Analysing the Prospects of a Successful Application Under s 180 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld)

Section 180 of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) makes provision for an applicant to seek a statutory right of user over a neighbour’s property where such right of use is reasonably necessary in the interests of effective use in any reasonable manner of the dominant land. In recent years, the Queensland courts have been confronted with a number of such applications. Litigation has also been common in New South Wales which has a statutory provision in largely similar terms. This article seeks to identify those factors that have underpinned successful applications, the obstacles that an applicant may encounter and the considerations that have guided the courts when considering the associated issues of compensation and costs.

Using the internet to assist court processes : delivery of justice in an electronic age

This article presents an overview of two aspects of the role the internet now plays in the court system - first, the extent to which judges, administrators and court officials at the different levels in the court hierarchy are using the internet to deliver enhanced access to the Australian justice system for the community as a whole, and second, how they have embraced that same technology as an aid for accessing information for better judgment delivery and administration.

Indemnity costs - whether indemnity costs can be ordered in Magistrates Court

In Asset Loan Management v Mamap Pty Ltd [2005] QDC 295, McGill DCJ held that costs may be recovered in Magistrates Courts on the indemnity basis. His Honour was satisfied his conclusion in this respect was not precluded by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Beardmore v Franklins Management Services Pty Ltd [2002] QCA 60

Archimedes, aid/watch, constitutional levers and where we now stand

Archimedes is reported as famously saying: 'Give me a place to stand and I will move the earth.' He was referring to the power of levers. His point was that a person of ordinary capacity with a place to stand, a fulcrum and a level could change the path of planets. This principle of physics is a metaphor for how the common law has moved over the last millennium. Courts have found a stable foundation on which to stand, such as the constitutional bedrock or well-grounded precedent, and, using cases as fulcrums and legal principles as levers, the have moved the law. Australia is at a critical juncture in the development of the law of charities. The High Court of Australia has held that political purposes can be charitable in certain circumstances. The Parliament of Australia has not only enshrined this in a statutory definition of charity but has done so with a preamble to the legislation which affirms the basis for this development in residing in the 'unique nature and diversity of charities and the distinctive and important role that they play in Australia'.

In conversation with the Honourable Ian Callinan AC

When, in 1977, the Australian electorate provided a double majority to effect a change of section 72 of the Commonwealth Constitution requiring judges of the High Court of Australia to retire at the age of 70 years old, I doubt we understood the continuing capacity of these esteemed members of the judiciary. For the opportunity to sit and talk with Ian Callinan AC who, in compliance with that amendment, retired from the High Court in September 2007, I needed to wait until he returned from The Hague where he was sitting as a Judge ad hoc on the International Court of Justice. Although a native of Casino, New South Wales, Mr Callinan is regarded as a Queenslander. Indeed, he grew up in Brisbane, finished high school at Brisbane Grammar and graduated in law at The University of Queensland. Appointed in 1978 as a Queen’s Counsel, Mr Callinan enjoyed this period of his legal career and we discussed an aspect of the Christopher Skase case, which reinforced my belief that Mr Callinan is an incredibly skilful advocate. On 14 September 1998, ABC Four Corners broadcasted the views of some prominent Australians on the appointment of Mr Callinan to the High Court. In assessing the type of person Mr Callinan is, Tony Morris QC said: “Ian Callinan isn't a coward”, while former Commonwealth Attorney-General, Michael Lavarch, said: “He was regarded as an absolutely outstanding criminal lawyer within the Queensland legal profession, I mean really a top-notch advocate”. I was not interested in raising any of the controversial issues that Mr Callinan has encountered as an advocate in high profile matters. I wanted to know how he felt about his time on the High Court, what his thoughts are on the operation of the High Court, the IP cases he decided, the real life issues that he feels impact on counsel who are appearing before the High Court and the people he regarded as role models. During our conversation, Mr Callinan laughed often and when he did his eyes lit up, revealing his passion for life. He is an incredibly genuine Australian who loved his time as a barrister, enjoyed his role on the High Court, enjoys his current job as mediator, loves writing novels, has a great desire for continual improvement in the quality of legal education and legal advocacy and sees a need for change in IP law. When I asked: “So, what might the future hold for you?”, he laughed and said: “Well, at my age I don’t have a long horizon time”. I said: “Just enjoy the journey?”, to which Mr Callinan responded: “Exactly”.

“Best interests” and withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from an adult who lacks capacity in the parens patriae jurisdiction

Disputes about withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment are increasingly coming before Australian Supreme Courts. Such cases are generally heard in the parens patriae jurisdiction where the test applied is what is in the patient’s “best interests”. However, the application of the “best interests” test, and its meaning, remains unclear in this context. To shed light on this emerging body of jurisprudence, this article analyses the Australian superior court decisions that consider an adult’s best interests in the context of decisions about life-sustaining treatment. We identify a number of themes from the current body of cases and consider how these themes may guide future decision-making. After then considering the law in the United Kingdom, we suggest an approach for assessing best interests that could be adopted by Australian Supreme Courts. We argue that the suggested approach will lead to a more structured and systematic decision-making process that better promotes the best interests of the patient.

Strategic entry deterrence : does it constitute a misuse of market power?

A challenge for regulators and the courts has been establishing the boundary between behaviour is exclusionary and should be condemned under s 46 of the then Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA), now s 46 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA), and behaviour that is not exclusionary and might even be pro-competitive. This boundary can be especially difficult to draw in the case of entry deterring strategies. Section 46(1) prohibits corporations with a substantial degree of market power from taking advantage of that market power for one of the statutorily proscribed purposes which include preventing the entry of a person into that or any other market. Section 45(2) separately prohibits corporations from making and giving effect to contracts arrangements and understandings that have the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in a market. The latest case in which the ACCC has failed to satisfy the s 46 criteria is the decision of Greenwood J in ACCC v Cement Australia Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 909 (Cement Australia case). Final orders were published in a separate judgment, in ACCC v Cement Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 148 (28 February 2014). The case concerned an entry deterring strategy, namely the pre-emptive buying of input factors in an upstream market to protect an incumbent with substantial market power in a downstream market and to prevent new entry in the downstream market. Greenwood J found that while Cement Australia Pty Ltd, formerly known as Queensland Cement Ltd (QCL), had substantial market power, its conduct in entering into the pre-emptive contracts was not a contravention of s 46, because Cement Australia had not “taken advantage” of its market power. However, since Cement Australia’s purpose in entering into the pre-emptive contracts was anti-competitive, they were held to contravene s 45(2) of the TPA. The purpose of this Note is to consider only the reasons for judgment in the Cement Australia case in relation to the “taking advantage” element. The judgment was handed down on 10 September 2013. The final hearing date was 15 July 2011, so it was long-awaited. At 714 pages, it is carefully drafted.

Survey : video forensic tools

Due to extension of using CCTVs and the other video security systems in all areas, these sorts of devices have been introduced as the most important digital evidences to search and seizure crimes. Video forensics tools are developed as a part of digital forensics tools to analyze digital evidences and clear vague points of them for presenting in the courts Existing video forensics tools have been facilitated the investigation process by providing different features based on various video editing techniques. In this paper, some of the most popular video forensics tools are discussed and the strengths and shortages of them are compared and consequently, an alternative framework which includes the strengths of existing popular tools is introduced.

Adults who lack capacity : substitute decision-making

• Mechanisms to facilitate consent to healthcare for adults who lack capacity are necessary to ensure that these adults can lawfully receive appropriate medical treatment when needed. • In Australia, the common law plays only a limited role in this context, through its recognition of advance directives and through the parens patriae jurisdiction of superior courts. • Substitute decision-making for adults who lack capacity is facilitated primarily by guardianship and other related legislation. This legislation, which has been enacted in all Australian States and Territories, permits a range of decision-makers to make different types of healthcare decisions. • Substitute decision-makers can be appointed by the adult or by a guardianship or other tribunal. Where there is no appointed decision-maker, legislation generally empowers those close to the adult to make the relevant decision. Most Australian jurisdictions have also provided for statutory advance directives. • For the most serious of decisions, such as non-therapeutic sterilisations, consent can only be provided by a tribunal. Other decisions can generally be made by a range of substitute decision-makers. Some treatment, such as very minor treatment or that which is needed in an emergency, can be provided without consent. • Guardianship legislation generally establishes a set of principles and/or other criteria to guide healthcare decisions. Mechanisms have also been established to resolve disputes as to who is the appropriate decision-maker and how a decision should be made.

Assessment of damages for defamation of business and personal reputation

An award of damages for defamation is to provide reparation for harm to a plaintiff’s reputation for the publication of defamatory material, compensate for any personal distress caused and vindicate the plaintiff’s reputation.1 Assessing such damages is recognised as a difficult task and perhaps the Queensland courts face further difficulties as there are few awards of damages for defamation in the state. This was pointed out in the recent decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal, Cerutti & Anor v Crestside Pty Ltd & Anor.2 This decision examined in detail the principles of assessing damages for defamation.

The New Lawyer

This text is designed to implement the Threshold Learning Outcomes (TLOs) for law in the first year, and to incorporate Sally Kift’s First Year Curriculum principles: http://tls.vu.edu.au/portal/site/trans/Resources/KiftTransitonPedagogySixPrinciples_16Nov09.pdf This is a learning-centered text book intentionally designed for first year students and written by experts in legal education and the first year experience. It is written in a tone and style that engages and communicates effectively with first year law students, without compromising its rigour. It provides students with opportunities to contextualise and make sense of their learning by connecting that learning with what they already know, and with current contemporary issues and affairs. This work is designed to ease students through the transition from a diverse variety of backgrounds (such as high school, work or other disciplines) to the first year of law. It provides practical guidance about adjusting to law school and to university. Students are asked to regularly reflect upon why they are studying law. The book also prepares law students for success in their latter year studies in law by ensuring that they are equipped with the necessary threshold concepts and foundational skills to do well: for example, research skills (particularly, online research skills), reasoning skills, written communication skills, negotiation skills, and self-management skills. A range of practical tips on studying law are provided throughout the book. The work also asks students to engage with developing an emergent sense of professional identity – including what it means to ‘think like a lawyer’. In supporting the students to engage with the concept of professional identity, the work begins a process of preparing students for transition from law school to legal practice. This is achieved by providing explanations of how the material being presented relates to the practice of law, as well as practical information relating to employability skills as a new graduate. This work has a number of learning and teaching objectives to enhance the quality of student learning in their first year of law by engaging, motivating and supporting that learning. First, the work is designed to engage first year students with their legal education and with a future sense of professional identity. It does this through its: • Dynamic writing style • Engaging format • Inclusion of contemporary issues and events • Flowcharts, checklists, mind-maps, tables and timelines • Inclusion of real-world problems and dilemmas. Second, the text motivates student learning by promoting active learning. It does this by: • Demonstrating, and asking students to practice, what they need to do – that is, the work is not simply focussed on telling students what they need to know • Including regular self-directed learning exercises throughout each chapter, such as practical exercises for the development of important foundational legal skills • Including exercises that promote student collaboration, and that require students to apply their learning to practical situations, and • Incorporating a range of interesting active thinking points and research activities. Third, the book supports student learning by encouraging reflective learning and independent learning. It does this by including: • Specific content on how to be a reflective practitioner and an independent learner • Exercises that require students to engage in independent learning, particularly in relation to legal research skill development • Exercises requiring students to reflect upon what they have learned, and encouraging students to keep a reflective learning journal • Exercises requiring students to reflect upon their own views and beliefs • Reflection on whether students have achieved the learning objectives articulated at the beginning of the chapter. The work also: • Demonstrates respect for student experiences, views, opinions and values • Acknowledges student diversity • Recognises the importance of being globally minded law students and lawyers • Supports law teachers in using the work in their classrooms through the provision of comprehensive teaching materials.

Sentencing and public confidence in Australia: The dynamics and foci of small group deliberations

This study is the first of its kind in Australia to use the deliberative small group methodology to explore participants’ deeper, nuanced thoughts on specific criminal justice issues in order to gain insight into the underlying beliefs that influence people’s opinions on sentencing. The use of small group discussions allows an analysis of the dynamics of people’s interactions and the potential of these to elicit deeper, more thoughtful deliberation. Participants’ comments around two policy areas – mandatory sentencing and the use of alternatives to imprisonment – were founded on concerns about the need for judges to tailor the sentence to fit the specific circumstances of each case. The methodology itself has shown that people may change their initial opinions on complex issues when given the opportunity to discuss and reflect on their beliefs.

Duty to the court and the administration of justice : some examples, implications and clarifications

No liberal democracy can survive without popular trust in its judicial system. The legal profession and the judiciary enjoy a level of independence and autonomy from the executive that makes them both powerful and privileged. A UNIQUE AND ORGANIC DUTY: So long as the courts are seen to fulfil their duty to guard against encroachments by the executive on the freedoms and rights of individual citizens with integrity and credibility, they maintain enough public support to retain their normative authority. But support for those with power and privilege is easily undermined. It is contingent upon trust. Lawyers who breach that trust in ways that go to the heart of the legal system ought to expect to be made examples of and to suffer severe penalties. The good news is that the sorts of breach discussed here should be neither difficult to anticipate nor to avoid – in theory. In practice, smart and honest lawyers sometimes fall foul of these duties for all sorts of understandable (if not condonable) reasons. Law does not get practised in a social or cultural vacuum. Lawyers are people, and people have weaknesses, failings and stresses...

Abandoning the Magic Circle

As a concept, the magic circle is in reality just 4 years old. Whilst often accredited to Johan Huizinga (1955), the modern usage of term in truth belongs to Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman. It became in academia following the publication of “Rules of Play” in 2003. Because of the terminologyused, it carries with it unhelpful preconceptions that the game world, or play-space, excludes reality. In this paper, I argue that Salen and Zimmerman (2003) have taken a term used as an example, and applied a meaning to it that was never intended, based primarily upon definitions given by other authors, namely Apter (1991) and Sniderman (n.d.). I further argue that the definition itself contains a logical fallacy, which has prevented the full understanding of the definition in later work. Through a study of the literature in Game Theory, and examples of possible issues which could arise in contemporary games, I suggest that the emotions of the play experience continue beyond the play space, and that emotions from the “real world” enter it with the participants. I consider a reprise of the Stanley Milgram Obedience Experiment (2006), and what that tells us about human emotions and the effect that events taking place in a virtual environment can have upon them. I evaluate the opinion espoused by some authors of there being different magic circles for different players, and assert that this is not a useful approach to take when studying games, because it prevents the analysis of a game as a single entity. Furthermore I consider the reasons given by other authors for the existence of the Magic Circle, and I assert that the term “Magic Circle” should be discarded, that it has no relevance to contemporary games, and indeed it acts as a hindrance to the design and study of games. I conclude that the play space which it claims to protect from the courts and other governmental authorities would be better served by the existing concepts of intent, consent, and commonly accepted principles associated with international travel.

A Submission to the Advisory Council on Intellectual Property in Relation to the Issues Paper Relating to the Enforcement of Trade Marks - February 2002

With respect to “shape” marks, there would appear to be a “break”, imposed by the Australian Courts, in the logical conclusion that registration of a shape, which performs a functional purpose, or even further, is indistinguishable from the shape of the item or product, creates a perpetual monopoly in the manufacture of that product.