Guest Editorial: Emerging Scholars' Section

This issue of the QUT Law Review features an Emerging Scholars’ section containing contributions from early career researchers and doctoral students. This section was conceived by the previous General Editor of the journal, Prof Dan Hunter, as a forum to showcase high-quality legal scholarship from emerging scholars. We are grateful to Prof Hunter for his work on this initiative.

Guest Editorial: Emerging Scholars' Section

This issue of the QUT Law Review also features an Emerging Scholars’ section containing contributions from early career researchers and doctoral students. This section was conceived by the previous General Editor of the journal, Prof Dan Hunter, as a forum to showcase high-quality legal scholarship from emerging scholars. We are grateful to Prof Hunter for his work on this initiative.

A cryptographic analysis of the TLS 1.3 handshake protocol candidates

The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is currently developing the next version of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, version 1.3. The transparency of this standardization process allows comprehensive cryptographic analysis of the protocols prior to adoption, whereas previous TLS versions have been scrutinized in the cryptographic literature only after standardization. This is even more important as there are two related, yet slightly different, candidates in discussion for TLS 1.3, called draft-ietf-tls-tls13-05 and draft-ietf-tls-tls13-dh-based. We give a cryptographic analysis of the primary ephemeral Diffie–Hellman-based handshake protocol, which authenticates parties and establishes encryption keys, of both TLS 1.3 candidates. We show that both candidate handshakes achieve the main goal of providing secure authenticated key exchange according to an augmented multi-stage version of the Bellare–Rogaway model. Such a multi-stage approach is convenient for analyzing the design of the candidates, as they establish multiple session keys during the exchange. An important step in our analysis is to consider compositional security guarantees. We show that, since our multi-stage key exchange security notion is composable with arbitrary symmetric-key protocols, the use of session keys in the record layer protocol is safe. Moreover, since we can view the abbreviated TLS resumption procedure also as a symmetric-key protocol, our compositional analysis allows us to directly conclude security of the combined handshake with session resumption. We include a discussion on several design characteristics of the TLS 1.3 drafts based on the observations in our analysis.