Modelling after-the-fact leakage for key exchange

Security models for two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols have developed over time to prove the security of AKE protocols even when the adversary learns certain secret values. In this work, we address more granular leakage: partial leakage of long-term secrets of protocol principals, even after the session key is established. We introduce a generic key exchange security model, which can be instantiated allowing bounded or continuous leakage, even when the adversary learns certain ephemeral secrets or session keys. Our model is the strongest known partial-leakage-based security model for key exchange protocols. We propose a generic construction of a two-pass leakage-resilient key exchange protocol that is secure in the proposed model, by introducing a new concept: the leakage-resilient NAXOS trick. We identify a special property for public-key cryptosystems: pair generation indistinguishability, and show how to obtain the leakage-resilient NAXOS trick from a pair generation indistinguishable leakage-resilient public-key cryptosystem.

Church's wall of silence on sexual abuse

A SINGLE document was all it took to illuminate a dark secret in the Church of England. The two-page child protection report, unearthed by police in the archives of the diocese of Manchester, was proof, at last, that a former cathedral choirboy -- alleging years of sexual abuse by one of Britain's most senior clergyman -- was not alone. There was another boy. Also a solo soprano, on the other side of the world, who was singing from the same hymn sheet about The Very Reverend Robert Waddington. "There had been a previous referral about sexual impropriety some time ago from Australia, where RW had been the headmaster at a school. An ex-pupil had made a complaint to the Bishop of (north) Queensland who had relayed it to the Archbishop (of York)," the 2003 report says. Eli Ward's family had prompted the secret report when they told church officials, without Ward's knowledge, of the alleged abuse he suffered in the mid-1980s.

Functional encryption for threshold functions (or fuzzy IBE) from lattices

Cryptosystems based on the hardness of lattice problems have recently acquired much importance due to their average-case to worst-case equivalence, their conjectured resistance to quantum cryptanalysis, their ease of implementation and increasing practicality, and, lately, their promising potential as a platform for constructing advanced functionalities. In this work, we construct “Fuzzy” Identity Based Encryption from the hardness of the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem. We note that for our parameters, the underlying lattice problems (such as gapSVP or SIVP) are assumed to be hard to approximate within supexponential factors for adversaries running in subexponential time. We give CPA and CCA secure variants of our construction, for small and large universes of attributes. All our constructions are secure against selective-identity attacks in the standard model. Our construction is made possible by observing certain special properties that secret sharing schemes need to satisfy in order to be useful for Fuzzy IBE. We also discuss some obstacles towards realizing lattice-based attribute-based encryption (ABE).

Lattice mixing and vanishing trapdoors : a framework for fully secure short signatures and more

We propose a framework for adaptive security from hard random lattices in the standard model. Our approach borrows from the recent Agrawal-Boneh-Boyen families of lattices, which can admit reliable and punctured trapdoors, respectively used in reality and in simulation. We extend this idea to make the simulation trapdoors cancel not for a specific forgery but on a non-negligible subset of the possible challenges. Conceptually, we build a compactly representable, large family of input-dependent “mixture” lattices, set up with trapdoors that “vanish” for a secret subset which we hope the forger will target. Technically, we tweak the lattice structure to achieve “naturally nice” distributions for arbitrary choices of subset size. The framework is very general. Here we obtain fully secure signatures, and also IBE, that are compact, simple, and elegant.

Strong cryptography from weak secrets

Distributed-password public-key cryptography (DPwPKC) allows the members of a group of people, each one holding a small secret password only, to help a leader to perform the private operation, associated to a public-key cryptosystem. Abdalla et al. recently defined this tool [1], with a practical construction. Unfortunately, the latter applied to the ElGamal decryption only, and relied on the DDH assumption, excluding any recent pairing-based cryptosystems. In this paper, we extend their techniques to support, and exploit, pairing-based properties: we take advantage of pairing-friendly groups to obtain efficient (simulation-sound) zero-knowledge proofs, whose security relies on the Decisional Linear assumption. As a consequence, we provide efficient protocols, secure in the standard model, for ElGamal decryption as in [1], but also for Linear decryption, as well as extraction of several identity-based cryptosystems [6,4]. Furthermore, we strenghten their security model by suppressing the useless testPwd queries in the functionality.

Hidden credential retrieval from a reusable password

We revisit the venerable question of access credentials management, which concerns the techniques that we, humans with limited memory, must employ to safeguard our various access keys and tokens in a connected world. Although many existing solutions can be employed to protect a long secret using a short password, those solutions typically require certain assumptions on the distribution of the secret and/or the password, and are helpful against only a subset of the possible attackers. After briefly reviewing a variety of approaches, we propose a user-centric comprehensive model to capture the possible threats posed by online and offline attackers, from the outside and the inside, against the security of both the plaintext and the password. We then propose a few very simple protocols, adapted from the Ford-Kaliski server-assisted password generator and the Boldyreva unique blind signature in particular, that provide the best protection against all kinds of threats, for all distributions of secrets. We also quantify the concrete security of our approach in terms of online and offline password guesses made by outsiders and insiders, in the random-oracle model. The main contribution of this paper lies not in the technical novelty of the proposed solution, but in the identification of the problem and its model. Our results have an immediate and practical application for the real world: they show how to implement single-sign-on stateless roaming authentication for the internet, in a ad-hoc user-driven fashion that requires no change to protocols or infrastructure.

Cryptanalysis of the convex hull click human identification protocol

Recently, a convex hull-based human identification protocol was proposed by Sobrado and Birget, whose steps can be performed by humans without additional aid. The main part of the protocol involves the user mentally forming a convex hull of secret icons in a set of graphical icons and then clicking randomly within this convex hull. While some rudimentary security issues of this protocol have been discussed, a comprehensive security analysis has been lacking. In this paper, we analyze the security of this convex hull-based protocol. In particular, we show two probabilistic attacks that reveal the user’s secret after the observation of only a handful of authentication sessions. These attacks can be efficiently implemented as their time and space complexities are considerably less than brute force attack. We show that while the first attack can be mitigated through appropriately chosen values of system parameters, the second attack succeeds with a non-negligible probability even with large system parameter values that cross the threshold of usability.

Cryptanalysis of WG-7 : a lightweight stream cipher

WG-7 is a stream cipher based on WG stream cipher and has been designed by Luo et al. (2010). This cipher is designed for low cost and lightweight applications (RFID tags and mobile phones, for instance). This paper addresses cryptographic weaknesses of WG-7 stream cipher. We show that the key stream generated by WG-7 can be distinguished from a random sequence after knowing 213.5 keystream bits and with a negligible error probability. Also, we investigate the security of WG-7 against algebraic attacks. An algebraic key recovery attack on this cipher is proposed. The attack allows to recover both the internal state and the secret key with the time complexity about 2/27.

Reversible and blind database watermarking using difference expansion

There has been significant research in the field of database watermarking recently. However, there has not been sufficient attention given to the requirement of providing reversibility (the ability to revert back to original relation from watermarked relation) and blindness (not needing the original relation for detection purpose) at the same time. This model has several disadvantages over reversible and blind watermarking (requiring only the watermarked relation and secret key from which the watermark is detected and the original relation is restored) including the inability to identify the rightful owner in case of successful secondary watermarking, the inability to revert the relation to the original data set (required in high precision industries) and the requirement to store the unmarked relation at a secure secondary storage. To overcome these problems, we propose a watermarking scheme that is reversible as well as blind. We utilize difference expansion on integers to achieve reversibility. The major advantages provided by our scheme are reversibility to a high quality original data set, rightful owner identification, resistance against secondary watermarking attacks, and no need to store the original database at a secure secondary storage. We have implemented our scheme and results show the success rate is limited to 11% even when 48% tuples are modified.

Reversible and blind database watermarking using difference expansion

There has been significant research in the field of database watermarking recently. However, there has not been sufficient attention given to the requirement of providing reversibility (the ability to revert back to original relation from watermarked relation) and blindness (not needing the original relation for detection purpose) at the same time. This model has several disadvantages over reversible and blind watermarking (requiring only the watermarked relation and secret key from which the watermark is detected and the original relation is restored) including the inability to identify the rightful owner in case of successful secondary watermarking, the inability to revert the relation to the original data set (required in high precision industries) and the requirement to store the unmarked relation at a secure secondary storage. To overcome these problems, we propose a watermarking scheme that is reversible as well as blind. We utilize difference expansion on integers to achieve reversibility. The major advantages provided by our scheme are reversibility to a high quality original data set, rightful owner identification, resistance against secondary watermarking attacks, and no need to store the original database at a secure secondary storage. We have implemented our scheme and results show the success rate is limited to 11% even when 48% tuples are modified.

Unconditionally secure disjointness tests for private datasets

We present two unconditional secure protocols for private set disjointness tests. In order to provide intuition of our protocols, we give a naive example that applies Sylvester matrices. Unfortunately, this simple construction is insecure as it reveals information about the intersection cardinality. More specifically, it discloses its lower bound. By using the Lagrange interpolation, we provide a protocol for the honest-but-curious case without revealing any additional information. Finally, we describe a protocol that is secure against malicious adversaries. In this protocol, a verification test is applied to detect misbehaving participants. Both protocols require O(1) rounds of communication. Our protocols are more efficient than the previous protocols in terms of communication and computation overhead. Unlike previous protocols whose security relies on computational assumptions, our protocols provide information theoretic security. To our knowledge, our protocols are the first ones that have been designed without a generic secure function evaluation. More important, they are the most efficient protocols for private disjointness tests in the malicious adversary case.

Lattice-based threshold changeability for standard shamir sectret-sharing schemes

We consider the problem of increasing the threshold parameter of a secret-sharing scheme after the setup (share distribution) phase, without further communication between the dealer and the shareholders. Previous solutions to this problem require one to start off with a nonstandard scheme designed specifically for this purpose, or to have communication between shareholders. In contrast, we show how to increase the threshold parameter of the standard Shamir secret-sharing scheme without communication between the shareholders. Our technique can thus be applied to existing Shamir schemes even if they were set up without consideration to future threshold increases. Our method is a new positive cryptographic application for lattice reduction algorithms, inspired by recent work on lattice-based list decoding of Reed-Solomon codes with noise bounded in the Lee norm. We use fundamental results from the theory of lattices (geometry of numbers) to prove quantitative statements about the information-theoretic security of our construction. These lattice-based security proof techniques may be of independent interest.

Cryptanalysis of LASH

We show that the LASH-x hash function is vulnerable to attacks that trade time for memory, including collision attacks as fast as 2(4x/11) and preimage attacks as fast as 2(4x/7). Moreover, we briefly mention heuristic lattice based collision attacks that use small memory but require very long messages that are expected to find collisions much faster than 2 x/2. All of these attacks exploit the designers’ choice of an all zero IV. We then consider whether LASH can be patched simply by changing the IV. In this case, we show that LASH is vulnerable to a 2(7x/8) preimage attack. We also show that LASH is trivially not a PRF when any subset of input bytes is used as a secret key. None of our attacks depend upon the particular contents of the LASH matrix – we only assume that the distribution of elements is more or less uniform.

Cryptanalysis of RC4(n, m) stream cipher

RC4(n, m) is a stream cipher based on RC4 and is designed by G. Gong et al. It can be seen as a generalization of the famous RC4 stream cipher designed by Ron Rivest. The authors of RC4(n, m) claim that the cipher resists all the attacks that are successful against the original RC4. The paper reveals cryptographic weaknesses of the RC4(n, m) stream cipher. We develop two attacks. The first one is based on non-randomness of internal state and allows to distinguish it from a truly random cipher by an algorithm that has access to 24·n bits of the keystream. The second attack exploits low diffusion of bits in the KSA and PRGA algorithms and recovers all bytes of the secret key. This attack works only if the initial value of the cipher can be manipulated. Apart from the secret key, the cipher uses two other inputs, namely, initial value and initial vector. Although these inputs are fixed in the cipher specification, some applications may allow the inputs to be under the attacker control. Assuming that the attacker can control the initial value, we show a distinguisher for the cipher and a secret key recovery attack that for the L-bit secret key, is able to recover it with about (L/n) · 2n steps. The attack has been implemented on a standard PC and can reconstruct the secret key of RC(8, 32) in less than a second.

Does counting still count? Revisiting the security of counting based user authentication protocols against statistical attacks

At NDSS 2012, Yan et al. analyzed the security of several challenge-response type user authentication protocols against passive observers, and proposed a generic counting based statistical attack to recover the secret of some counting based protocols given a number of observed authentication sessions. Roughly speaking, the attack is based on the fact that secret (pass) objects appear in challenges with a different probability from non-secret (decoy) objects when the responses are taken into account. Although they mentioned that a protocol susceptible to this attack should minimize this difference, they did not give details as to how this can be achieved barring a few suggestions. In this paper, we attempt to fill this gap by generalizing the attack with a much more comprehensive theoretical analysis. Our treatment is more quantitative which enables us to describe a method to theoretically estimate a lower bound on the number of sessions a protocol can be safely used against the attack. Our results include 1) two proposed fixes to make counting protocols practically safe against the attack at the cost of usability, 2) the observation that the attack can be used on non-counting based protocols too as long as challenge generation is contrived, 3) and two main design principles for user authentication protocols which can be considered as extensions of the principles from Yan et al. This detailed theoretical treatment can be used as a guideline during the design of counting based protocols to determine their susceptibility to this attack. The Foxtail protocol, one of the protocols analyzed by Yan et al., is used as a representative to illustrate our theoretical and experimental results.