Synthesis of organoclays: A critical review and some unresolved issues

The synthesis of organoclays (OC) by intercalation of quaternary ammonium cation (QAC) into expanding clay minerals, notably montmorillonite (Mt), has attracted a great deal of attention during the past two decades. The OC have also found applications in the manufacture of clay polymer nanocomposites (CPN) and environmental remediation. Despite the wealth of information that exists on the formation and properties of OC, some problems remain to be resolved. The present contribution is an attempt at clarifying two outstanding issues, based on the literature and experimental data obtained by the authors over the past years. The first issue concerns the relationship between the cation exchange capacity (CEC) of the Mt and the basal spacing of the OC which, in turn, is dependent on the concentration and the nature of the added QAC. At a concentration less than 1 CEC, organo-Mt (OMt) formed using the QAC with a short alkyl chain length with nc < 16 (e.g., dodecyl trimethylammonium) gives basal spacings of 1.4–1.6 nm that are essentially independent of the CEC. However, for long-chain QAC with nc ≥ 16 (e.g., hexadecyl trimethylammonium), the basal spacing varies with the QAC concentration. For Mt with a CEC of 80–90 meq/100 g, the basal spacing of the OC increases gradually with the CEC and shows a sudden (stepwise) increase to 3.2–3.8 nm at a QAC concentration of 1.5 CEC and to 3.5–4.0 nm at a concentration of 2.0 CEC. The second issue pertains to the “locking” effect in QAC- and silane-modified pillared interlayered clays (PILC) and Mt. For silylated Mt, the “locking” effect results from the covalent bonding of silane to two adjacent layers within a single clay mineral particle. The same mechanism can operate in silane-grafted PILC but in this case, the “locking” effect may primarily be ascribed to the pillaring of adjacent basal surfaces by metal hydr(oxides).

Formal modelling and analysis of DNP3 secure authentication

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are one of the key foundations of smart grids. The Distributed Network Protocol version 3 (DNP3) is a standard SCADA protocol designed to facilitate communications in substations and smart grid nodes. The protocol is embedded with a security mechanism called Secure Authentication (DNP3-SA). This mechanism ensures that end-to-end communication security is provided in substations. This paper presents a formal model for the behavioural analysis of DNP3-SA using Coloured Petri Nets (CPN). Our DNP3-SA CPN model is capable of testing and verifying various attack scenarios: modification, replay and spoofing, combined complex attack and mitigation strategies. Using the model has revealed a previously unidentified flaw in the DNP3-SA protocol that can be exploited by an attacker that has access to the network interconnecting DNP3 devices. An attacker can launch a successful attack on an outstation without possessing the pre-shared keys by replaying a previously authenticated command with arbitrary parameters. We propose an update to the DNP3-SA protocol that removes the flaw and prevents such attacks. The update is validated and verified using our CPN model proving the effectiveness of the model and importance of the formal protocol analysis.

Formal security analysis of the DNP3-secure authentication protocol

This thesis evaluates the security of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, which are one of the key foundations of many critical infrastructures. Specifically, it examines one of the standardised SCADA protocols called the Distributed Network Protocol Version 3, which attempts to provide a security mechanism to ensure that messages transmitted between devices, are adequately secured from rogue applications. To achieve this, the thesis applies formal methods from theoretical computer science to formally analyse the correctness of the protocol.