360 resultados para contract perfection
Resumo:
A generalised gamma bidding model is presented, which incorporates many previous models. The log likelihood equations are provided. Using a new method of testing, variants of the model are fitted to some real data for construction contract auctions to find the best fitting models for groupings of bidders. The results are examined for simplifying assumptions, including all those in the main literature. These indicate no one model to be best for all datasets. However, some models do appear to perform significantly better than others and it is suggested that future research would benefit from a closer examination of these.
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Citizenship is more than a status associated with a bundle of rights; it is also the formal contract by which the sovereignty of a nation is extended to the individual in exchange for being governed. Who can and who cannot contract into this status and what rights are able to be exercised is also shaped by who possesses the nation. In this article it is argued that citizenship operates discursively to contain Indigenous people’s engagement with the economy through social rights. This containment precludes consideration of Indigenous sovereign rights to our lands and resources, to enable Indigenous economic development within a capitalist market economy.
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Where a secured lender elects to appoint a receiver and manager, the appointment document standardly provides for the receiver and manager to act as the agent of the debtor. This article considers the significance of this agency in the context of three specific issues that have the potential to arise in the receivership of a corporate borrower across all Australian jurisdictions.
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Collaborative infrastructure projects use hybrid formal and informal governance structures to manage transactions. Based on previous desk-top research, the authors identified the key mechanisms underlying project governance, and posited the performance implications of the governance (Chen et al. 2012). The current paper extends that qualitative research by testing the veracity of those findings using data from 320 Australian construction organisations. The results provide, for the first time, reliable and valid scales to measure governance and performance of collaborative projects, and the relationship between them. The results confirm seven of seven hypothesised governance mechanisms; 30 of 43 hypothesised underlying actions; eight of eight hypothesised key performance indicators; and the dual importance of formal and informal governance. A startling finding of the study was that the implementation intensity of informal mechanisms (non-contractual conditions) is a greater predictor of project performance variance than that of formal mechanisms (contractual conditions). Further, contractual conditions do not directly impact project performance; instead their impact is mediated by the non-contractual features of a project. Obligations established under the contract are not sufficient to optimise project performance.
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In cases involving allegations of price fixing under the former s 45A of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), it was necessary to prove that at least two parties to the arrangement or understanding at issue were “in competition with each other”. The same requirement is contained in the cartel provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) that replaced s 45A. The so-called “competition condition” is set out in s 44ZZRD (4) of the CCA. Where a supplier enters into vertical supply arrangements with agents or brokers, problems can arise if the supplier also has a downstream presence. At that functional level there may be a horizontal and therefore competitive dimension, and the competition condition may be satisfied. In such circumstances, great care will need to be taken in any discussions between the supplier and its downstream agents or distributors about the prices, discounts, allowances, rebates or credits that the agent or distributor may charge. Whether agents or brokers competed with their suppliers in vertical supply arrangements arose for consideration in two decisions handed down by the Federal Court in Brisbane...
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The policy objectives of the continuous disclosure regime augmented by the misleading or deceptive conduct provisions in the Corporations Act are to enhance the integrity and efficiency of Australian capital markets by ensuring equality of opportunity for all investors through public access to accurate and material company information to enable them to make well-informed investment decisions. This article argues that there were failures by the regulators in the performance of their roles to protect the interests of investors in Forrest v ASIC; FMG v ASIC (2012) 247 CLR 486: ASX failed to enforce timely compliance with the continuous disclosure regime and ensure that the market was properly informed by seeking immediate clarification from FMG as to the agreed fixed price and/or seeking production of a copy of the CREC agreement; and ASIC failed to succeed in the High Court because of the way it pleaded its case. The article also examines the reasoning of the High Court in Forrest v ASIC and whether it might have changed previous understandings of the Campomar test for determining whether representations directed to the public generally are misleading.
Resumo:
In Australia, collaborative contracts, and in particular, project alliances, have been increasingly used to govern infrastructure projects. These contracts use formal and informal governance mechanisms to manage the delivery of infrastructure projects. Formal mechanisms such as financial risk sharing are specified in the contract, while informal mechanisms such as integrated teams are not. Given that the literature contains a multiplicity of often untestable definitions, this paper reports on a review of the literature to operationalize the concepts of formal and informal governance. This work is the first phase of a study that will examine the optimal balance of formal and informal governance structures. Desk-top review of leading journals in the areas of construction management and business management, as well as recent government documents and industry guidelines, was undertaken to to conceptualise and operationalize formal and informal governance mechanisms. The study primarily draws on transaction-cost economics (e.g. Williamson 1979; Williamson 1991), relational contract theory (Feinman 2000; Macneil 2000) and social psychology theory (e.g. Gulati 1995). Content analysis of the literature was undertaken to identify key governance mechanisms. Content analysis is a commonly used methodology in the social sciences area. It provides rich data through the systematic and objective review of literature (Krippendorff 2004). NVivo 9, a qualitative data analysis software package, was used to assist in this process. A previous study by the authors identified that formal governance mechanisms can be classified into seven measurable categories: (1) negotiated cost, (2) competitive cost, (3) commercial framework, (4) risk and reward sharing, (5) qualitative performance, (6) collaborative multi-party agreement, and (7) early contractor involvement. Similarly, informal governance mechanisms can be classified into four measureable categories: (1) leadership structure, (2) integrated team, (3) team workshops, and (4) joint management system. This paper explores and further defines the key operational characteristics of each mechanism category, highlighting its impact on value for money in alliance project delivery. The paper’s contribution is that it provides the basis for future research to compare the impact of a range of individual mechanisms within each category, as a means of improving the performance of construction projects.
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Collaborative contracting has emerged over the past 15 years as an innovative project delivery framework that is particularly suited to infrastructure projects. Australia leads the world in the development of project and program alliance approaches to collaborative delivery. These approaches are considered to promise superior project results. However, very little is known about the learning routines that are most widely used in support of collaborative projects in general and alliance projects in particular. The literature on absorptive capacity and dynamic capabilities indicates that such learning enhances project performance. The learning routines employed at corporate level during the operation of collaborative infrastructure projects in Australia were examined through a large survey conducted in 2013. This paper presents a descriptive summary of the preliminary findings. The survey captured the experiences of 320 practitioners of collaborative construction projects, including public and private sector clients, contractors, consultants and suppliers (three per cent of projects were located in New Zealand, but for brevity’s sake the sample is referred to as Australian). The majority of projects identified used alliances (78.6%); whilst 9% used Early Contractor Involvement (ECI) contracts and 2.7% used Early Tender Involvement contracts, which are ‘slimmer’ types of collaborative contract. The remaining 9.7% of respondents used traditional contracts that employed some collaborative elements. The majority of projects were delivered for public sector clients (86.3%), and/or clients experienced with asset procurement (89.6%). All of the projects delivered infrastructure assets; one third in the road sector, one third in the water sector, one fifth in the rail sector, and the rest spread across energy, building and mining. Learning routines were explored within three interconnected phases: knowledge exploration, transformation and exploitation. The results show that explorative and exploitative learning routines were applied to a similar extent. Transformative routines were applied to a relatively low extent. It was also found that the most highly applied routine is ‘regularly applying new knowledge to collaborative projects’; and the least popular routine was ‘staff incentives to encourage information sharing about collaborative projects’. Future research planned by the authors will examine the impact of these routines on project performance.
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"Fully updated to reflect the rapid pace of change in the health law areas. Explains the legal process as it relates to the health care professional."--Libraries Australia. Table of Contents Part I. Introductory concepts -- 1. What is law -- 2. The legal structure -- 3. The legal process -- Part II. Patient relationships -- 4. Consent to health care by a competent adult -- 5. Consent to health care by a legally incompetent person -- 6. Negligence -- 7. Patient information and privacy -- 8. Patients' property -- 9. Contract -- Part III. Employment -- 10. Contracts to provide health care services -- 011. Accidents and injuries related to health care --12. Registration and practice --13. Drugs --14. Criminal law and health care --15. State involvement in birth and death: registration and coronial inquiries --16. State involvement in threats to health or welfare --17. Human tissue transplants and reproductive technology --18. Expanding recognition of human rights --19. Decision making, law and ethics: a discussion.
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Background and purpose Phosphodiesterases PDE3 and/or PDE4 control ventricular effects of catecholamines in several species but their relative effects in failing human ventricle are unknown. We investigated whether the PDE3-selective inhibitor cilostamide (0.3-1μM) or PDE4 inhibitor rolipram (1-10μM) modified the positive inotropic and lusitropic effects of catecholamines in human failing myocardium. Experimental approach Right and left ventricular trabeculae from freshly explanted hearts of 5 non-β-blocker-treated and 15 metoprolol-treated patients with terminal heart failure were paced to contract at 1Hz. The effects of (-)-noradrenaline, mediated through β1-adrenoceptors (β2-adrenoceptors blocked with ICI118551), and (-)-adrenaline, mediated through β2-adrenoceptors (β1-adrenoceptors blocked with CGP20712A), were assessed in the absence and presence of PDE inhibitors. Catecholamine potencies were estimated from –logEC50s. Key results Cilostamide did not significantly potentiate the inotropic effects of the catecholamines in non-β-blocker-treated patients. Cilostamide caused greater potentiation (P=0.037) of the positive inotropic effects of (-)-adrenaline (0.78±0.12 log units) than (-)-noradrenaline (0.47±0.12 log units) in metoprolol-treated patients. Lusitropic effects of the catecholamines were also potentiated by cilostamide. Rolipram did not affect the inotropic and lusitropic potencies of (-)-noradrenaline or (-)-adrenaline on right and left ventricular trabeculae from metoprolol-treated patients. Conclusions and implications Metoprolol induces a control by PDE3 of ventricular effects mediated through both β1- and β2-adrenoceptors, thereby further reducing sympathetic cardiostimulation in patients with terminal heart failure. Concurrent therapy with a PDE3 blocker and metoprolol could conceivably facilitate cardiostimulation evoked by adrenaline through β2-adrenoceptors. PDE4 does not appear to reduce inotropic and lusitropic effects of catecholamines in failing human ventricle.
Resumo:
A contract to buy or sell a home is the most important contract most people will ever make. It is crucial that the purchase or sale is made carefully and correctly. Similarly, maintaining a home and undertaking repairs or renovations can be significant aspects of life. This chapter will explore these issues under the broad headings of: • buying a home • selling a home • building or renovating a home.
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Scenario 1 A buys a two storey commercial building built along the only street frontage to the property. Vehicles cannot reach the rear of the property as the building extends across the entire width of the land. A bought the building with full knowledge that vehicular access to the rest of the property had been compromised by a desire to obtain maximum street frontage for the building which was occupied by a commercial tenant. On street parking is scarce in the surrounding area. A (to the knowledge of the adjoining owner B) constructs a carpark at the rear of the building. The employees of A’s tenant have been using the carpark obtaining access via a driveway on B’s land. To formalise this arrangement, A seeks a right of way for vehicles to travel down B’s driveway to access the carpark...
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With a view to minimising the spiraling labour costs, the concrete masonry industry is developing thin layer mortar technology (known as thin bed technology) collaboratively with Queensland University of Technology. Similar technologies are practiced in Europe mainly for clay brick masonry; in the UK thin layer mortared concrete masonry has been researched under commercial contract with limited information published. This paper presents numerous experimental data generated over the past three years. It is shown that this form of masonry requires special drymixed mortar containing a minimum of 2% polymer for improved workability and blocks with tighter height tolerance, both of which might increase the cost of these constituent materials. However, through semiskilled labour, tools to dispense and control the thickness of mortar and the associated increase in productivity, reduction to the overall costs of this form of construction can be achieved. Further the polymer mortar provides several advantages: (1) improved sustainability due to dry curing and (2) potential to construct mortar layers of 2mm thickness and (3) ability for mechanisation of mortar application and control of thickness without the need for skilled labour.
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Implementation of an electronic tendering (e-tendering) systems requires careful attention to the needs of the system and its various participants. Fairness in an e-tendering is of utmost importance. Current proposals and implementations do not provide fairness and thus, are vulnerable to collusion and favourism. Dishonest participants, either the principal or tenderer may collude to alter or view competing tenders which would give the favoured tenderer a greater chance of winning the contract. This paper proposes an e-tendering system that is secure and fair to all participants. We employ the techniques of anonymous token system along with signed commitment approach to achieve a publicly verifiable fair e-tendering protocol. We also provide an analysis of the protocol that confirms the security of our proposal against security goals for an e-tendering system.
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This chapter analyses the obligations insurers and insureds owe each other and the remedies which follow a breach of obligation.