The issue of consent: For the plaintiff or defendant to prove in trespass to person?

In White v Johnston1 the vexed question of whether it is for a plaintiff to prove lack of consent to a trespass to person or for the defendant to establish consent as defence was considered. The court also considered the principles of assessing an award of exemplary damages...

Compensation or consideration for a statutory right of user?

Section 180 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) makes provision for an applicant to seek a statutory right of user over a neighbour’s property where such right of use is reasonably necessary in the interests of effective use in any reasonable manner of the dominant land. A key issue in an application under s 180 is compensation. Unfortunately, while s 180 expressly contemplates that an order for compensation will include provision for payment of compensation to the owner of servient land there are certain issues that are less clear. One of these is the basis for determination of the amount of compensation. In this regard, s 180(4)(a) provides that, in making an order for a statutory right of user, the court: (a) shall, except in special circumstances, include provision for payment by the applicant to such person or persons as may be specified in the order of such amount by way of compensation or consideration as in the circumstances appears to the court to be just The operation of this statutory provision was considered by de Jersey CJ (as he then was) in Peulen v Agius [2015] QSC 137.

Breaches of lease between exercise of option to renew and expiry of lease in Queensland

The decision of Greppo v Jam-Cal Bundaberg Pty Ltd [2015] QCA 131 illustrates a defect in s 128 of the Property Law Act 1974(Qld) which gives a right to a lessee to apply for relief against forfeiture against loss of a right to exercise an option to renew. The defect arises because the legislation does not adequately deal with breaches that occur after the exercise of the option but before the expiry of the lease. Most commercial leases of all kinds have a standard provisions, as the lease in this case, as a conditions of the exercise of the option to renew that the lessee will have given notice of exercise within the time specified to the lessor and will have up to the date of expiry of the lease paid all rent and observed all lessee’s covenants. The difficulties occur because invariably an option must be exercised before the expiry of the lease when a lessee may not be in breach of the lease but may later prior to the expiry of the lease fall into breach. As this decision indicates,at least in Queensland, that the lessee who desires to challenge the lessor’s right to enforce those conditions can neither seek relief under s 128 against forfeiture of the right to exercise the option ,or indeed, under s 124 of the Property Law Act 1974 to preserve the agreement for lease brought about by the otherwise regular exercise of the option to renew. The decision cries out for legislative reform along the lines of s 133E of the Conveyancing Act 1919(NSW) which was amended in 2001 to meet this contingency.

The doctrine of necessity and the detention and restraint of people with intellectual impairment: Is there any justification?

In Australia, the legal basis for the detention and restraint of people with intellectual impairment is ad hoc and unclear. There is no comprehensive legal framework that authorises and regulates the detention of, for example, older people with dementia in locked wards or in residential aged care, people with disability in residential services or people with acquired brain injury in hospital and rehabilitation services. This paper focuses on whether the common law doctrine of necessity (or its statutory equivalents) should have a role in permitting the detention and restraint of people with disabilities. Traditionally, the defence of necessity has been recognised as an excuse, where the defendant, faced by a situation of imminent peril, is excused from the criminal or civil liability because of the extraordinary circumstances they find themselves in. In the United Kingdom, however, in In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) and R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L, the House of Lords broadened the defence so that it operated as a justification for treatment, detention and restraint outside of the emergency context. This paper outlines the distinction between necessity as an excuse and as a defence, and identifies a number of concerns with the latter formulation: problems of democracy, integrity, obedience, objectivity and safeguards. Australian courts are urged to reject the United Kingdom approach and retain an excuse-based defence, as the risks of permitting the essentially utilitarian model of necessity as a justification are too great.

What’s law got to do with it?: Medical negligence, causation and the use of policy

In a medical negligence context, and under the causation provisions enacted pursuant to Civil Liability Legislation in most Australian jurisdictions, the normative concept of “scope of liability” requires a consideration of whether or not and why a medical practitioner should be responsible for a patient’s harm. As such, it places a limit on the extent to which practitioners are deemed liable for a breach of the duty of care owed by them, in circumstances where a legal factual connection between that breach and the causation of a patient’s harm has already been shown. It has been said that a determination of causation requires ‘the identification and articulation of an evaluative judgement by reference to “the purposes and policy of the relevant part of the law”’: Wallace v Kam (2013) 297 ALR 383, 388. Accordingly, one of the normative factors falling within scope of liability is an examination of the content and purpose of the rule or duty of care violated – that is, its underlying policy and whether this supports an attribution of legal responsibility upon a practitioner. In this context, and with reference to recent jurisprudence, this paper considers: the policy relevant to a practitioner’s duty of care in each of the areas of diagnosis, treatment and advice; how this has been used to determine an appropriate scope of liability for the purpose of the causation inquiry in medical negligence claims; and whether such an approach is problematic for medical standards or decision-making.

‘The door creaked shut’: The new breach of bail offence for youth in Queensland

As part of the 2014 amendments to the Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld) the previous Queensland government introduced a new breach of bail offence and a reverse onus provision in relation to the new offence. Also included in the raft of amendments was a provision removing the internationally accepted principle that, in relation to young offenders, detention should be used as ‘a last resort’. This article argues that these changes are likely to increase the entrenchment of young people within the criminal justice system.

Strategically Pleading Intentional Torts in medical cases

The opportunities and challenges faced by litigants who strategically plead intentional torts are borne out by two recent medical cases. Both arose out of dental treatment. Dean v Phung established some key principles which were clarified in White v Johnston. Before considering those two cases it is worth examining the environment in which such intentional torts claims now exist. Following the Ipp Review of the Law of Negligence, non-uniform legislative changes to the law of negligence were introduced across Australia which have imposed limitations on liability and quantum of damages in cases where a person has been injured through the fault of another. While it seems that, given the limitation of the scope of the review and recommendations to negligently caused damage, the Ipp Review reforms were meant to be limited to injury resulting from negligent acts rather than intentional torts, the extent to which the civil liability legislation applies to intentional torts differs across Australia.

Evidence in view: Matton Developments Pty Ltd v CGU Insurance Limited [2014] QSC 256

Rule 478 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld)(view by court) is silent as to the manner in which a court might be expected to exercise the discretion to order an inspection or demonstration under the rule and also as to the use which may be made of any inspection or demonstration ordered. The decision in Matton Developments Pty Ltd v CGU Insurance Limited [2014] QSC 256 provides guidance on both matters. This case provides some guidance on the circumstances in which a court may exercise its discretion to order a view or demonstration

Trial by jury election less of a trial

In Kencian v Watney [2015] QCA 212 the Queensland Court of Appeal allowed an appeal against the decision in Watney v Kencian & Wooley [2014] QSC 290 and ordered, pursuant to r475(1) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) that the trial proceed as a trial by jury.

No variance for filed orders: Hayes v Westpac Banking Corporation [2015] QCA 260

In Hayes v Westpac Banking Corporation [2015] QCA 260 the Queensland Court of Appeal examined the relationship between rules 7 (extending and shortening time) and 667 (setting aside) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), and held that r667(1) does not enable the court to set aside or vary an order after the order has been filed. The court found that, to the extent that this conclusion was contrary to the decision in McIntosh v Linke Nominees Pty Ltd [2010] 1 Qd R 152, the decision in McIntosh was wrong and should not be followed.

Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act (Qld) : disclosure, cooling-off and marketeers

The Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 commenced on 1 July 2001. Significant changes have now been made to the Act by the Property Agents and Motor Dealers Amendment Act 2001 (“the amending Act”). The amending Act contains two distinct parts. First, ss 11-19 of the amending Act provide for increased disclosure obligations on real estate agents, property developers and lawyers together with an extension of the 5 business day cooling-off period imposed by the original Act to all residential property (other than contracts formed on a sale by auction). These provisions are expected to commence on 29 October 2001. The remaining provisions of the amending Act provide for increased jurisdiction and powers to the Property Agents and Motor Dealers Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) enabling the Tribunal to deal with claims against marketeers. These provisions commenced on the date of assent (21 September 2001).

Civil and Criminal Liability of Players

The liability of players in their particular sporting fields has increasingly become prevalent in the minds of government, sport administrators, the medical and legal professions and the parents and players themselves. This awareness has arisen for numerous reasons. Due to the enormous volume of sport to which the community is being exposed through the varied levels of the media together with our aspirations towards a healthier lifestyle and longevity, participation in sports has increased. Accordingly, sports injury litigation has increased. A number of other factors may be advanced to explain the increase. Sport has become big business all over the world. A talent for sport may bring the lucky player fame and fortune. It is not surprising therefore, where such ambitions are frustrated by deliberately or carelessly inflicted injury to the player, thought will be given to seeking compensation for that injury in the courts of law. Other factors are that litigation is on the increase as a means of dispute resolution and lawyers see sporting organisations better able to afford compensation to their players because they are more likely to carry insurance.

Submission on NSW Attorney-General's Discussion Paper on Amendment of Limitation of Actions Act 1969 to remove time limit for civil claims for child abuse

The New South Wales Attorney-General and Justice Policy Division released a Discussion Paper about reform of the Limitation of Actions Act 1969. The key question was whether and how to amend the statute to better provide access to justice for civil claimants in child abuse cases. This submission draws on published literature and multidisciplinary research to support the Discussion Paper's Option A, namely, to abolish the time limit for civil claims for injuries in criminal child abuse cases, and for this to be made retrospective.