The Context-integrity of the global carbon regime: The relevance and impact of the World Trade Organization

In the study of the integrity of the global carbon regime there are a number of institutions that must be considered for their impacts on this system. In particular, the subject matter of this chapter is concerned with the main international institution for trade, the World Trade Organization (the WTO). Otherwise stated, this chapter is concerned with how the institutional integrity of the global carbon regime aligns with the values and policy objectives of the WTO. This is done with a view to consider whether the global carbon regime aligns with these values and objectives in a way demonstrative of context-integrity. This alignment is not a single-sided undertaking and, therefore, it is essential that the underlying values of the WTO themselves align with the global carbon regime. I suggest this is particularly crucial given the importance of the objectives of the climate change regime, and the scientific predictions of the current climate projections.

Information preferences for the evaluation of coastal development impacts on ecosystem services: A multi-criteria assessment in the Australian context

Ecosystem based management requires the integration of various types of assessment indicators. Understanding stakeholders' information preferences is important, in selecting those indicators that best support management and policy. Both the preferences of decision-makers and the general public may matter, in democratic participatory management institutions. This paper presents a multi-criteria analysis aimed at quantifying the relative importance to these groups of economic, ecological and socio-economic indicators usually considered when managing ecosystem services in a coastal development context. The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is applied within two nationwide surveys in Australia, and preferences of both the general public and decision-makers for these indicators are elicited and compared. Results show that, on average across both groups, the priority in assessing a generic coastal development project is for the ecological assessment of its impacts on marine biodiversity. Ecological assessment indicators are globally preferred to both economic and socio-economic indicators regardless of the nature of the impacts studied. These results are observed for a significantly larger proportion of decision-maker than general public respondents, questioning the extent to which the general public's preferences are well reflected in decision-making processes.

Altruism, Trade Policy, and the Optimality of Foreign Aid

There are many studies in the literature that deal with the welfare effects of income transfers between nations in a general equilibrium setting. An important impetus for this extensive literature was the demonstration of the transfer paradox; that the donor country could actually gain from a transfer of income to another, and that the recipient could lose as a result of the gift. The reason for this paradoxical result is that the transfer gives rise to a terms-of-trade effect that may be especially beneficial to the donor and detrimental to the recipient. Subsequently, many papers have established conditions under which this paradox will or will not occur. Early work by Samuelson (1954) was followed by demonstrations of paradoxes by Gale (1974), Ohyama (1974), Brecher and Bhagwati (1982) and Bhagwati, Brecher and Hatta 1983, 1985, and Dixit (1983)) among others.1 More recently, many studies have examined whether or not foreign aid — tied and untied — can be welfare improving for both the donor and the recipient (see, for example, Turunen-Red and Woodland (1988), Kemp and Wong (1993), Schweinberger (1990), Hatzipanayotou and Michael (1995), Lahiri and Raimondos-Moller 1995, 1997, Djajić, Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller 1996a, 1996b, and Lahiri, Raimondos-Møller, Wong and Woodland 1997.2

Competition for aid and trade policy

This paper considers the optimal allocation of a given amount of foreign aid between two recipient countries. It is shown that, given consumer preferences, a country following a more restrictive trade policy would receive a smaller share of the aid if the donor country maximises its own welfare in allocating aid. If, on the other hand, the donor country allocates aid in order to maximize the sum of the welfare of the two recipient countries, the result is just the opposite. Finally, we analyze the situation where the recipient countries compete with each other for the given amount of aid. It is shown that this competition tends to lower the level of optimal tariffs in the recipient countries.

Correcting trade distortions in a small open economy

This paper considers the second-best strategy of correcting a wide variety of trade distortions in a small open economy with perfect competition in all markets. Using the tools of duality, we obtain some general properties of the structure and the levels of the optimal taxlsubsidy rates. The paper also analyzes the welfare effects of unilateral piecemeal trade policy reforms when some of the quota distortions—imposed by the foreign countries—are unalterable. It is shown that the merits of unilateral trade policy reforms that are emphasized in the literature crucially depend on the absence of unalterable foreign imposed quotas.

The transfer problem and the intertemporal terms of trade

In this paper the effects of a transfer on the intertemporal terms of trade are examined in the context of a simple two-country, two-period model. When intertemporal trade occurs because the two economies have different rates of time preference, a transfer improves the terms of trade of the paying country. Alternatively, when trade occurs owing to international differences in the endowments of goods over the two periods, the effect of a transfer depends on (a) the relationship between the interest rate and the rates of time preference of the two countries and (b) the relationship between their elasticities of intertemporal consumption substitution.

Welfare effects of aid under quantitative trade restrictions

The paper examines the effects of tied-aid on the welfare of both the donor and the recipient countries. We depart from the previous literature by assuming preexistence of quantitative trade distortions. To mitigate these distortions the donor country provides aid that is tied to the rationed good. Conditions for the presence of the transfer paradox and of the enrichment of both countries are derived and interpreted under the stability of the system. Furthermore, we show that whereas untied aid cannot increase global welfare, tied-aid unambiguously does so.

Is economic valuation of ecosystem services useful to decision-makers? Lessons learned from Australian coastal and marine management

Economic valuation of ecosystem services is widely advocated as a useful decision-support tool for ecosystem management. However, the extent to which economic valuation of ecosystem services is actually used or considered useful in decision-making is poorly documented. This literature blindspot is explored with an application to coastal and marine ecosystems management in Australia. Based on a nation-wide survey of eighty-eight decision-makers representing a diversity of management organizations, the perceived usefulness and level of use of ecosystem services economic valuation in support of coastal and marine management are examined. A large majority of decision-makers are found to be familiar with economic valuation and consider it useful - even necessary - in decision-making, although this varies across decision-makers groups. However, most decision-makers never or rarely use it. The perceived level of importance and trust in estimated dollar values differ across ecosystem services, and are especially high for values that relate to commercial activities. A number of factors are also found to influence respondent’s use of economic valuation. Such findings concur with conclusions from other existing works, and are instructive to reflect on the issue of the usefulness of ESV in environmental management decision-making. They also confirm that the survey-based approach developed in this application represents a sound strategy to examine this issue at various scales and management levels.

Conference Report: International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade Conference (IIFET) 2014

The 17th Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade (IIFET) was held in Brisbane in July 2014. IIFET is the principal international association for fisheries economics, and the biennial conference is an opportunity for the best fisheries economists in the world to meet and share their ideas. The conference was organised by CSIRO, QUT, UTAS, University of Adelaide and KG Kailis Ltd. This is the first time the conference has been held in Australia. The conferences covered a wide range of topics of relevance to Australia. These included studies of fishery management systems around the world, identified key issues in aquaculture and marine biodiversity conservation, and provided a forum for new modelling and theoretical approaches to analysing fisheries problems to be presented. The theme of the conference was Towards Ecosystem Based Management of Fisheries: What Role can Economics Play? Several sessions were dedicated to modelling socio-ecological systems, and two keynote speakers were invited to present the latest thinking in the area. In this report, the key features of the conference are outlined.

Trade wars in the TRIPS Council: Intellectual property, technology transfer, and climate change

This Chapter considers the geopolitical conflicts in respect of intellectual property, trade, and climate change in the TRIPS Agreement 1994 under the World Trade Organization (WTO). In particular, it focuses upon debates in the TRIPS Council on the topic of patent law and clean energy in 2013 and 2014. The chapter highlights the development agenda of a number of developing countries who are keen for access to clean energy to combat climate change and global warming. It also considers the mixed contributions of members of the BRICS/ BASIC group – including Brazil, India, China, and South Africa. This chapter highlights the intellectual property maximalist position of a number of developed countries on intellectual property, climate change, and trade. Seeking to overcome this conflict and stalemate, this Chapter puts forward both procedural and substantial reform options in respect of intellectual property, trade, and climate change in the TRIPS Council and the WTO. It also flags that the TRIPS Agreement 1994 could well be displaced by the rise of mega-regional trade agreements – such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).