Multiple roles of transfer prices: One vs. two books

This paper investigates multiple roles of transfer prices for shipments of goods and services between entities of a multinational enterprise. At the center is the role of transfer pricing (TP) in tax manipulation, but other roles having to do with internal operations or strategic delegation, etc. are also considered. The interesting question is to what extent and how the different roles of TPs interfere with each other. The answer depends on whether companies use one or two books, i.e. whether they (can) apply different TPs for different purposes. We illustrate, in a stylized model, the competing aims of tax manipulation and strategic delegation. Finally, we briefly look at selected reform proposals, concluding that either TP problems are not addressed, or else new distortions will be introduced instead.

Transfer pricing rules and competing governments

The literature on the regulation of multinationals' transfer prices has not considered the possibility that governments may use transfer pricing rules strategically when they compete with other governments. The present paper analyses this case and shows that, even in the absence of agency considerations, a non‐cooperative equilibrium is characterised by above‐optimal levels of effective taxation. We then derive conditions under which harmonization of transfer pricing rules lead to a Pareto improvement, and show that harmonization according to the ‘arm's length’ principle—the form of harmonization advocated by the OECD—may not be Pareto improving.

The transfer problem and the intertemporal terms of trade

In this paper the effects of a transfer on the intertemporal terms of trade are examined in the context of a simple two-country, two-period model. When intertemporal trade occurs because the two economies have different rates of time preference, a transfer improves the terms of trade of the paying country. Alternatively, when trade occurs owing to international differences in the endowments of goods over the two periods, the effect of a transfer depends on (a) the relationship between the interest rate and the rates of time preference of the two countries and (b) the relationship between their elasticities of intertemporal consumption substitution.

Single layer graphene film by ethanol chemical vapor deposition: Highly efficient growth and clean transfer method

The choice of ethanol (C2H5OH) as carbon source in the Chemical Vapor Deposition (CVD) of graphene on copper foils can be considered as an attractive alternative among the commonly used hydrocarbons, such as methane (CH4) [1]. Ethanol, a safe, low cost and easy handling liquid precursor, offers fast and efficient growth kinetics with the synthesis of fullyformed graphene films in just few seconds [2]. In previous studies of graphene growth from ethanol, various research groups explored temperature ranges lower than 1000 °C, usually reported for methane-assisted CVD. In particular, the 650–850 °C and 900 °C ranges were investigated, respectively for 5 and 30 min growth time [3, 4]. Recently, our group reported the growth of highly-crystalline, few-layer graphene by ethanol-CVD in hydrogen flow (1– 100 sccm) at high temperatures (1000–1070 °C) using growth times typical of CH4-assisted synthesis (10–30 min) [5]. Furthermore, a synthesis time between 20 and 60 s in the same conditions was explored too. In such fast growth we demonstrated that fully-formed graphene films can be grown by exposing copper foils to a low partial pressure of ethanol (up to 2 Pa) in just 20 s [6] and we proposed that the rapid growth is related to an increase of the Cu catalyst efficiency due weak oxidizing nature of ethanol. Thus, the employment of such liquid precursor, in small concentrations, together with a reduced time of growth and very low pressure leads to highly efficient graphene synthesis. By this way, the complete coverage of a copper catalyst surface with high spatial uniformity can be obtained in a considerably lower time than when using methane.

Trade wars in the TRIPS Council: Intellectual property, technology transfer, and climate change

This Chapter considers the geopolitical conflicts in respect of intellectual property, trade, and climate change in the TRIPS Agreement 1994 under the World Trade Organization (WTO). In particular, it focuses upon debates in the TRIPS Council on the topic of patent law and clean energy in 2013 and 2014. The chapter highlights the development agenda of a number of developing countries who are keen for access to clean energy to combat climate change and global warming. It also considers the mixed contributions of members of the BRICS/ BASIC group – including Brazil, India, China, and South Africa. This chapter highlights the intellectual property maximalist position of a number of developed countries on intellectual property, climate change, and trade. Seeking to overcome this conflict and stalemate, this Chapter puts forward both procedural and substantial reform options in respect of intellectual property, trade, and climate change in the TRIPS Council and the WTO. It also flags that the TRIPS Agreement 1994 could well be displaced by the rise of mega-regional trade agreements – such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).