Removing barriers to protection at the exported border : visas, carrier sanctions, and international obligation

Asylum is being gradually denuded of the national institutional mechanisms (judicial, legislative and administrative) that provide the framework for a fair and effective asylum hearing. In this sense, there is an ongoing ‘denationalization’ or ‘deformalization’ of the asylum process. This chapter critically examines one of the linchpins of this trend: the erection of pre-entry measures at ports of embarkation in order to prevent asylum seekers from physically accessing the territory of the state. Pre-entry measures comprise the core requirement that foreigners possess an entry visa granting permission to enter the state of destination. Visa requirements are increasingly implemented by immigration officials posted abroad or by officials of transit countries pursuant to bilateral agreements (so-called ‘juxtaposed’ immigration controls). Private carriers, which are subject to sanctions if they bring persons to a country who do not have permission to enter, also engage in a form of de facto immigration control on behalf of states. These measures constitute a type of ‘externalized’ or ‘exported’ border that pushes the immigration boundaries of the state as far from its physical boundaries as possible. Pre-entry measures have a crippling impact on the ability of asylum seekers to access the territory of states to claim asylum. In effect, states have ‘externalized’ asylum by replacing the legal obligation on states to protect refugees arriving at ports of entry with what are perceived to be no more than moral obligations towards asylum seekers arriving at the external border of the state.

The role of legislative, executive and judicial mechanisms in ensuring a fair and effective asylum process

A good faith reading of core international protection obligations requires that states employ appropriate legislative, administrative and judicial mechanisms to ensure the enjoyment of a fair and effective asylum process. Restrictive asylum policies instead seek to ‘denationalize’ the asylum process by eroding access to national statutory, judicial and executive safeguards that ensure a full and fair hearing of an asylum claim. From a broader perspective, the argument in this thesis recognizes hat international human rights depend on domestic institutions for their effective implementation, and that a rights-based international legal order requires that power is limited, whether that power is expressed as an instance of the sovereign right of states in international law or as the authority of governments under domestic constitutions.

Joinder to a later unsigned document?

It is well known that a statutory requirement of formality is associated with contracts concerning land. In this regard, s 59 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) provides: No action may be brought upon any contract for the sale or other disposition of land or any interest in land unless the contract upon which such action is brought, or some memorandum or note of the contract, is in writing, and signed by the party to be charged, or by some person by the party lawfully authorised. In addition to the possibility of a formal contract, the statutory wording clearly contemplates reliance on an informal note or memorandum. To constitute a sufficient note or memorandum for the purposes of the statute, the signed note or memorandum must contain details of the parties to the contract, an adequate description of the property, the price and any other essential terms. It is also accepted that the doctrine of joinder may be invoked in circumstances where the document signed by the party to be charged contains an express or implied reference to any other document. In this way, a sufficient note or memorandum may be constituted by the joinder of a number of documents.

Can compensation be claimed under the standard commercial land and building contract where the property sold has no legally enforceable vehicular access?

This was the question that confronted Wilson J in Jarema Pty Ltd v Michihiko Kato [2004] QSC 451. Facts The plaintiff was the buyer of a commercial property at Bundall. The property comprised a 6 storey office building with a basement car park with 54 car parking spaces. The property was sold for $5 million with the contract being the standard REIQ/QLS form for Commercial Land and Buildings (2nd ed GST reprint). The contract provided for a “due diligence” period. During this period, the buyer’s solicitors discovered that there was no direct access from a public road to the car park entrance. Access to the car park was over a lot of which the Gold Coast City Council was the registered owner under a nomination of trustees, the Council holding the property on trust for car parking and town planning purposes. Due to the absence of a registered easement over the Council’s land, the buyer’s solicitors sought a reduction in the purchase price. The seller would not agree to this. Finally the sale was completed with the buyer reserving its rights to seek compensation.

A superannuation fund as a buyer?

In Bennett v Stewart McMurdo J considered the operation of a contract where the buyer was described as a superannuation fund. The Bennetts signed a standard REIQ contract as buyers of the Stewarts’ house and land. However, the reference schedule to the contract document contained these words next to the word ‘buyer’: ‘Bennett Superannuation Fund’ The Bennetts wished to enforce the contract. In response, the Stewarts (the sellers) raised two issues: • As the ‘Bennett Superannuation Fund’ was a trust and not a distinct legal entity capable of making a contract, the contract did not specify who was the buyer, so that the contract was void for uncertainty; and • The contract was unenforceable as there was no sufficient note or memorandum for the purposes of s 59 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) as s 59 requires, amongst other things, an identification of the parties. McMurdo J did not accept either of these arguments and made an order for specific performance in favour of the Bennetts. Looking at each issue separately:

Legal ethics in a post-Westphalian world : building the international rule of law and otehr tasks

The emergence of strong sovereign states after the Treaty of Westphalia turned two of the most cosmopolitan professions (law and arms) into two of the least cosmopolitan. Sovereign states determined the content of the law within their borders – including which, if any, ecclesiastical law was to be applied; what form of economic regulation was adopted; and what, if any, international law applied. Similarly, states sought to ensure that all military force was at their disposal in national armies. The erosion of sovereignty in a post-Westphalian world may significantly reverse these processes. The erosion of sovereignty is likely to have profound consequences for the legal profession and the ethics of how, and for what ends, it is practised. Lawyers have played a major role in the civilization of sovereign states through the articulation and institutionalisation of key governance values – starting with the rule of law. An increasingly global profession must take on similar tasks. The same could be said of the military. This essay will review the concept of an international rule of law and its relationship to domestic conceptions and outline the task of building the international rule of law and the role that lawyers can and should play in it.

Changes to the REIQ contract and conveyancing case law update

The Reference Schedule to the REIQ houses and land contract and the lots in a Community Titles Scheme (“CTS”) contract has been amended to contain provision for disclosure concerning the installation of an approved safety switch. This section will not be required to be completed if the land is vacant (in the case of the houses and land contract) or if the present use is a commercial use (in the case of the lots in a CTS contract).

Defending the sanctity of life principle : a reply to John Keown

This article is a response to Professor Keown’s criticism of my paper “Finding a Way Through the Ethical and Legal Maze: Withdrawal of Medical Treatment and Euthanasia” (2005) 13 (3) Medical Law Review 357. The article takes up and responds to a number of criticisms raised by Keown in an attempt to further the debate concerning the moral and legal status of withdrawing life-sustaining measures, its distinction from euthanasia, and the implications of the lawfulness of withdrawal for the principle of the sanctity of life.

Managing wetlands sustainably as ecosystems : The contribution of the law (part 1)

The ways in which a society set standards of behaviour and of conduct for its members vary hugely. For example, accepted practices, recognised customs, spiritually or morally inspired norms, judicially declared rules, executively formulated edicts, formal legislative enactments or constitutionally embedded rights and duties. Whatever form they assume, these standards are the artificial construction of the human mind. Accordingly the law - whatever its form - can do no more and no less than regulate or set standards for human behaviour, human conduct, and human decision-making. The law cannot regulate the environment. It can only regulate human activities that impact directly or indirectly upon the environment. This applies as much to wetlands as components of the environment as it does to any other components of the environment or the environment at large. The capacity of the law to protect the environment and therefore wetlands is thus totally dependent upon the capacity of the law to regulate human behaviour, human conduct and human decision-making. At the same time the law needs to reflect the specific nature, functions and locations of wetlands. A wetland is an ecosystem by itself; it comprises a range of ecosystems within it; and it is part of a wider set of ecosystems. Hence, the significant ecological functions performed by wetlands. Then there are the benefits flowing to humans from wetlands. These may be social, economic, cultural, aesthetic, or a combination of some or of all of these. It is a challenge for a society acting through its legal system to find the appropriate balance between these ecological and these human values. But that is what sustainability requires.The ways in which a society set standards of behaviour and of conduct for its members vary hugely. For example, accepted practices, recognised customs, spiritually or morally inspired norms, judicially declared rules, executively formulated edicts, formal legislative enactments or constitutionally embedded rights and duties. Whatever form they assume, these standards are the artificial construction of the human mind. Accordingly the law - whatever its form - can do no more and no less than regulate or set standards for human behaviour, human conduct, and human decision-making. The law cannot regulate the environment. It can only regulate human activities that impact directly or indirectly upon the environment. This applies as much to wetlands as components of the environment as it does to any other components of the environment or the environment at large. The capacity of the law to protect the environment and therefore wetlands is thus totally dependent upon the capacity of the law to regulate human behaviour, human conduct and human decision-making. At the same time the law needs to reflect the specific nature, functions and locations of wetlands. A wetland is an ecosystem by itself; it comprises a range of ecosystems within it; and it is part of a wider set of ecosystems. Hence, the significant ecological functions performed by wetlands. Then there are the benefits flowing to humans from wetlands. These may be social, economic, cultural, aesthetic, or a combination of some or of all of these. It is a challenge for a society acting through its legal system to find the appropriate balance between these ecological and these human values. But that is what sustainability requires.