Company taxation and tax spillovers: Separate accounting versus formula apportionment

It is observed in the real world that taxes matter for location decisions and that multinationals shift profits by transfer pricing. The US and Canada use so-called formula apportionment (FA) to tax corporate income, and the EU is debating a switch from separate accounting (SA) to FA. This paper develops a theoretical model that compares basic properties of FA to SA. The focal point of the analysis is how changes in tax rates affect capital formation, input choice, and transfer pricing, as well as on spillovers on tax revenue in other countries. The analysis shows that a move from SA to FA will not eliminate such spillovers and will, in cases identified in the paper, actually aggravate them.

What if tax reform was a fundamental human right?

As an election looms in Australia, the tax debate continues unabated. Self-interest abounds. When we remove self-interest, we are often reduced to standard design principles for a taxation system. Lost in this discussion is the fundamental purpose of tax, which is to finance government expenditure. Most would argue that tax revenue should be sufficient to meet basic economic and social needs of the community. But how does a community determine what these basic economic and social needs should be? One way is by using a human rights framework. This can provide guidance for both developing and developed countries considering tax reform.

The taxation of multinational banks : alternative apportionment through a unitary taxation regime aligning with economic reality

The taxation of multinational banks currently is governed by the general principles of international tax. However, it is arguable that there are characteristics exclusive to multinational banks that may warrant the consideration of a separate taxing regime. This article argues that because of the unique nature of multinational banks, the traditional international tax rules governing jurisdiction to tax and allocation of income do not produce a result which is optimal, as it does not reflect economic reality. That is, the current system does not produce a result that accurately reflects the economic source of the income or the location of the economic activity. The suggested alternative is unitary taxation using global formulary apportionment. Formulary apportionment is considered as an alternative that reflects economic reality by recognising the unique nature of multinational banks and allocating the income to the location of the economic activity. The unique nature of multinational banking is recognised in the fact that formulary apportionment does not attempt to undertake a transactional division of a highly integrated multinational entity. Rather, it allocates income to the jurisdictions based on an economically justifiable formula. Starting from this recognition, the purpose of this article is to demonstrate that formulary apportionment is a theoretically superior (or optimal) model for the taxation of multinational banks. An optimal regime, for the purposes of this article, is considered to be one that distributes the taxing rights in an equitable manner between the relevant jurisdictions, while, simultaneously allowing decisions of the international banks to be tax neutral. In this sense, neutrality is viewed as an economic concept and equity is regarded as a legal concept. A neutral tax system is one in which tax rules do not affect economic choices about commercial activities. Neutrality will ideally be across jurisdictions as well as across traditional and non-traditional industries. The primary focus of this article is jurisdictional neutrality. A system that distributes taxing rights in an equitable manner between the relevant jurisdictions ensures that each country receives its fair share of tax revenue. Given the increase in multinational banking, jurisdictions should be concerned that they are receiving their fair share. Inter-nation equity is concerned with re-determining the proper division of the tax base among countries. Richard and Peggy Musgrave argue that sharing of the tax base by countries of source should be seen as a matter of inter-nation equity requiring international cooperation. The rights of the jurisdiction of residency will also be at issue. To this extent, while it is agreed that inter-nation equity is an essential attribute to an international tax regime, there is no universal agreement as to how to achieve it. The current system attempts to achieve such equity through a combined residency and source regime, with the transfer pricing rules used to apportion income between the relevant jurisdictions. However, this article suggests, that as an alternative to the current regime, equity would be achieved through formulary apportionment. Opposition to formulary apportionment is generally based on the argument that it is not a theoretically superior (or optimal) model because of the implementation difficulties. Yet these are two separate issues. As such, this article is divided into two core parts. The first part examines the theoretical soundness of the formulary apportionment model concluding that it is theoretically superior to the arm’s length pricing requirement of the traditional transfer pricing regime. The second part examines the practical implications of accepting formulary apportionment as an optimal model with a view to disclosing the issues that arise when a formulary apportionment regime is adopted. Prior to an analysis of the theoretical and practical application of formulary apportionment to multinational banks, the unique nature of these banks is considered. The article concludes that, while there are significant implementation, compliance, and enforcement issues to overcome, the unitary taxation model may be theoretically superior to the current arm’s length model which applies to multinational banks. This conclusion is based on the unitary taxation model providing greater alignment with the unique features of these banks.

A nation’s role in addressing base erosion and profit shifting : balancing sovereignty with international collaboration and coordination

The notion of sovereignty is central to any international tax issue. While a nation is free to design its tax laws as it sees fit and raise revenue in accordance with the needs of its citizens, it is not possible to undertake such a task in isolation. In a world of cross-border investments and business transactions, all tax regimes impact on one another. Tax interactions between sovereign states cannot be avoided. Ultimately, the interactions mean that a nation must decide whether to engage in both collaboration and coordination with other nations and supranational bodies alike or maintain an individualised stance in relation to its tax policy. Whatever the decision, there is arguably an exercise in national sovereignty in some form. In the context of an international tax regime, whether that regime is interpreted broadly as meaning international norms generally adopted by nations around the world or domestic regimes legislating for cross-border transactions, rhetoric around national fiscal sovereignty takes on many different forms. At one end of the spectrum it is relied upon by financial secrecy jurisdictions (tax havens) as a defence to their position on the basis that ‘other’ nations cannot interfere with the fiscal sovereignty of a jurisdiction. At the other end of the spectrum, it is argued that profit shifting and international tax avoidance if not stopped is, in and of itself, a threat to a nation’s fiscal sovereignty on the basis that it threatens the ability to tax and raise the revenue needed. This paper considers a modern conceptualisation of sovereignty along with its role within international tax coordination and collaboration to argue that a move towards a more unified approach to addressing international base erosion and profit shifting may be the ultimate exercise of national fiscal sovereignty. By using the current transfer pricing regime as a case study, this paper posits that it is not merely enough to have international agreement on allocation rules to be applied, but that the ultimate exercise of national sovereignty is political agreement with other states to ensure that it is governments which determine the allocational basis of worldwide profits to be taxed. In doing so, it is demonstrated that the arm’s length pricing requirement of the current transfer pricing regime, rather than providing governments with the ability to determine the location of profits, is providing multinational entities with the ultimate power to determine that location. If left unchecked, this will eventually erode a nation’s ability to capture the required tax revenue and, as a consequence, may be deemed a failure by nation states to exercise their fiscal sovereignty.

The case for unitary taxation with formulary apportionment in the finance sector and the effect on developing nations

In 2013 the OECD released its 15 point Action plan to deal with base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS). In that plan it was recognised that BEPS has a significant effect on developing countries. This is because the lack of tax revenue can lead to a critical underfunding of public investment that would help promote economic growth. To this end, the BEPS project is aimed at ensuring an inclusive approach to take into account not only views of the G20 and OECD countries but also the perspective of developing nations. With this focus in mind and in the context of developing nations, the purpose of this article is to consider a possible solution to profit shifting which occurs under the current transfer pricing regime, with that solution being unitary taxation with formulary apportionment. It does so using the finance sector as a specific case for application. Multinational financial institutions (MNFIs) play a significant role in financing activities of their clients in developing nations. Consistent with the ‘follow-the-client’ phenomenon which explains financial institution expansion, these entities are increasingly profiting from activities associated with this growing market. Further, not only are MNFIs persistent users of tax havens but also, more than other industries, have opportunities to reduce tax through transfer pricing measures. This article establishes a case for an industry specific adoption of unitary taxation with formulary apportionment as a viable alternative to the current regime. It argues that such a model would benefit not only developed nations but also developing nations which are currently suffering the effects of BEPS. In doing so, it considers the practicalities of such an implementation by examining both definitional issues and a possible formula for MNFIs. This article argues that, while there would be implementation difficulties to overcome, the current domestic models of formulary apportionment provide important guidance as to how the unitary business and business activities of MNFIs should be defined as well as factors that should be included in an allocation formula, along with the appropriate weighting. While it would be difficult for developing nations to adopt such a regime, it is argued that it would be no more difficult than addressing issues they face with the current transfer pricing regime. As such, this article concludes that unitary taxation with formulary apportionment is a viable industry specific alternative for MNFIs which would assist developing nations and aid independent fiscal soundness.

Assessing taxpayer response to legislative changes: A case study of ‘in-house’ fringe benefits rules

On 22 October 2012, the Australian Federal Government announced the removal of the $1,000 in-house fringe benefits concession when used as part of a salary packaging arrangement. At the time of the announcement, the Federal Government predicted that the removal of the concession would contribute additional tax revenue of $445 million over the following four years as well as an increase of GST payments to the States and Territories. However, anecdotal evidence at the same time indicated that the Australian employer response was to immediately stop providing employees with such in-house fringe benefits via salary sacrificing arrangements. Data presented in this article, collected from a combination of interviews with tax managers of four Australian entities as well as a review of the published archival data, confirms that the abolition of the $1,000 in-house fringe benefits concession was perceived as a negative change, whereby employees were considered the ‘big losers’ despite assertions by the Federal Government to the contrary. Using a conceptual map of tax rule change developed by Oats and Sadler, this article seeks to understand the reasons for this fringe benefits tax change and taxpayer response. In particular, the economic and political factors, and the responses of the relevant taxpayers (employers) are explored. Drawing on behavioural economic concepts, the actions, attitudes and response of employers to the rule change are also examined. The research findings suggest that the decision by Australian employers to cease providing the in-house fringe benefits as part of a salary-packaging arrangement after the legislative amendment was impacted by more than simple rational behaviour.

Cross culture comparison of tax morale and tax compliance : evidence from Costa Rica and Switzerland

This paper analyzes the effects of internal and external social norms on tax morale and tax compliance behavior. Field data and data derived from laboratory experiments are used to examine tax morale and tax compliance behavior in Costa Rica and Switzerland. The results indicate that internal and external social norms have a significant effect on tax morale and tax compliance.

Tax morale affects tax compliance : evidence from surveys and an artefactual field experiment

Our working hypotheses is that cross-cultural differences in tax compliance behaviour have foundations in the institutions of tax administration and citizen assessment of the quality of governance. Tax compliance being a complex behavioural issue. Its investigation requires use of a variety of methods and data sources. Results from artefactual field experiments conducted in countries with substantially different political histories and records of governance quality demondtrate that observed differences in tax compliance levels persist over alternative levels of enforcement. The experimental results are shown to be robust by replicating them for the same countries using survey response measures of tax compliance.