Secrets, Lies and Children's Fiction

Many children learn from a very young age about the importance of always telling the truth. They also learn that telling lies is necessary if they are to survive in a world that paradoxically values the truth but practises deception. Secrets, Lies and Children’s Fiction demonstrates how this paradox is played out in texts for children and young adults, how secrets and lies may be a necessary means for survival and adaptation, and how mendacity may have its virtues.

A Bayesian network approach to modelling temporal behaviour of Lyngbya majuscula bloom initiation

Lyngbya majuscula is a cyanobacterium (blue-green algae) occurring naturally in tropical and subtropical coastal areas worldwide. Deception Bay, in Northern Moreton Bay, Queensland, has a history of Lyngbya blooms, and forms a case study for this investigation. The South East Queensland (SEQ) Healthy Waterways Partnership, collaboration between government, industry, research and the community, was formed to address issues affecting the health of the river catchments and waterways of South East Queensland. The Partnership coordinated the Lyngbya Research and Management Program (2005-2007) which culminated in a Coastal Algal Blooms (CAB) Action Plan for harmful and nuisance algal blooms, such as Lyngbya majuscula. This first phase of the project was predominantly of a scientific nature and also facilitated the collection of additional data to better understand Lyngbya blooms. The second phase of this project, SEQ Healthy Waterways Strategy 2007-2012, is now underway to implement the CAB Action Plan and as such is more management focussed. As part of the first phase of the project, a Science model for the initiation of a Lyngbya bloom was built using Bayesian Networks (BN). The structure of the Science Bayesian Network was built by the Lyngbya Science Working Group (LSWG) which was drawn from diverse disciplines. The BN was then quantified with annual data and expert knowledge. Scenario testing confirmed the expected temporal nature of bloom initiation and it was recommended that the next version of the BN be extended to take this into account. Elicitation for this BN thus occurred at three levels: design, quantification and verification. The first level involved construction of the conceptual model itself, definition of the nodes within the model and identification of sources of information to quantify the nodes. The second level included elicitation of expert opinion and representation of this information in a form suitable for inclusion in the BN. The third and final level concerned the specification of scenarios used to verify the model. The second phase of the project provides the opportunity to update the network with the newly collected detailed data obtained during the previous phase of the project. Specifically the temporal nature of Lyngbya blooms is of interest. Management efforts need to be directed to the most vulnerable periods to bloom initiation in the Bay. To model the temporal aspects of Lyngbya we are using Object Oriented Bayesian networks (OOBN) to create ‘time slices’ for each of the periods of interest during the summer. OOBNs provide a framework to simplify knowledge representation and facilitate reuse of nodes and network fragments. An OOBN is more hierarchical than a traditional BN with any sub-network able to contain other sub-networks. Connectivity between OOBNs is an important feature and allows information flow between the time slices. This study demonstrates more sophisticated use of expert information within Bayesian networks, which combine expert knowledge with data (categorized using expert-defined thresholds) within an expert-defined model structure. Based on the results from the verification process the experts are able to target areas requiring greater precision and those exhibiting temporal behaviour. The time slices incorporate the data for that time period for each of the temporal nodes (instead of using the annual data from the previous static Science BN) and include lag effects to allow the effect from one time slice to flow to the next time slice. We demonstrate a concurrent steady increase in the probability of initiation of a Lyngbya bloom and conclude that the inclusion of temporal aspects in the BN model is consistent with the perceptions of Lyngbya behaviour held by the stakeholders. This extended model provides a more accurate representation of the increased risk of algal blooms in the summer months and show that the opinions elicited to inform a static BN can be readily extended to a dynamic OOBN, providing more comprehensive information for decision makers.

Show me the magic : the adventures of Don McAlpine

Synopsis Show Me The Magic takes us on an enthralling and joyful journey into the life and work of the legendary and world-renowned Australian cinematographer, Don McAlpine. A country kid from the small wheat-belt town of Quandialla in isolated south-western New South Wales, Australia, McAlpine was born in 1934 - the year before the first technicolour film was released. There wasn’t even a cinema in Quandialla. Don helped his mother support their family from the age of 14, when his father was stricken by tuberculosis. His part-time job at the Temora chemist as a darkroom photo developer struck a chord in young Don's soul. Soon, a school performance of The Mikado ignited in him the desire to entertain an audience. His fascination with the magical images emerging from his darkroom set him on the winding path that would eventually lead to the glittering lights of Hollywood, where, in 2009, he received the American Society of Cinematographers’ “International Cinematographer of the Year” Award in front of the foremost luminaries of the American film industry. That same year, Don shot his 50th film, X-Men Origins: Wolverine, a big-budget, effects-driven action movie directed by Oscar-winner Gavin Hood and starring Hugh Jackman. Show Me the Magic takes us on set and behind the scenes of that film. In 2011, Don posted another landmark: Mental, a low budget movie directed by PJ Hogan (Muriel’s Wedding, My Best Friend’s Wedding, Peter Pan). Mental was Don’s first digital film and his first Australian film in 25 years. As we travel with Don back into his past, and into the Australian outback landscape that he loves so much, we experience the extremes of movie making: embedded alongside him on the contrasting sets of Wolverine and Mental, we peel back the layers of what Don calls ‘the beautiful deception' of cinema to illuminate the world behind the screen. Joined by celebrated Australian directors Bruce Beresford and Gillian Armstrong, we explore the heritage of the remarkable Australian films that Don photographed, including the iconic Breaker Morant and My Brilliant Career. In Los Angeles, Don reconnects with Paul Mazursky who gave him his big break in Hollywood with Tempest and followed up with Down and Out in Beverly Hills. And two Australians of a later generation - Baz Luhrmann and Catherine Martin - take us behind the scenes on Don’s spectacular creative achievements – Romeo + Juliet and Moulin Rouge! At once the story of a remarkable man and an exploration of filmmaking at the highest level, Show Me The Magic will engage and entrance anyone who has ever been touched by the magic of movies. - See more at: http://www.showmethemagic.com.au/film.htm#synopsis" This film is dedicated to the memory of South African film-maker Peter Henkel, 1924 - 1992.

Social engineering in social networking sites : phase-based and source-based models

Social networking sites (SNSs), with their large numbers of users and large information base, seem to be perfect breeding grounds for exploiting the vulnerabilities of people, the weakest link in security. Deceiving, persuading, or influencing people to provide information or to perform an action that will benefit the attacker is known as “social engineering.” While technology-based security has been addressed by research and may be well understood, social engineering is more challenging to understand and manage, especially in new environments such as SNSs, owing to some factors of SNSs that reduce the ability of users to detect the attack and increase the ability of attackers to launch it. This work will contribute to the knowledge of social engineering by presenting the first two conceptual models of social engineering attacks in SNSs. Phase-based and source-based models are presented, along with an intensive and comprehensive overview of different aspects of social engineering threats in SNSs.

Toward understanding social engineering

There is no doubt that social engineering plays a vital role in compromising most security defenses, and in attacks on people, organizations, companies, or even governments. It is the art of deceiving and tricking people to reveal critical information or to perform an action that benefits the attacker in some way. Fraudulent and deceptive people have been using social engineering traps and tactics using information technology such as e-mails, social networks, web sites, and applications to trick victims into obeying them, accepting threats, and falling victim to various crimes and attacks such as phishing, sexual abuse, financial abuse, identity theft, impersonation, physical crime, and many other forms of attack. Although organizations, researchers, practitioners, and lawyers recognize the severe risk of social engineering-based threats, there is a severe lack of understanding and controlling of such threats. One side of the problem is perhaps the unclear concept of social engineering as well as the complexity of understand human behaviors in behaving toward, approaching, accepting, and failing to recognize threats or the deception behind them. The aim of this paper is to explain the definition of social engineering based on the related theories of the many related disciplines such as psychology, sociology, information technology, marketing, and behaviourism. We hope, by this work, to help researchers, practitioners, lawyers, and other decision makers to get a fuller picture of social engineering and, therefore, to open new directions of collaboration toward detecting and controlling it.

Typology of phishing email victims based on their behavioural response

A victim of phishing emails could be subjected to money loss and identity theft. This paper investigates the different types of phishing email victims, with the goal of increasing such victims' defences. To obtain this kind of information, an experiment which involves sending a phishing email to participants is conducted. Quantitative and qualitative methods are also used to collect users' information. A model for detecting deception has been employed to understand victims' behaviour. This paper reports the qualitative results. The findings suggest that victims of phishing emails do not always exhibit the same vulnerability. The cause of being a victim is a result of three weaknesses in the detection process: (1) lack of knowledge; (2) weak confirmation channel, and; (3) victims' high propensity towards risk-taking. Therefore, it is suggested that users be provided with suitable confirmation channels and be more risk averse in their behaviour so that they would not fall victim to phishing emails.

The impact of users' characteristics on their ability to detect phishing emails

We investigate how email users' characteristics influence their response to phishing emails. A user generally goes through three stages of behaviour upon receiving a phishing email: suspicion of the legitimacy of the email, confirmation of its legitimacy and response by either performing the action requested in the phishing email or not. Using a mixed method approach combining experiments, surveys and semi-structured interviews, we found that a user's behaviour at each stage varies with their personal characteristics such as personality traits and ability to perceive information in an email beyond its content. We found, for example, that users who are submissive, extraverted or open tend to be less suspicious of phishing emails while users who can identify cues such as inconsistent IP address, can avoid falling victim to phishing emails. Our findings enable us to draw practical implications for educating and potentially reducing the incidence of phishing emails victimisation.

Social engineering in social networking sites : how good becomes evil

Social Engineering (ES) is now considered the great security threat to people and organizations. Ever since the existence of human beings, fraudulent and deceptive people have used social engineering tricks and tactics to trick victims into obeying them. There are a number of social engineering techniques that are used in information technology to compromise security defences and attack people or organizations such as phishing, identity theft, spamming, impersonation, and spaying. Recently, researchers have suggested that social networking sites (SNSs) are the most common source and best breeding grounds for exploiting the vulnerabilities of people and launching a variety of social engineering based attacks. However, the literature shows a lack of information about what types of social engineering threats exist on SNSs. This study is part of a project that attempts to predict a persons’ vulnerability to SE based on demographic factors. In this paper, we demonstrate the different types of social engineering based attacks that exist on SNSs, the purposes of these attacks, reasons why people fell (or did not fall) for these attacks, based on users’ opinions. A qualitative questionnaire-based survey was conducted to collect and analyse people’s experiences with social engineering tricks, deceptions, or attacks on SNSs.

Social engineering in social networking sites : the art of impersonation

Social networking sites (SNSs), with their large number of users and large information base, seem to be the perfect breeding ground for exploiting the vulnerabilities of people, who are considered the weakest link in security. Deceiving, persuading, or influencing people to provide information or to perform an action that will benefit the attacker is known as “social engineering.” Fraudulent and deceptive people use social engineering traps and tactics through SNSs to trick users into obeying them, accepting threats, and falling victim to various crimes such as phishing, sexual abuse, financial abuse, identity theft, and physical crime. Although organizations, researchers, and practitioners recognize the serious risks of social engineering, there is a severe lack of understanding and control of such threats. This may be partly due to the complexity of human behaviors in approaching, accepting, and failing to recognize social engineering tricks. This research aims to investigate the impact of source characteristics on users’ susceptibility to social engineering victimization in SNSs, particularly Facebook. Using grounded theory method, we develop a model that explains what and how source characteristics influence Facebook users to judge the attacker as credible.

More than just friends? Facebook, disclosive ethics and the morality of technology

Social networking sites have become increasingly popular destinations for people wishing to chat, play games, make new friends or simply stay in touch. Furthermore, many organizations have been quick to grasp the potential they offer for marketing, recruitment and economic activities. Nevertheless, counterclaims depict such spaces as arenas where deception, social grooming and the posting of defamatory content flourish. Much research in this area has focused on the ends to which people deploy the technology, and the consequences arising, with a view to making policy recommendations and ethical interventions. In this paper, we argue that tracing where morality lies is more complex than these efforts suggest. Using the case of a popular social networking site, and concepts about the morality of technology, we disclose the ethics of Facebook as diffuse and multiple. In our conclusions we provide some reflections on the possibilities for action in light of this disclosure.

Getting away with murder: An examination of detected homicides staged as suicides

Staged crime scenes involve an offender deliberately altering evidence to simulate events to mislead investigators. Despite likely occurring more often than reported in the literature due to success in offender deception, the exact frequency of staged crime scenes is unknown. In an attempt to bridge this gap, a legal database was searched for detected staged scenes. A total of 115 cases were examined, and this study reports on 16 staged suicides that were examined through descriptive analysis. Findings indicate the frequent involvement of firearms, hanging, or asphyxia; and that offenders are usually known to victims, although not necessarily intimately.

Susceptibility to social engineering in social networking sites: The case of Facebook

Past research has suggested that social engineering poses the most significant security risk. Recent studies have suggested that social networking sites (SNSs) are the most common source of social engineering attacks. The risk of social engineering attacks in SNSs is associated with the difficulty of making accurate judgments regarding source credibility in the virtual environment of SNSs. In this paper, we quantitatively investigate source credibility dimensions in terms of social engineering on Facebook, as well as the source characteristics that influence Facebook users to judge an attacker as credible, therefore making them susceptible to victimization. Moreover, in order to predict users’ susceptibility to social engineering victimization based on their demographics, we investigate the effectiveness of source characteristics on different demographic groups by measuring the consent intentions and behavior responses of users to social engineering requests using a role-play experiment.

Measuring source credibility of social engineering attackers on Facebook

Past research has suggested that social networking sites are the most common source for social engineering-based attacks. Persuasion research shows that people are more likely to obey and accept a message when the source’s presentation appears to be credible. However, many factors can impact the perceived credibility of a source, depending on its type and the characteristics of the environment. Our previous research showed that there are four dimensions of source credibility in terms of social engineering on Facebook: perceived sincerity, perceived competence, perceived attraction, and perceived worthiness. Because the dimensionalities of source credibility as well as their measurement scales can fluctuate from one type of source to another and from one type of context to another, our aim in this study includes validating the existence of those four dimensions toward the credibility of social engineering attackers on Facebook and developing a valid measurement scale for every dimension of them.