Questions about multidisciplinary teams

Multidisciplinary care (MDC) involves health professionals from a range of disciplines working together as a team (a multidisciplinary team – MDT) to deliver comprehensive care that addresses as many of a patient's needs as possible. Writing in 2011, Wilcoxon and others concluded: ‘Multidisciplinary care is accepted as best practice in cancer treatment planning and care.’ Yet their report (of the national audit of multidisciplinary cancer care in Australia) indicated that two-thirds of the surveyed hospitals did not have a MDT. Further, they found that where teams did exist, one-third of patients were not told that their case would be discussed by the team; the MDT-recommended treatment plan was not included in the patient’s record one-quarter of the time; and less than 1 per cent of teams reported routine attendance by the tumour-specific minimum core team. There is sparse case authority as to the potential medico-legal consequences of MDC by MDTs. This article raises five questions about legal aspects of MDC for consideration. The questions are not limited to cancer care, as MDTs are increasingly used in other areas of medicine.

Strategically Pleading Intentional Torts in medical cases

The opportunities and challenges faced by litigants who strategically plead intentional torts are borne out by two recent medical cases. Both arose out of dental treatment. Dean v Phung established some key principles which were clarified in White v Johnston. Before considering those two cases it is worth examining the environment in which such intentional torts claims now exist. Following the Ipp Review of the Law of Negligence, non-uniform legislative changes to the law of negligence were introduced across Australia which have imposed limitations on liability and quantum of damages in cases where a person has been injured through the fault of another. While it seems that, given the limitation of the scope of the review and recommendations to negligently caused damage, the Ipp Review reforms were meant to be limited to injury resulting from negligent acts rather than intentional torts, the extent to which the civil liability legislation applies to intentional torts differs across Australia.

The changing face of conveyancing responsibility

In this note the authors examine two cases, one from Australia, the other from New Zealand, both of which explore the responsibility of legal practitioners engaged as professionals in the buying and selling of land. What is shown is that the allocation of risk and responsibility is constantly under scrutiny for those involved in the conveyancing process, something which the nascent Australian electronic conveyancing protocols will only heighten.

The Statutory Defence(s) of 'peer professional opinion'

In the wake of the GFC and with ever increasing consumer-protection-related laws, clients are more aware of their rights and your obligations as a professional valuer. They also are more likely to take legal action if, as a result of their reliance on a valuation, they suffer a financial loss. In some Australian jurisdictions, in response to a claim of negligence, the professional valuer may be able to raise a professional practice defence under civil liability legislation. This article considers the nature of this statutory defence, what is required to rely upon it and in which jurisdictions it applies.

Copyright, fair use and the Australian Constitution

There has been much debate over recent years about whether Australian copyright law should adopt a fair use doctrine. In this chapter we argue by pointing to the historical record that the incorporation of the term 'copyrights' in the Australian Constitution embeds a notion of balance and fair use in Australian law and that this should be taken into account when interpreting the Australian Copyright Act 1968. English case law in the 18th and 19th centuries developed a principle that copyright infringement did not occur where a person had made a fair use of a work. Fair use was generally established where the defendant had made a productive use that did more than alter the original work for the purpose of evading liability, and where the defendant had made an original contribution to the resulting work. Additionally, fairness was shown by a use that did not supersede or prejudice the market for the original work. At the time of including the copyright power in the Constitution, the UK Parliament’s understanding of “copyrights” included the notion of fair use as it had been developed in U.K. precedent. In this chapter we argue that the work “copyrights” in the Australia Constitution takes its definition from copyright in 1900 and as it has evolved since. Importantly, the word “copyrights” is infused with a particular meaning that incorporates the principle of copyright balance. The constitutional notion of copyright, therefore, is not that of an unlimited power to prevent all copying. Rather, copyright distinguishes between infringing copying and non-infringing copying and grants to the copyright owner only the power to control the former. Non-infringing copying includes well-accepted limitations on the copyright owner’s rights, including the copying of ideas, the copying of public domain works and the copying of insubstantial parts of copyrighted works. In this chapter we argue that non-infringing copying also includes copying to make a fair use of a work. The sections that distinguish infringing copying from non-infringing copying in the Copyright Act 1968 are sections 36(1) and 101(1), which define infringement as the doing, without licence, of an “act comprised in the copyright”. An infringing copy is an act comprised the copyright, whereas a non-infringing copy is not. We argue that space for fair uses of copyrighted works is built into the Copyright Act 1968 through these sections, because a fair use will not produce an infringing copy and so is not an act comprised in the copyright.

Swimming against the tide? Australian labour regulation and the fissured workplace

In The Fissured Workplace, David Weil dissects the ways in which ostensibly ‘large’ American businesses have come to shed direct employees and instead source their labour needs through a ‘complicated network of smaller business units’. As he notes, this has increased the profitability of these ‘lead’ businesses, at the expense of those who (ultimately) work for them: Wage setting and supervision shift from core businesses to a myriad of organizations, each operating under the rigorous standards of lead businesses but facing fierce competitive pressures. Although lead businesses set demanding goals and standards, and often detailed work practice requirements for subsidiary companies, the actual liability, oversight, and supervision of the workforce become the problem of one or more other organizations. And by replacing a direct employment relationship with a fissured workplace, employment itself becomes more precarious, with risk shifted onto smaller employers and individual workers, who are often cast in the role of independent businesses in their own right.