Strategic entry deterrence : does it constitute a misuse of market power?

A challenge for regulators and the courts has been establishing the boundary between behaviour is exclusionary and should be condemned under s 46 of the then Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA), now s 46 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA), and behaviour that is not exclusionary and might even be pro-competitive. This boundary can be especially difficult to draw in the case of entry deterring strategies. Section 46(1) prohibits corporations with a substantial degree of market power from taking advantage of that market power for one of the statutorily proscribed purposes which include preventing the entry of a person into that or any other market. Section 45(2) separately prohibits corporations from making and giving effect to contracts arrangements and understandings that have the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in a market. The latest case in which the ACCC has failed to satisfy the s 46 criteria is the decision of Greenwood J in ACCC v Cement Australia Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 909 (Cement Australia case). Final orders were published in a separate judgment, in ACCC v Cement Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 148 (28 February 2014). The case concerned an entry deterring strategy, namely the pre-emptive buying of input factors in an upstream market to protect an incumbent with substantial market power in a downstream market and to prevent new entry in the downstream market. Greenwood J found that while Cement Australia Pty Ltd, formerly known as Queensland Cement Ltd (QCL), had substantial market power, its conduct in entering into the pre-emptive contracts was not a contravention of s 46, because Cement Australia had not “taken advantage” of its market power. However, since Cement Australia’s purpose in entering into the pre-emptive contracts was anti-competitive, they were held to contravene s 45(2) of the TPA. The purpose of this Note is to consider only the reasons for judgment in the Cement Australia case in relation to the “taking advantage” element. The judgment was handed down on 10 September 2013. The final hearing date was 15 July 2011, so it was long-awaited. At 714 pages, it is carefully drafted.

Power relations and small and medium-sized enterprise strategies for capturing value in global production networks: visual effects (VFX) service firm in the Hollywood film industry

Power relations and small and medium-sized enterprise strategies for capturing value in global production networks: visual effects (VFX) service firms in the Hollywood film industry, Regional Studies. This paper provides insights into the way in which non-lead firms manoeuvre in global value chains in the pursuit of a larger share of revenue and how power relations affect these manoeuvres. It examines the nature of value capture and power relations in the global supply of visual effects (VFX) services and the range of strategies VFX firms adopt to capture higher value in the global value chain. The analysis is based on a total of thirty-six interviews with informants in the industry in Australia, the United Kingdom and Canada, and a database of VFX credits for 3323 visual products for 640 VFX firms.

How technological change affects power relations in global markets : remote developers in the console and mobile games industry

This paper focuses on Australian development firms in the console and mobile games industry in order to understand how small firms in a geographically remote and marginal position in the global industry are able to relate to global firms and capture revenue share. This paper shows that, while technological change in the games industry has resulted in the emergence of new industry segments based on transactional rather than relational forms of economic coordination, in which we might therefore expect less asymmetrical power relations, lead firms retain a position of power in the global games entertainment industry relative to remote developers. This has been possible because lead firms in the emerging mobile devices market have developed and sustained bottlenecks in their segment of the industry through platform competition and the development of an intensely competitive ecosystem of developers. Our research shows the critical role of platform competition and bottlenecks in influencing power asymmetries within global markets.

A toothless chihuahua? : the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, neoliberalism and supermarket power in Australia

During the Senate Inquiry into 'milk price wars' in 2011, Senator Nick Xenophon accused the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) of being 'less effective than a toothless Chihuahua'. This follows the ACCC's lack of action regarding the reported abuse of market power of Australia's supermarket duopoly, where an extensive inquiry into the competitiveness of retail prices in 2008 found grocery retailing to be 'workably competitive' despite numerous claims to the contrary. How can farmers' submissions to the inquiry that cite market abuse be reconciled with the ACCC's finding that all is well in the food supply chain? Following an in-depth examination of 53 farmer submissions to the inquiry, we conclude that the findings of the ACCC are commensurate with the neoliberal economisation of the political sphere, where commercial entities 'legitimately' govern beyond their corporate boundaries, often using disciplinary measures that were once exclusive to governments. We argue that such clear structural inequalities between farmers and major corporations is reason to re-regulate markets and reinsert a stronger role for government to 'level the playing field'.

Food waste, power, and corporate social responsibility in the Australian food supply chain

By examining corporate social responsibility (CSR) and power within the context of the food supply chain, this paper illustrates how food retailers claim to address food waste while simultaneously setting standards that result in the large-scale rejection of edible food on cosmetic grounds. Specifically, this paper considers the powerful role of food retailers and how they may be considered to be legitimately engaging in socially responsible behaviors to lower food waste, yet implement practices that ultimately contribute to higher levels of food waste elsewhere in the supply chain. Through interviews with key actors in the Australian fresh fruit and vegetable supply chain, we highlight the existence of a legitimacy gap in corporate social responsibility whereby undesirable behaviors are pushed elsewhere in the supply chain. It is argued that the structural power held by Australia’s retail duopoly means that supermarkets are able to claim virtuous and responsible behaviors, despite counter claims from within the fresh food industry that the food supermarkets’ private quality standards mean that fresh food is wasted. We argue that the supermarkets claim CSR kudos for reducing food waste at the expense of other supply chain actors who bear both the economic cost and the moral burden of waste, and that this is a consequence of supermarkets’ remarkable market power in Australia.

Section 46(1) and 46(1AA) of the TPA : the struggle of the small against the large

The purpose of this article is to highlight the conflict in the policy objectives of subs 46(1) and subs 46(1AA) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA). The policy objective of subs 46(1) is to promote competition and efficient markets for the benefit of consumers (consumer welfare standard). It does not prohibit corporations with substantial market power using cost savings arising from efficiencies such economies of scale or scope, to undercut small business competitors The policy objective of 46(1AA), on the other hand, is to protect small business operators from price discounting by their larger competitors.. Unlike subs 46(1), it does not contain a ‘taking advantage’ element. It is argued that subs 46(1AA) may harm consumer welfare by having a chilling effect on price competition if this would harm small business competitors.

When should private property rights give way to the public interest?

Since Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177 it has been recognised that corporations with substantial market power are subject to special responsibilities and restraints that corporations without market power are not. In NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Power and Water Authority (2004) 219 CLR 90 McHugh A-CJ, Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ in their joint reasons stated (at [76]), that s 46 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) can operate not only to prevent firms with substantial market power from doing prohibited things, but also compel them positively to do things they do not want to do. Their Honours also stated (at [126]) that the proposition that a private property owner who declines to permit competitors to use the property is immune from s 46 is “intrinsically unsound”. However, the circumstances in which a firm with substantial power must accommodate competitors, and private property rights give way to the public interest are uncertain. The purpose of this Note is to consider recent developments in two areas of the CCA where the law requires private property rights to give way to the public interest. The first part of the Note considers two recent cases which clarify the circumstances in which s 46 of the CCA can be used to compel a firm with substantial market power to accommodate a competitor and allow the competitor to make use of private property rights in the public interest. Secondly, on 12 February 2014 the Minister for Small Business, the Hon Bruce Billson,released the Productivity Commission’s Final Report, on the National Access Regime in Pt IIIA of the CCA (National Access Regime, Inquiry Report No 66, Canberra). Pt IIIA provides for the processes by which third parties may obtain access to infrastructure owned by others in the public interest. The Report recommends that Pt IIIA be retained but makes a number of suggestions for its reform, some of which will be briefly considered.

Competition Law in Australia [6th ed.]

Competition Law in Australia, 6th edition provides a comprehensive discussion of the provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) dealing with the regulation of competition and markets in Australia. This book covers disparate topics, such as restrictions in horizontal and vertical agreements, horizontal mergers and acquisitions, misuse of market power, and access to services necessary to compete in upstream or downstream markets. However, the unifying theme of this text is that it is not possible to use a formalistic approach in applying the CCA. The decisions of the courts, and the competition authorities responsible for implementing and enforcing the CCA, underline the need to undertake a detailed substantive economic analysis of the effect of the agreement or conduct at issue on competition, efficiency and consumer welfare.

Regulating unilateral supermarket misconduct as customer/acquirer of goods and services

Supermarkets in Australia may have substantial market power as buyers in wholesale markets for grocery products. They may also have substantial bargaining power in negotiating contracts with their suppliers of grocery products. The Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) regulates misconduct by supermarkets as customer/acquirers in three ways. First, s 46(1) of the CCA prohibits the ‘taking advantage’ of buyer power for the purpose of damaging a competitor, preventing entry or deterring or preventing competitive conduct. Secondly, s 21 of the ACL prohibits unconscionable conduct in business–to–business transactions. Thirdly, Pt IVB of the CCA provides for the promulgation of mandatory and voluntary industry codes of conduct. Since 1 July 2015 the conduct of supermarkets as customer/acquirers has been regulated by the Food and Grocery Industry Code of Conduct. This article examines these three different approaches. It considers them against the background of the misconduct at issue in ACCC v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd which the ACCC chose to litigate as an unconscionable conduct case, rather than a misuse of market power case. The article also considers the strengths and weaknesses of each of the three approaches and concludes that while the three approaches address different problems there is scope for overlap and all three should be retained for compete coverage.

Dominating search: Google before the law

For many, particularly in the Anglophone world and Western Europe, it may be obvious that Google has a monopoly over online search and advertising and that this is an undesirable state of affairs, due to Google's ability to mediate information flows online. The baffling question may be why governments and regulators are doing little to nothing about this situation, given the increasingly pivotal importance of the internet and free flowing communications in our lives. However, the law concerning monopolies, namely antitrust or competition law, works in what may be seen as a less intuitive way by the general public. Monopolies themselves are not illegal. Conduct that is unlawful, i.e. abuses of that market power, is defined by a complex set of rules and revolves principally around economic harm suffered due to anticompetitive behavior. However the effect of information monopolies over search, such as Google’s, is more than just economic, yet competition law does not address this. Furthermore, Google’s collection and analysis of user data and its portfolio of related services make it difficult for others to compete. Such a situation may also explain why Google’s established search rivals, Bing and Yahoo, have not managed to provide services that are as effective or popular as Google’s own (on this issue see also the texts by Dirk Lewandowski and Astrid Mager in this reader). Users, however, are not entirely powerless. Google's business model rests, at least partially, on them – especially the data collected about them. If they stop using Google, then Google is nothing.

Re-imagining China's future : soft power, cultural presence and the East Asian media market

As various contributors to this volume suggest, the term soft power is multifaceted. In 2002 Joseph Nye, the political scientist who coined the term more than a decade previously, noted that the soft power of a country rests on three resources: a country’s culture, its political values, and its foreign policies (Nye 2002). However, several factors can be drawn together to explain China’s adoption of this concept. First, China’s economic influence has precipitated a groundswell of nationalism, which reached its apex at the Opening Ceremony of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. This global media event provided an international platform to demonstrate China’s new found self-confidence. Second, cultural diplomacy and foreign aid, particularly through Third World channels is seen by the Chinese Communist Party leadership as an appropriate way to extend Chinese influence globally (Kurlantzick 2007). Third, education in Chinese culture through globally dispersed Confucius Institutes is charged with improving international understanding of Chinese culture and values, and in the process renovating negative images of China. Fourth, the influence of Japanese and Korean popular culture on China’s youth cultures in recent years has caused acute discomfit to cultural nationalists. Many contend it is time to stem the tide. Fifth, the past few years have witnessed a series of lively debates about the importance of industries such as design, advertising, animation and fashion, resulting in the construction of hundreds of creative clusters, animation centres, film backlots, cultural precincts, design centres and artist lofts.

Analysing the effect of digital technology on channel strategy, power and disintermediation in the home video market : the demise of the video store?

The antecedents of channel power (e.g. El-Ansary and Stern, 1972) and the impact of channel structure ( e.g. Anderson and Narus,1984) on channel dynamics have long been important topics within the channel literature. In addition to the theoretical and methodological contributions, research in these areas has helped channel managers to understand how power is generated and used in coordinating distribution strategies in different contexts. The study presented in this paper builds upon these previous literatures, which are first briefly reviewed below.

Securities market regulators’ use of the ‘please explain’ queries sanction and its power of compliance

The aim of this study is to investigate the compliance impact of price queries issued by a securities market operator to its participating firms. Market operators in Australia and New Zealand, such as the Australian Securities Exchange and the New Zealand Securities Exchange, have the regulatory power in their rules to issue queries to its market participants to explain unusual fluctuations in trading price or volume in the market. The operator will issue a price query where it believes that the market has not been fully informed as to price relevant information. Responsive regulation has informed much of the regulatory debate in securities laws in our region. We posit that price queries are one strategy that a market operator can use in communicating its enforcement expectations to its stakeholder. However, whilst responsive regulation informs regulatory choices, an alternate view seeks to explain why participants respond to these regulatory strategies, and we use disclosure behaviour after price queries to test compliance behaviour

The exploration of consumer power in online brand communities : a comparison case study in Australia and China

Aided by the development of information technology, the balance of power in the market place is rapidly shifting from marketers towards consumers and nowhere is this more obvious than in the online environment (Denegri-Knott, Zwick, & Schroeder, 2006; Moynagh & Worsley, 2002; Newcomer, 2000; Samli, 2001). From the inception and continuous development of the Internet, consumers are becoming more empowered. They can choose what they want to click on the Internet, they can shop and transact payments, watch and download video, chat with others, be it friends or even total strangers. Especially in online communities, like-minded consumers share and exchange information, ideas and opinions. One form of online community is the online brand community, which gathers specific brand lovers. As with any social unit, people form different roles in the community and exert different effects on each other. Their interaction online can greatly influence the brand and marketers. A comprehensive understanding of the operation of this special group form is essential to advancing marketing thought and practice (Kozinets, 1999). While online communities have strongly shifted the balance of power from marketers to consumers, the current marketing literature is sparse on power theory (Merlo, Whitwell, & Lukas, 2004). Some studies have been conducted from an economic point of view (Smith, 1987), however their application to marketing has been limited. Denegri-Knott (2006) explored power based on the struggle between consumers and marketers online and identified consumer power formats such as control over the relationship, information, aggregation and participation. Her study has built a foundation for future power studies in the online environment. This research project bridges the limited marketing literature on power theory with the growing recognition of online communities among marketing academics and practitioners. Specifically, this study extends and redefines consumer power by exploring the concept of power in online brand communities, in order to better understand power structure and distribution in this context. This research investigates the applicability of the factors of consumer power identified by Denegri-Knott (2006) to the online brand community. In addition, by acknowledging the model proposed by McAlexander, Schouten, & Koenig (2002), which emphasized that community study should focus on the role of consumers and identifying multiple relationships among the community, this research further explores how member role changes will affect power relationships as well as consumer likings of the brand. As a further extension to the literature, this study also considers cultural differences and their effect on community member roles and power structure. Based on the study of Hofstede (1980), Australia and China were chosen as two distinct samples to represent differences in two cultural dimensions, namely individualism verses collectivism and high power distance verses low power distance. This contribution to the research also helps answer the research gap identified by Muñiz Jr & O'Guinn (2001), who pointed out the lack of cross cultural studies within the online brand community context. This research adopts a case study methodology to investigate the issues identified above. Case study is an appropriate research strategy to answer “how” and “why” questions of a contemporary phenomenon in real-life context (Yin, 2003). The online brand communities of “Haloforum.net” in Australia and “NGA.cn” in China were selected as two cases. In-depth interviews were used as the primary data collection method. As a result of the geographical dispersion and the preference of a certain number of participants, online synchronic interviews via MSN messenger were utilized along with the face-to-face interviews. As a supplementary approach, online observation was carried over two months, covering a two week period prior to the interviews and a six week period following the interviews. Triangulation techniques were used to strengthen the credibility and validity of the research findings (Yin, 2003). The findings of this research study suggest a new definition of power in an online brand community. This research also redefines the consumer power types and broadens the brand community model developed by McAlexander et al. (2002) in an online context by extending the various relationships between brand and members. This presents a more complete picture of how the perceived power relationships are structured in the online brand community. A new member role is discovered in the Australian online brand community in addition to the four member roles identified by Kozinets (1999), in contrast however, all four roles do not exist in the Chinese online brand community. The research proposes a model which links the defined power types and identified member roles. Furthermore, given the results of the cross-cultural comparison between Australia and China showed certain discrepancies, the research suggests that power studies in the online brand community should be country-specific. This research contributes to the body of knowledge on online consumer power, by applying it to the context of an online brand community, as well as considering factors such as cross cultural difference. Importantly, it provides insights for marketing practitioners on how to best leverage consumer power to serve brand objective in online brand communities. This, in turn, should lead to more cost effective and successful communication strategies. Finally, the study proposes future research directions. The research should be extended to communities of different sizes, to different extents of marketer control over the community, to the connection between online and offline activities within the brand community, and (given the cross-cultural findings) to different countries. In addition, a greater amount of research in this area is recommended to determine the generalizability of this study.

The open kimono: How Intel balances trust and power to maintain platform leadership

A small group of companies including Intel, Microsoft, and Cisco have used "platform leadership" with great effect as a means for driving innovation and accelerating market growth within their respective industries. Prior research in this area emphasizes that trust plays a critical role in the success of this strategy. However, many of the categorizations of trust discussed in the literature tend to ignore or undervalue the fact that trust and power are often functionally equivalent, and that the coercion of weaker partners is sometimes misdiagnosed as collaboration. In this paper, I use case study data focusing on Intel's shift from ceramic/wire-bonded packaging to organic/C4 packaging to characterize the relationships between Intel and its suppliers, and to determine if these links are based on power in addition to trust. The case study shows that Intel's platform leadership strategy is built on a balance of both trust and a relatively benevolent form of power that is exemplified by the company's "open kimono" principle, through which Intel insists that suppliers share detailed financial data and highly proprietary technical information to achieve mutually advantageous objectives. By explaining more completely the nature of these inter-firm linkages, this paper usefully extends our understanding of how platform leadership is maintained by Intel, and contributes to the literature by showing how trust and power can be used simultaneously within an inter-firm relationship in a way that benefits all of the stakeholders.