183 resultados para political finance
Resumo:
The topic of corruption has recently attracted a great deal of attention, yet there is still a lack of micro level empirical evidence regarding the determinates of corruption. Furthermore, the present literature has not investigated the effects of political interest on corruption despite the interesting potential of this link. We address these deficiencies by analysing a cross-section of individuals, using the World Values Survey. We explore the determinants of corruption through two dependant variables (perceived corruption and the justifiability of corruption). The impact of political interest on corruption is explored through three different proxies presenting empirical evidence at both the cross-country level and the within-country level.The results of the multivariate analysis suggest that political interest has an impact on corruption controlling for a huge number of factors.
Resumo:
We study an overlapping-generations model in which agents' mortality risks, and consequently impatience, are endogenously determined by private and public investment in health care. Revenues allocated for public health care arc determined by a voting process. We find that the degree of substitutability between public and private health expenditures matters for macroeconomic outcomes of the model. Higher substitutability implies a “crowding-out" effect, which in turn impacts adversely on morality risks and impatience leading to lower public expenditures on health care in the political equilibrium. Consequently, higher substitutability is associated with greater polarization in wealth, and long-run distributions that are bimodal.
Resumo:
In this paper we examine the dynamics of the link between inequality and inflation from a political economy perspective. We consider a simple dynamic general equilibrium model in which agents vote over the desired inflation rate in each period, and inequality is persistent. Inflation in our model is a mechanism of redistribution, and we find that the link between inequality and inflation within any period or over time depends on institutional and preference related parameters. Furthermore, we find that differences in the initial distributions of wealth can yield a diverse set of patterns for the evolution of the inflation and inequality link. Relative to existing literature, our model leads to more precise predictions about the inflation-inequality correlation. To that end, results in the extant empirical literature on the inflation and inequality link need to be interpreted with caution.
Resumo:
The standard approach to tax compliance applies the economics-of-crime methodology pioneered by Becker (1968): in its first application, due to Allingham and Sandmo (1972) it models the behaviour of agents as a decision involving a choice of the extent of their income to report to tax authorities, given a certain institutional environment, represented by parameters such as the probability of detection and penalties in the event the agent is caught. While this basic framework yields important insights on tax compliance behavior, it has some critical limitations. Specifically, it indicates a level of compliance that is significantly below what is observed in the data. This thesis revisits the original framework with a view towards addressing this issue, and examining the political economy implications of tax evasion for progressivity in the tax structure. The approach followed involves building a macroeconomic, dynamic equilibrium model for the purpose of examining these issues, by using a step-wise model building procedure starting with some very simple variations of the basic Allingham and Sandmo construct, which are eventually integrated to a dynamic general equilibrium overlapping generations framework with heterogeneous agents. One of the variations involves incorporating the Allingham and Sandmo construct into a two-period model of a small open economy of the type originally attributed to Fisher (1930). A further variation of this simple construct involves allowing agents to initially decide whether to evade taxes or not. In the event they decide to evade, the agents then have to decide the extent of income or wealth they wish to under-report. We find that the ‘evade or not’ assumption has strikingly different and more realistic implications for the extent of evasion, and demonstrate that it is a more appropriate modeling strategy in the context of macroeconomic models, which are essentially dynamic in nature, and involve consumption smoothing across time and across various states of nature. Specifically, since deciding to undertake tax evasion impacts on the consumption smoothing ability of the agent by creating two states of nature in which the agent is ‘caught’ or ‘not caught’, there is a possibility that their utility under certainty, when they choose not to evade, is higher than the expected utility obtained when they choose to evade. Furthermore, the simple two-period model incorporating an ‘evade or not’ choice can be used to demonstrate some strikingly different political economy implications relative to its Allingham and Sandmo counterpart. In variations of the two models that allow for voting on the tax parameter, we find that agents typically choose to vote for a high degree of progressivity by choosing the highest available tax rate from the menu of choices available to them. There is, however, a small range of inequality levels for which agents in the ‘evade or not’ model vote for a relatively low value of the tax rate. The final steps in the model building procedure involve grafting the two-period models with a political economy choice into a dynamic overlapping generations setting with more general, non-linear tax schedules and a ‘cost-of evasion’ function that is increasing in the extent of evasion. Results based on numerical simulations of these models show further improvement in the model’s ability to match empirically plausible levels of tax evasion. In addition, the differences between the political economy implications of the ‘evade or not’ version of the model and its Allingham and Sandmo counterpart are now very striking; there is now a large range of values of the inequality parameter for which agents in the ‘evade or not’ model vote for a low degree of progressivity. This is because, in the ‘evade or not’ version of the model, low values of the tax rate encourages a large number of agents to choose the ‘not-evade’ option, so that the redistributive mechanism is more ‘efficient’ relative to the situations in which tax rates are high. Some further implications of the models of this thesis relate to whether variations in the level of inequality, and parameters such as the probability of detection and penalties for tax evasion matter for the political economy results. We find that (i) the political economy outcomes for the tax rate are quite insensitive to changes in inequality, and (ii) the voting outcomes change in non-monotonic ways in response to changes in the probability of detection and penalty rates. Specifically, the model suggests that changes in inequality should not matter, although the political outcome for the tax rate for a given level of inequality is conditional on whether there is a large or small or large extent of evasion in the economy. We conclude that further theoretical research into macroeconomic models of tax evasion is required to identify the structural relationships underpinning the link between inequality and redistribution in the presence of tax evasion. The models of this thesis provide a necessary first step in that direction.
Resumo:
In this paper we present substantial evidence for the existence of a bias in the distribution of births of leading US politicians in favor of those that have been the oldest in their cohort at school. This “relative age effect” has been proven to influence performance at school and in sports,but evidence on its impact on people’s vocational success has been rare. We find a marked break in the density of birthdate of politicians using a maximum likelihood test and McCrary’s (2008) nonparametric test. We conjecture that being relatively old in a peer group may create long term advantages which can create a significant role in the ability to succeed in a highly competitive environment like the race for top political offices in the USA. The magnitude of the effect we estimate is larger than what most other studies on the relative age effect for a broader (adult) population find, but is in general in line with studies that look at populations in high-competition environments.
Resumo:
This thesis, conceived within a Marxist framework, addresses key conceptual issues in the writing and theorising on industry policy in post second world- war Australia. Broadly, the thesis challenges the way that industry policy on the left of politics (reflected in the social democratic and Keynesian positions) has been constructed as a practical, progressive policy agenda. Specifically, the thesis poses a direct challenge to the primacy of the ‘national’ in interpreting the history of industry policy. The challenge is to the proposition that conflicts between national industry and international finance arose only from the mid 1980s. On the contrary, as will be seen, this is a 1960s issue and any interpretation of the debates and the agendas surrounding industry policy in the 1980s must be predicated on an understanding of how the issue was played out two decades earlier. As was the case in the 1960s, industry policy in the 1980s has been isolated from two key areas of interrogation: the role of the nation state in regulating accumulation and the role of finance in industry policy. In the 1950s and more so in the 1960s and early 1970s there was a reconfiguration of financing internationally but it is one that did not enter into industry policy analysis. The central concern therefore is to simultaneously sketch the historical political economy on industry policy from the 1950s through to the early 1970s in Australia and to analytically and empirically insert the role of finance into that history. In so doing the thesis addresses the economic and social factors that shaped the approach to industry finance in Australia during this critical period. The analysis is supported by a detailed examination of political and industry debates surrounding the proposal for, and institution of, a key national intervention in the form of the Australian Industry Development Corporation (AIDC).
Resumo:
We examine the role of politico-economic influences on macroeconomic performance within the framework of an endogenous growth model with costly technology adoption and uncertainty. The model is aimed at understanding the diversity in growth and inequality experiences across countries. Agents adopt either of two risky technologies, one of which is only available through financial intermediaries, who are able to alleviate some of this risk. The entry cost of financial intermediation depends on the proportion of government revenue that is allocated towards cost-reducing financial development expenditure, and agents vote on this proportion. The results show that agents at the top and bottom ends of the distribution prefer alternative means of re-distribution, thereby effectively blocking the allocation of resources towards cost-reducing financial development expenditure. Thus political factors have a role in delaying financial and capital deepening and economic development. Furthermore, the model provides a political-economy perspective on the Kuznets curve; uncertainty interacts with the political economy mechanism to produce transitional inequality patterns that, depending on initial conditions, can unearth the Kuznets-curve experience. Finally, the political outcomes are inefficient relative to policies aimed at maximizing the collective welfare of agents in the economy.
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This thesis examines the value of political connections for business groups by constructing a unique dataset that allows us to identify the form and extent of the connections. Results show firms' membership to family-controlled business groups (South Korean chaebol) play a key role in determining the value of political connections. Politically connected chaebol firms experience substantial price increases following the establishment of the connection than other firms, but the reverse is found for other (non-family-controlled) connected business groups.
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This thesis presents four essays in the political economy of elections and reforms. The first study exploits discontinuities around school entry cut-off dates to show that early childhood conditions can impact the probability to become a top-flight politician. The second study provides empirical estimates of the effect of sequential voting on turnout and bandwagon voting outside the laboratory. The third work describes a novel nonparametric strategy to identify tactical voting patterns directly from balloting results using British election data. Finally, a study is put forward that examines the political feasibility of reforms.
Resumo:
We examine the association between institutional ownership, political connections, and analyst following in Malaysia from 1999 to 2009. Based on 940 firm-year observations, we document a positive relation between institutional ownership, particularly by Employees Provident Fund (EPF), and analyst following, thus supporting the governance role that institutional investors play in promoting corporate transparency. However, there is no evidence that political connections matter to analyst following. The monitoring role of institutional investors, including EPF, does not appear to be any different between politically connected and non-connected firms.