Institutional investors, risk/return and corporate governance : practical lessons from the Global Financial Crisis

The global grown in institutional investors means that firms can no longer ignore their influence in capital markets. However, not all institutional investors have the same motives to influence the firms they invest in. Institution investors' ability to influence management depends on the size of their investment and whether they have any business relations with the firm. Using a sample of Australian firms from 2006 to 2008, our empirical results show that the proportion of a company's shares held by institutional investors is positively associated with firm governance ratings, risk and profitability. This study shows that a positive association between risk and return is associated with large active institutional ownership, which we interpret as shareholders with sufficient power to pressure management to increase short-term profits.

The rise of englightened shareholder primacy and its impact on US corporate self-regulation

Enlightened shareholder primacy (“ESP”) is a new approach in the corporate governance (“CG”) framework. The emergence of this approach is important owing to its role in answering a vital question: is the company really a private organisation to be seen only through the economic prism of contract? Or is it public and about a wider group of interests and underwritten by communitarian concern about social responsibility? Apart from answering this question, ESP explains the changes in corporate directors’ roles and self-regulation strategies of companies.

Convergence in European corporate governance : the audit committee concept

This paper analyses recent corporate governance codes issued by 20 countries for evidence of convergence in corporate governance systems in Europe. The analysis shows that there has been a degree of convergence towards an Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance as the audit committee concept is widely accepted in countries with both unitary and two-tier governance systems. Further, the latest audit committee recommendations in countries that have issued several governance codes show a strengthening of the recommendations for an audit committee over time in line with the Anglo-Saxon audit committee concept and convergence with the debate in the US and UK on issues such as the independence and financial expertise of members. However, consistent with the literature on the convergence of European corporate governance systems, at an operational level there is limited consistency in the recommended structure and role of audit committees.

OHS liability, corporate officers and corporate groups

This article examines the new model for corporate officer liability under section 144 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic), and explores the extent to which this might effectively extend responsibility for OHS offences to members of corporate groups, such as holding companies. In doing so, the authors canvass the failure of corporate law to impose such obligations on corporate officers in general, and on holding companies as shadow officers. It is argued that provisions such as section 144 of the Victorian Act should be included in all OHS legislation.

The contingent effects of differentiation and integration on corporate entrepreneurship

This paper develops a contingency view regarding the effects of structural differentiation and integration on levels of corporate entrepreneurship. Integrating notions of benefits and costs resulting from integration with structural contingency theory, we argue that the joint effects of structural differentiation and integration on corporate entrepreneurship levels are moderated by organizational size and environmental dynamism. Our findings from a time-separated sample demonstrate that in smaller organizations and more dynamic environments, the positive effects of integration on the structural differentiation-corporate entrepreneurship relationship strongly diminish. As such, with this research we begin to identify contingencies that influence the corporate entrepreneurship levels observed among firms striving to balance the needs for structural differentiation and integration.

Corporate governance and bankruptcy risk

We examine how firm characteristics, particularly the degree of firm complexity and the firm’s need for specialty knowledge, affect the relationship between corporate governance and the risk of bankruptcy. We find that having larger boards reduces the risk of bankruptcy only for complex firms. Our results also suggest that the proportion of inside directors on the board is inversely associated with the risk of bankruptcy in firms that require more specialist knowledge, and that the reverse is true in technically unsophisticated firms. The results further reveal that the additional explanatory power from corporate governance variables becomes stronger as the time to bankruptcy is increased, implying that although corporate governance variables are important predictors, governance changes are likely to be too late to save a firm on the verge of bankruptcy.

Agency problems of corporate philanthropy

Evaluating agency theory and optimal contracting theory views of corporate philanthropy, we find that as corporate giving increases, shareholders reduce their valuation of firm cash holdings. Dividend increases following the 2003 Tax Reform Act are associated with reduced corporate giving. Using a natural experiment, we find that corporate giving is positively (negatively) associated with CEO charity preferences (CEO shareholdings and corporate governance quality). Evidence from CEO-affiliated charity donations, market reactions to insider-affiliated donations, its relation to CEO compensation, and firm contributions to director-affiliated charities indicates that corporate donations advance CEO interests and suggests misuses of corporate resources that reduce firm value.

Corporate governance quality, audit fees and non-audit services fees

This paper extends prior research on the relationship between governance quality and auditor remuneration.We examine the influence of audit committee effectiveness (ACE), a proxy for governance quality, on audit fees (AF) and non-audit services fees (NASF) using a new composite measure comprising audit committee independence, expertise, diligence and size. We find that after controlling for board of director characteristics, there is a significant positive association between ACE and AF only for larger clients. Our results indicate that effective audit committees undertake more monitoring which results in wider audit scope and higher audit fees. Contrary to our expectations, we find the association between ACE and NASF to be positive and significant, especially for larger clients. This suggests that larger clients are more likely to purchase non-audit services (NAS) even in the presence of effective audit committees probably due to the complexity of their activities. Overall, our findings support regulatory initiatives aimed at improving corporate governance quality.

The Corporate Governance Effects of Audit Committee

This chapter provides a synthesis and evaluation of empirical research on the governance effects associated with audit committees. Given recent policy recommendations in several countries aimed at strengthening these committees, it is important to establish what research evidence demonstrates about their existing governance contribution. A framework for analyzing the impact of audit committees is described, identifying potential perceived effects which may have led to their adoption and documented effects on aspects of the audit function, on financial reporting quality and on corporate performance. It is also shown that most of the existing research has focused on factors associated with audit committee existence, characteristics, and measures of activity and there is very little evidence on the processes associated with the operation of audit committees and the manner in which they influence organizational behavior. It is clear that there is no automatic relationship between the adoption of audit committee structures or characteristics and the achievement of particular governance effects, and caution may be needed over expectations that greater codification around factors such as audit committee members’ independence and expertise as the means of ‘‘correcting’’ past weaknesses in the arrangements for audit committees. The most fundamental question concerning what difference audit committees make in practice continues to be an important area for research development. For future research we suggest: (1) greater consideration of the organizational and institutional contexts in which audit committees operate; (2) explicit theorization of the processes associated with audit committee operation; (3) complementing extant research methods with field studies; and (4) investigation of unintended as well as expected consequences of audit committees.

Corporate governance in 2010 : what will change?

2010 is expected to see the publication of a new UK Code on Corporate Governance, replacing the Combined Code. Why is a new code being issued? What significant changes are proposed? WIll it change the corporate governance world?

Institutional investors, risk/performance and corporate governance

Modern portfolio theory suggests that investors minimize risk for a given level of expected return by carefully choosing the proportions of various assets. This study sets out to determine the role of the institutional investor in monitoring risk and firm performance. Using a sample of Australian firms from 2006 to 2008, our empirical study shows a positive association between firm-specific risk, risk-management policy, and performance for firms with increasing institutional shareholdings. The study also finds that the significance of this association depends on the institutional investor's ability to influence management, which in turn depends on the size of ownership and whether the investee firm does not have potential business dealings with the investor. We also find that when firms are financially distressed, institutional investors engage in promoting short-term performance or exit rather than support long-term value creation. The results are robust while controlling the potential for endogeneity and using sensitivity tests to control for variants of performance and risk. These findings add to the growing body of literature examining institutional ownership and the importance of understanding the role of risk-management in the risk and return relation.

Trial by media: An empirical investigation of corporate reputation and stock returns in Australia

This article examines whether investors are able to generate abnormal risk-adjusted returns in the Australian market based on media-specific firm reputational factors under market uncertainty between 2004 and 2012. The findings suggest that after controlling for crisis-centric time periods and market risk factors, contrarian trading strategies produce abnormal returns for poor corporate reputation firms but not for their good corporate reputation counterparts. Corporate reputation may be a driver of performance for poorly performing Australian firms and could be considered a stimulus for trading activity due to its explanatory capabilities.

ACE research vignette 040: Three steps towards more corporate entrepreneurship within an organisation

This series of research vignettes is aimed at sharing current and interesting research findings from our team of international Entrepreneurship researchers. In this vignette, Henri Burgers investigates what managers can do to make their firm more entrepreneurial.