Advance pricing arrangements : an Australian Tax Office success or a legislative failure?

Australia’s domestic income tax legislation and double tax agreements contain transfer pricing rules which are designed to counter the underpayment of tax by businesses engaged in international dealings between related parties. The current legislation and agreements require that related party transactions take place at a value which reflects an arm’s length price, that is, a price which would be charged between unrelated parties. For a host of reasons, it is increasingly difficult for multinational entities to demonstrate that they are transferring goods and services at a price which is reflective of the behaviour of independent parties, thereby making it difficult to demonstrate compliance with the relevant legislation. Further, where an Australian business undertakes cross-border related party transactions there is the risk of an audit by the Australian Tax Office (ATO). If a business wishes to avoid the risk of an audit, and any ensuing penalties, there is one option: an advance pricing arrangement (APA). An APA is an agreement whereby the future transfer pricing methodology to be used to determine the arm’s length price is agreed to by the taxpayer and the relevant tax authority or authorities. The ATO views the APA process as an important part of its international tax strategy and believes that there are complementary benefits provided to both the taxpayer and the ATO. The ATO promotes the APA process on the basis of creating greater certainty for all parties while reducing compliance costs and the risk of audit and penalty. While the ATO regards the APA system as a success, it may be argued that the implementation of such a system is simply a practical solution to an ongoing problem of an inherent failure in both the legislation and ATO interpretation and application of this legislation to provide certainty to the taxpayer. This paper investigates the use of APAs as a solution to the problem of transfer pricing and considers whether they are the success the ATO claims. It is argued that there is no doubt that APAs provide a valuable practical tool for multinational entities facing the challenges of the taxation of global trading under the current transfer pricing regime. It does not, however, provide a long term solution. Rather, the long term solution may be in the form of legislative amendment.

Small business entity tax concessions : through the eyes of the practitioner

The often competing imperatives of equity, simplicity and efficiency in the income tax regime, particularly the notion of simplicity, has been most evident within Australia’s small business sector over the last decade. In an attempt to provide tax simplification and reduce the tax compliance burden faced by Australian small businesses, provisions collectively referred to as the ‘simplified tax system’ or STS were introduced. The STS was designed to provide eligible small businesses with the option of adopting a range of ‘simplified’ tax measures designed to simplify their tax affairs whilst at the same time, reducing their tax compliance costs. Ultimately, a low take-up rate and accompanying criticisms led to a remodelled and rebadged concessionary regime known as the ‘Small Business Entity’ (SBE) regime which came into effect from 1 July 2007. This paper, through a pilot study, investigates the SBE regime though the eyes of the practitioner. In line the Australian Federal Government’s objective of simplification and reduced compliance costs, the purpose of the study was to (1) determine the extent to which the SBE concessions are being adopted by tax practitioners on behalf of their clients, (2) gain an understanding as to which individual SBE tax concessions are most favoured by practitioners, (3) determine the primary motivation as to why tax practitioners recommend particular SBE concessions to their clients, and (4) canvass the opinions of practitioners as to whether they believed that the introduction of the SBE concessions had met their stated objective of reducing tax compliance costs for small businesses. The findings of this research indicate that, while there is a perception that the SBE concessions are worth embracing, contrary to the policy intent, the reasons behind adopting the concessions was the opportunity to minimise a clients’ tax liability. It was revealed that adopting particular concessions had nothing to do with compliance costs savings and, in fact, the SBE concessions merely added another layer of complexity to an already cumbersome and complex tax code, which resulted in increased compliance costs for their small businesses clients. Further, the SBE concessions allowed tax practitioners the opportunity to engage in effective tax minimisation, thereby fulfilling the client advocacy role of the tax practitioner in maximising their clients’ tax preferences.

Tax evasion, inequality, and progressive taxes : a political economy perspective

The standard approach to tax compliance applies the economics-of-crime methodology pioneered by Becker (1968): in its first application, due to Allingham and Sandmo (1972) it models the behaviour of agents as a decision involving a choice of the extent of their income to report to tax authorities, given a certain institutional environment, represented by parameters such as the probability of detection and penalties in the event the agent is caught. While this basic framework yields important insights on tax compliance behavior, it has some critical limitations. Specifically, it indicates a level of compliance that is significantly below what is observed in the data. This thesis revisits the original framework with a view towards addressing this issue, and examining the political economy implications of tax evasion for progressivity in the tax structure. The approach followed involves building a macroeconomic, dynamic equilibrium model for the purpose of examining these issues, by using a step-wise model building procedure starting with some very simple variations of the basic Allingham and Sandmo construct, which are eventually integrated to a dynamic general equilibrium overlapping generations framework with heterogeneous agents. One of the variations involves incorporating the Allingham and Sandmo construct into a two-period model of a small open economy of the type originally attributed to Fisher (1930). A further variation of this simple construct involves allowing agents to initially decide whether to evade taxes or not. In the event they decide to evade, the agents then have to decide the extent of income or wealth they wish to under-report. We find that the ‘evade or not’ assumption has strikingly different and more realistic implications for the extent of evasion, and demonstrate that it is a more appropriate modeling strategy in the context of macroeconomic models, which are essentially dynamic in nature, and involve consumption smoothing across time and across various states of nature. Specifically, since deciding to undertake tax evasion impacts on the consumption smoothing ability of the agent by creating two states of nature in which the agent is ‘caught’ or ‘not caught’, there is a possibility that their utility under certainty, when they choose not to evade, is higher than the expected utility obtained when they choose to evade. Furthermore, the simple two-period model incorporating an ‘evade or not’ choice can be used to demonstrate some strikingly different political economy implications relative to its Allingham and Sandmo counterpart. In variations of the two models that allow for voting on the tax parameter, we find that agents typically choose to vote for a high degree of progressivity by choosing the highest available tax rate from the menu of choices available to them. There is, however, a small range of inequality levels for which agents in the ‘evade or not’ model vote for a relatively low value of the tax rate. The final steps in the model building procedure involve grafting the two-period models with a political economy choice into a dynamic overlapping generations setting with more general, non-linear tax schedules and a ‘cost-of evasion’ function that is increasing in the extent of evasion. Results based on numerical simulations of these models show further improvement in the model’s ability to match empirically plausible levels of tax evasion. In addition, the differences between the political economy implications of the ‘evade or not’ version of the model and its Allingham and Sandmo counterpart are now very striking; there is now a large range of values of the inequality parameter for which agents in the ‘evade or not’ model vote for a low degree of progressivity. This is because, in the ‘evade or not’ version of the model, low values of the tax rate encourages a large number of agents to choose the ‘not-evade’ option, so that the redistributive mechanism is more ‘efficient’ relative to the situations in which tax rates are high. Some further implications of the models of this thesis relate to whether variations in the level of inequality, and parameters such as the probability of detection and penalties for tax evasion matter for the political economy results. We find that (i) the political economy outcomes for the tax rate are quite insensitive to changes in inequality, and (ii) the voting outcomes change in non-monotonic ways in response to changes in the probability of detection and penalty rates. Specifically, the model suggests that changes in inequality should not matter, although the political outcome for the tax rate for a given level of inequality is conditional on whether there is a large or small or large extent of evasion in the economy. We conclude that further theoretical research into macroeconomic models of tax evasion is required to identify the structural relationships underpinning the link between inequality and redistribution in the presence of tax evasion. The models of this thesis provide a necessary first step in that direction.

Measuring the managerial benefits of tax compliance : a fresh approach

Managerial benefits of tax compliance have been identified by many authors in the tax compliance costs literature; they have however often been ignored when measuring the net effect of tax compliance on business taxpayers because it was believed that the measurement of such benefits was impossible or difficult. This paper first discusses the theoretical issues surrounding the valuation of managerial benefits, including the related tax/ accounting costs overlap problem; it then proposes a fresh approach for measuring managerial benefits. The proposed measurement model incorporates a subjective evaluation of useful accounting information by owner‑managers and objective measurements of accounting costs. Two main components of managerial benefits are identified: the incremental value of managerial accounting information and the savings on reporting costs. A study of small businesses conducted in late 2006, compared accounting practices between tax complying entities (TCEs) and tax compliance free entities (TFEs) and investigated how accounting information was valued by owner-managers in TCEs. The research adopted a mixed methodological design including a major quantitative phase followed by a minor qualitative phase. The results show that while a vast majority of TFEs maintained basic accounting functions, record keeping requirements imposed by tax compliance led to the implementation of more sophisticated accounting systems in TCEs. It was also found that TCE owner-managers assigned a relatively significant value to the managerial accounting information that is generated as a result of record keeping imposed by tax compliance, suggesting that substantial managerial benefits might be derived.

The managerial benefits of tax compliance: perception by small business taxpayers

Research undertaken in 2006 – 2007 investigated the perception of managerial benefits of tax compliance by small business taxpayers. Survey data from a sample of 300 small business taxpayers and responses to semi-structured interviews of owner managers were examined. The study found that a majority of small business taxpayers recognised that tax compliance activities led to better record keeping and to an improved knowledge of their financial affairs. However, there seemed to be a general reluctance by respondents to accept the idea that benefits could be derived as a result of complying with tax. The findings of this study are important as it is the first research that systematically investigated managerial benefits and their perception by small business taxpayers in Australia.