The iatrogenic reflex and belief that repression can coercively suppress asymmetric coercive violence : does very robust action by the government decrease functional support for insurgents?

Non-state insurgent actors are too weak to compel powerful adversaries to their will, so they use violence to coerce. A principal objective is to grow and sustain violent resistance to the point that it either militarily challenges the state, or more commonly, generates unacceptable political costs. To survive, insurgents must shift popular support away from the state and to grow they must secure it. State actor policies and actions perceived as illegitimate and oppressive by the insurgent constituency can generate these shifts. A promising insurgent strategy is to attack states in ways that lead angry publics and leaders to discount the historically established risks and take flawed but popular decisions to use repressive measures. Such decisions may be enabled by a visceral belief in the power of coercion and selective use of examples of where robust measures have indeed suppressed resistance. To avoid such counterproductive behaviours the cases of apparent 'successful repression' must be understood. This thesis tests whether robust state action is correlated with reduced support for insurgents, analyses the causal mechanisms of such shifts and examines whether such reduction is because of compulsion or coercion? The approach is founded on prior research by the RAND Corporation which analysed the 30 insurgencies most recently resolved worldwide to determine factors of counterinsurgent success. This new study first re-analyses their data at a finer resolution with new queries that investigate the relationship between repression and insurgent active support. Having determined that, in general, repression does not correlate with decreased insurgent support, this study then analyses two cases in which the data suggests repression seems likely to be reducing insurgent support: the PKK in Turkey and the insurgency against the Vietnamese-sponsored regime after their ousting of the Khmer Rouge. It applies 'structured-focused' case analysis with questions partly built from the insurgency model of Leites and Wolf, who are associated with the advocacy of US robust means in Vietnam. This is thus a test of 'most difficult' cases using a 'least likely' test model. Nevertheless, the findings refute the deterrence argument of 'iron fist' advocates. Robust approaches may physically prevent effective support of insurgents but they do not coercively deter people from being willing to actively support the insurgency.

A review of rationale for allocating costs and payments in producing and supplying public sector information PART A of 2 Parts – Chapters 1, 2 and 3) 13 March 2011 version

This work reviews the rationale and processes for raising revenue and allocating funds to perform information intensive activities that are pertinent to the work of democratic government. ‘Government of the people, by the people, for the people’ expresses an idea that democratic government has no higher authority than the people who agree to be bound by its rules. Democracy depends on continually learning how to develop understandings and agreements that can sustain voting majorities on which democratic law making and collective action depends. The objective expressed in constitutional terms is to deliver ‘peace, order and good government’. Meeting this objective requires a collective intellectual authority that can understand what is possible; and a collective moral authority to understand what ought to happen in practice. Facts of life determine that a society needs to retain its collective competence despite a continual turnover of its membership as people die but life goes on. Retaining this ‘collective competence’ in matters of self-government depends on each new generation: • acquiring a collective knowledge of how to produce goods and services needed to sustain a society and its capacity for self-government; • Learning how to defend society diplomatically and militarily in relation to external forces to prevent overthrow of its self-governing capacity; and • Learning how to defend society against divisive internal forces to preserve the authority of representative legislatures, allow peaceful dispute resolution and maintain social cohesion.

From "Secondary Punishment" to "Supermax" : the human costs of high-security regimes in Australia

“Supermax” prisons, conceived by the United States in the early 1980s, are typically reserved for convicted political criminals such as terrorists and spies and for other inmates who are considered to pose a serious ongoing threat to the wider community, to the security of correctional institutions, or to the safety of other inmates. Prisoners are usually restricted to their cells for up to twenty-three hours a day and typically have minimal contact with other inmates and correctional staff. Not only does the Federal Bureau of Prisons operate one of these facilities, but almost every state has either a supermax wing or stand-alone supermax prison. The Globalization of Supermax Prisons examines why nine advanced industrialized countries have adopted the supermax prototype, paying particular attention to the economic, social, and political processes that have affected each state. Featuring essays that look at the U.S.-run prisons of Abu Ghraib and Guantanemo, this collection seeks to determine if the American model is the basis for the establishment of these facilities and considers such issues as the support or opposition to the building of a supermax and why opposition efforts failed; the allegation of human rights abuses within these prisons; and the extent to which the decision to build a supermax was influenced by developments in the United States. Additionally, contributors address such domestic matters as the role of crime rates, media sensationalism, and terrorism in each country’s decision to build a supermax prison.

The Limited Benefit of Prison in Controlling Crime : On the Threshold of a Political Shift

In 2012 the New Zealand government spent $3.4 billion, or nearly $800 per person, on responses to crime via the justice system. Research shows that much of this spending does little to reduce the changes of re-offending. Relatively little money is spent on victims, the rehabilitation of offenders or to support the families of offenders. This book is based on papers presented at the Costs of Crime forum held by the Institute of Policy Studies in February 2011. It presents lessons from what is happening in Australia, Britain and the United States and focuses on how best to manage crime, respond to victims, and reduce offending in a cost-effective manner in a New Zealand context. It is clear that strategies are needed that are based on better research and a more informed approach to policy development. Such strategies must assist victims constructively while also reducing offending. Using public resources to lock as many people in our prisons as possible cannot be justified by the evidence and is fiscally unsustainable; nor does such an approach make society safer. To reduce the costs of crime we need to reinvest resources in effective strategies to build positive futures for those at risk and the communities needed to sustain them.

Exposure to pesticides, ill health and averting behaviour : costs and determining the relationship

Farmers' exposure to pesticides is high in developing countries. As a result many farmers suffer from ill-health, both short and long term. Deaths are not uncommon. This paper addresses this issue. Field survey data from Sri Lanka are used to estimate farmers' expenditure on defensive behavior (DE) and to determine factors that influence DE. The avertive behavior approach is used to estimate costs. Tobit regression analysis is used to determine factors that influence DE. Field survey data show that farmers' expenditures on DE are low. This is inversely related to high incidence of ill health among farmers using pesticides.