Yorkshire Cities and Culture : A Review of Current Thinking

This report was commissioned by the Yorkshire Cultural Observatory and the Yorkshire & Humber Key Cities group. It is not a strategy document but an attempt to give an overview of the current thinking within academia and policy-making about the cultural agenda for regions and regional cities in the UK. In particular it looks at the challenges for Yorkshire cities in the context of the current and potential regional cultural offer. The report is a snapshot of current academic and policy thinking, but it also draws on a series of interviews conducted with policymakers in the five key cities as well as regional agencies. These interviews were limited in number and are not meant to be a comprehensive consultation exercise. Rather they acted to focus some of the issues raised by the literature and policy review and to develop suggestions around priority areas for the region.

Optimal strategies and minimax lower bounds for online convex games

A number of learning problems can be cast as an Online Convex Game: on each round, a learner makes a prediction x from a convex set, the environment plays a loss function f, and the learner’s long-term goal is to minimize regret. Algorithms have been proposed by Zinkevich, when f is assumed to be convex, and Hazan et al., when f is assumed to be strongly convex, that have provably low regret. We consider these two settings and analyze such games from a minimax perspective, proving minimax strategies and lower bounds in each case. These results prove that the existing algorithms are essentially optimal.

Shifting : one-inclusion mistake bounds and sample compression

We present new expected risk bounds for binary and multiclass prediction, and resolve several recent conjectures on sample compressibility due to Kuzmin and Warmuth. By exploiting the combinatorial structure of concept class F, Haussler et al. achieved a VC(F)/n bound for the natural one-inclusion prediction strategy. The key step in their proof is a d=VC(F) bound on the graph density of a subgraph of the hypercube—one-inclusion graph. The first main result of this report is a density bound of n∙choose(n-1,≤d-1)/choose(n,≤d) < d, which positively resolves a conjecture of Kuzmin and Warmuth relating to their unlabeled Peeling compression scheme and also leads to an improved one-inclusion mistake bound. The proof uses a new form of VC-invariant shifting and a group-theoretic symmetrization. Our second main result is an algebraic topological property of maximum classes of VC-dimension d as being d-contractible simplicial complexes, extending the well-known characterization that d=1 maximum classes are trees. We negatively resolve a minimum degree conjecture of Kuzmin and Warmuth—the second part to a conjectured proof of correctness for Peeling—that every class has one-inclusion minimum degree at most its VC-dimension. Our final main result is a k-class analogue of the d/n mistake bound, replacing the VC-dimension by the Pollard pseudo-dimension and the one-inclusion strategy by its natural hypergraph generalization. This result improves on known PAC-based expected risk bounds by a factor of O(log n) and is shown to be optimal up to a O(log k) factor. The combinatorial technique of shifting takes a central role in understanding the one-inclusion (hyper)graph and is a running theme throughout

Adaptive online gradient descent

We study the rates of growth of the regret in online convex optimization. First, we show that a simple extension of the algorithm of Hazan et al eliminates the need for a priori knowledge of the lower bound on the second derivatives of the observed functions. We then provide an algorithm, Adaptive Online Gradient Descent, which interpolates between the results of Zinkevich for linear functions and of Hazan et al for strongly convex functions, achieving intermediate rates between [square root T] and [log T]. Furthermore, we show strong optimality of the algorithm. Finally, we provide an extension of our results to general norms.

Multitask learning with expert advice

We consider the problem of prediction with expert advice in the setting where a forecaster is presented with several online prediction tasks. Instead of competing against the best expert separately on each task, we assume the tasks are related, and thus we expect that a few experts will perform well on the entire set of tasks. That is, our forecaster would like, on each task, to compete against the best expert chosen from a small set of experts. While we describe the "ideal" algorithm and its performance bound, we show that the computation required for this algorithm is as hard as computation of a matrix permanent. We present an efficient algorithm based on mixing priors, and prove a bound that is nearly as good for the sequential task presentation case. We also consider a harder case where the task may change arbitrarily from round to round, and we develop an efficient approximate randomized algorithm based on Markov chain Monte Carlo techniques.

A note on trader Sharpe Ratios

Traders in the financial world are assessed by the amount of money they make and, increasingly, by the amount of money they make per unit of risk taken, a measure known as the Sharpe Ratio. Little is known about the average Sharpe Ratio among traders, but the Efficient Market Hypothesis suggests that traders, like asset managers, should not outperform the broad market. Here we report the findings of a study conducted in the City of London which shows that a population of experienced traders attain Sharpe Ratios significantly higher than the broad market. To explain this anomaly we examine a surrogate marker of prenatal androgen exposure, the second-to-fourth finger length ratio (2D:4D), which has previously been identified as predicting a trader's long term profitability. We find that it predicts the amount of risk taken by traders but not their Sharpe Ratios. We do, however, find that the traders' Sharpe Ratios increase markedly with the number of years they have traded, a result suggesting that learning plays a role in increasing the returns of traders. Our findings present anomalous data for the Efficient Markets Hypothesis.

Aspiration levels and educational choices: An experimental study

The explanation of social inequalities in education is still a debated issue in economics. Recent empirical studies tend to downplay the potential role of credit constraint. This article tests a different potential explanation of social inequalities in education, specifically that social differences in aspiration level result in different educational choices. Having existed for a long time in the sociology of education, this explanation can be justified if aspiration levels are seen as reference points in a prospect theory framework. In order to test this explanation, this article applies the method of experimental economics to the issue of education choice and behaviour. One hundred and twenty-nine individuals participated in an experiment in which they had to perform a task over 15 stages grouped in three blocks or levels. In order to continue through the experiment, a minimum level of success was required at the end of each level. Rewards were dependent on the final level successfully reached. At the end of each level, participants could either choose to stop and take their reward or to pay a cost to continue further in order to possibly receive higher rewards. To test the impact of aspiration levels, outcomes were either presented as gains or losses relative to an initial sum. In accordance with the theoretical predictions, participants in the loss framing group choose to go further in the experiment. There was also a significant and interesting gender effect in the loss framing treatment, such that males performed better and reached higher levels.

Alone against the crowd: Individual differences in referees' ability to cope under pressure

This paper contributes to the recent debate about the role of referees in the home advantage phenomenon. Specifically, it aims to provide a convincing answer to the newly posed question of the existence of individual differences among referees in terms of the home advantage (Boyko, Boyko, & Boyko, 2007; Johnston, 2008). Using multilevel modelling on a large and representative dataset we find that (1) the home advantage effect differs significantly among referees, and (2) this relationship is moderated by the size of the crowd. These new results suggest that a part of the home advantage is due to the effect of the crowd on the referees, and that some referees are more prone to be influenced by the crowd than others. This provides strong evidence to indicate that referees are a significant contributing factor to the home advantage. The implications of these findings are discussed both in terms of the relevant social psychological research, and with respect to the selection, assessment, and training of referees.

The limits of competition : reasserting a role for consumer protection and fair trading regulation in competitive markets

In this paper we advocate for the continued need for consumer protection and fair trading regulation, even in competitive markets. For the purposes of this paper a ‘competitive market’ is defined as one that has low barriers to entry and exit, with homogenous products and services and numerous suppliers. Whilst competition is an important tool for providing consumer benefits, it will not be sufficient to protect at least some consumers, particularly vulnerable, low income consumers. For this reason, we argue, setting competition as the ‘end goal’ and assuming that consumer protection and consumer benefits will always follow, is a flawed regulatory approach. The ‘end goal’ should surely be consumer protection and fair markets, and a combination of competition law and consumer protection law should be applied in order to achieve those goals.