, and ensure predictability for all parties.