The traditional rationale of the arm’s length approach to transfer pricing : should the separate accounting model be maintained for modern multinational entities?

This article examines the current transfer pricing regime to consider whether it is a sound model to be applied to modern multinational entities. The arm's length price methodology is examined to enable a discussion of the arguments in favour of such a regime. The article then refutes these arguments concluding that, contrary to the very reason multinational entities exist, applying arm's length rules involves a legal fiction of imagining transactions between unrelated parties. Multinational entities exist to operate in a way that independent entities would not, which the arm's length rules fail to take into account. As such, there is clearly an air of artificiality in applying the arm's length standard. To demonstrate this artificiality with respect to modern multinational entities, multinational banks are used as an example. The article concluded that the separate entity paradigm adopted by the traditional transfer pricing regime is incongruous with the economic theory of modern multinational enterprises.

Internationalization of Chinese and Korean firms

This article compares and contrasts the growth of Chinese and Korean multinational enterprises (MNEs). The article identifies the similarities and differences between Chinese and Korean MNEs in terms of motivations for internationalization, expansion strategies, and paths. The goal of this article is to contribute to the literature by shifting focus on host-country conditions to home-country conditions in explaining the drivers for firms' internationalization. We conclude that firms are motivated to expand abroad when faced with domestic competitive disadvantages resulting from absence or deficiency of one or more of Porter's Diamond attributes in their domestic market. Implications for further studies are also explored.

International transfer pricing : the Australian approach and lessons for Canada

In response to developments in international trade and an increased focus on international transfer-pricing issues, Canada’s minister of finance announced in the 1997 budget that the Department of Finance would undertake a review of the transfer-pricing provisions in the Income Tax Act. On September 11, 1997, the Department of Finance released draft transfer-pricing legislation and Revenue Canada released revised draft Information Circular 87-2R. The legislation was subsequently amended and included in Bill C-28, which received first reading on December 10, 1997. The new rules are intended to update Canada’s international transfer-pricing practices. In particular, they attempt to harmonize the standards in the Income Tax Act with the arm’s-length principle established in the OECD’s transfer pricing guidelines. The new rules also set out contemporaneous documentation requirements in respect of cross-border related-party transactions, facilitate administration of the law by Revenue Canada, and provide for a penalty where transfer prices do not comply with the arm’s-length principle. The Australian tax authorities have similarly reviewed and updated their transfer-pricing practices. Since 1992, the Australian commissioner of taxation has issued three rulings and seven draft rulings directly relating to international transfer pricing. These rulings outline the selection and application of transfer pricing methodologies, documentation requirements, and penalties for non-compliance. The Australian Taxation Office supports the use of advance pricing agreements (APAs) and has expanded its audit strategy by conducting transfer-pricing risk assessment reviews. This article presents a detailed review of Australia’s transfer-pricing policy and practices, which address essentially the same concerns as those at which the new Canadian rules are directed. This review provides a framework for comparison of the approaches adopted in the two jurisdictions. The author concludes that although these approaches differ in some respects, ultimately they produce a similar result. Both regimes set a clear standard to be met by multinational enterprises in establishing transfer prices. Both provide for audits and penalties in the event of noncompliance. And both offer the alternative of an APA as a means of avoiding transfer-pricing disputes with Australian and Canadian tax authorities.

The inherent international tax regime and its constraints on Australia's sovereignty

On 1 November 2011 the Minister for Financial Services and Superannuation, the Honourable Bill Shorten MP, announced that Australia would be undertaking a reform of the ‘transfer pricing rules in the income tax law and Australia’s future tax treaties to bring them into line with international best practice, improving the integrity and efficiency of the tax system.’ Mr Shorten stated that the reason for the reform was that ‘recent court decisions suggest our existing transfer pricing rules may be interpreted in a way that is out-of-kilter with international norms.’ Further, he stated that ‘the Government has asked the Treasury to review how the transfer pricing rules can be improved, including but not limited to how to be more in line with international best practice.’ He urged all interested parties to participate in this consultation process. On 16 March 2012, an Exposure Draft and accompanying Explanatory Memorandum outlining the proposed amendments to implement the first stage of the transfer pricing reforms were released. Within the proposed changes is the explicit embedding of the use of the OECD’s Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital and Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations to help determine the arm’s length price. Does this mean that Australia engages in an international tax regime?

More than naming and shaming needed to stop corporate tax avoidance

The report of the Senate Economics References Committee inquiry into corporate tax avoidance comes with the subtitle – “You cannot tax what you cannot see”, with a strong focus on increased transparency. The majority of the 17 recommendations in the interim report relate to improved transparency of the tax affairs of corporate taxpayers. This is a significant step in the right direction. Recent experiences in the war on corporate tax avoidance both in Australia and overseas confirm that “information is power”. Most notably, we have seen increased transparency changing the behaviour of multinational enterprises as well as inducing governments to act.

Taxes and decision rights in multinationals

We examine how a multinational's choice to centralize or decentralize its decision structure is affected by country tax differentials. Within a simple model that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of transfer prices in multinational enterprises (MNEs)—here, as a strategic precommitment device and a tax manipulation instrument—we show that centralization is more profitable when tax differentials are large. When tax differentials are small, decentralization can be performed in two different ways each providing the highest profits in a particular range of the tax differential. Hence, the paper emphasizes the organizational flexibility that MNEs have in pursuing tax optimization.