Recent developments : loss of chance in medical litigation : Tabet v Gett [2010] HCA 12.

Following the judgement of the High Court in Tabet v Gett [2010]HCA 12 handed down on 21 April 2010 it appears that in Australia there is now very limited scope for recovery in negligence for the loss of a chance of a better medical outcome.

Advance directives, autonomy and the refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment

As Australian society 1s agemg, individuals are increasingly concerned about managing their future, including making decisions about the medical treatment they may wish to receive or refuse if they lose decision-making capacity. To date, there has been relatively little research into the extent to which legal regulation allows competent adults to make advance refusals of life-sustaining medical treatment that will bind health professionals and others when a decision needs to be made at a future time. This thesis aims to fill this gap in the research by presenting the results of research into the legal regulation of advance directives that refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. In the five papers that comprise this thesis, the law that governs this area is examined, and the ethical principle of autonomy is used to critically evaluate that law. The principal finding of this research is that the current scheme of regulation is ineffective to adequately promote the right of a competent adult to make binding advance directives about refusal of medical treatment. The research concludes that legislation should be enacted to enable individuals to complete an advance directive, only imposing restrictions to the extent that this is necessary to promote individual autonomy. The thesis first examines the principle of autonomy upon which the common law (and some statutory law) is expressed to be based, to determine whether that principle is an appropriate one to underpin regulation. 1 The finding of the research is that autonomy can be justified as an organising principle on a number of grounds: it is consistent with the values of a liberal democracy; over recent decades, it is a principle that has been even more prominent within the discipline of medical ethics; and it is the principle which underpins the legal regulation of a related topic, namely the contemporaneous refusal of medical treatment. Next, the thesis reviews the common law to determine whether it effectively achieves the goal of promoting autonomy by allowing a competent adult to make an advance directive refusing treatment that will operate if he or she later loses decision-making capacity. 2 This research finds that conunon law doctrine, as espoused by the judiciary, prioritises individual choice by recognising valid advance directives that refuse treatment as binding. However, the research also concludes that the common law, as applied by the judiciary in some cases, may not be effective to promote individual autonomy, as there have been a number of circumstances where advance directives that refuse treatment have not been followed. The thesis then examines the statutory regimes in Australia that regulate advance directives, with a focus on the regulation of advance refusals of life-sustaining medical treatment.3 This review commences with an examination ofparliamentary debates to establish why legislation was thought to be necessary. It then provides a detailed review of all of the statutory regimes, the extent to which the legislation regulates the form of advance directives, and the circumstances in which they can be completed, will operate and can be ignored by medical professionals. The research finds that legislation was enacted mainly to clarify the common law and bring a level of certainty to the field. Legislative regimes were thought to provide medical professionals with the assurance that compliance with an advance directive that refuses life-sustaining medical treatment will not expose them to legal sanction. However, the research also finds that the legislation places so many restrictions on when an advance directive refusing treatment can be made, or will operate, that they have not been successful in promoting individual autonomy.

Withholding and withdrawal of ‘futile’ life-sustaining treatment : unilateral medical decision-making in Australia and New Zealand

This article examines the law in Australia and New Zealand that governs the withholding and withdrawal of ‘futile’ life-sustaining treatment. Although doctors have both civil and criminal law duties to treat patients, those general duties do not require the provision of treatment that is deemed to be futile. This is either because futile treatment is not in a patient’s best interests or because stopping such treatment does not breach the criminal law. This means, in the absence of a duty to treat, doctors may unilaterally withdraw or withhold treatment that is futile; consent is not required. The article then examines whether this general position has been altered by statute. It considers a range of suggested possible legislation but concludes it is likely that only Queensland’s adult guardianship legislation imposes a requirement to obtain consent to withhold or withdraw such treatment.

LexisNexis Questions and Answers : Medical Law

LexisNexis Questions and Answers: Medical Law is designed to facilitate both continuous review and preparation for assignments and examinations. This book provides a clear and concise revision guide for each of the major topics covered in the typical health law course. It provides an understanding of medical law in each Australian jurisdiction and gives a clear and systematic approach to analysing and answering problem and essay questions. Each chapter commences with an identification of the key issues, including a summary of the relevant cases and legislation. Each question is followed by a suggested answer plan, a sample answer and comments on how the answer might be assessed by an examiner. The author also offers advice on common errors to avoid and practical hints and tips on how to achieve higher marks.

Withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment

• At common law, a competent adult can refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, either contemporaneously or through an advance directive which will operate at a later time when the adult’s capacity is lost. • Legislation in most Australian jurisdictions also provides for a competent adult to complete an advance directive that refuses life-sustaining medical treatment. • At common law, a court exercising its parens patriae jurisdiction can consent to, or authorise, the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining medical treatment from an adult or child who lacks capacity if that is in the best interests of the person. A court may also declare that the withholding or withdrawal of treatment is lawful. • Guardianship legislation in all jurisdictions allows a substitute decision-maker, in an appropriate case, to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment for an adult who lacks capacity. • In terms of children, a parent may refuse life-sustaining medical treatment for his or her child if it is in the child’s best interests. • While a refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment by a competent child may be valid, this decision can be overturned by a court. • At common law and generally under guardianship statutes, demand for futile treatment need not be complied with by doctors.

Doctors' knowledge of the law on withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment

Objectives To examine the level of knowledge of doctors about the law on withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from adults who lack decision-making capacity, and factors associated with a higher level of knowledge. Design, setting and participants Postal survey of all specialists in emergency medicine, geriatric medicine, intensive care, medical oncology, palliative medicine, renal medicine and respiratory medicine on the AMPCo Direct database in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland. Survey initially posted to participants on 18 July 2012 and closed on 31 January 2013. Main outcome measures Medical specialists’ levels of knowledge about the law, based on their responses to two survey questions. Results Overall response rate was 32%. For the seven statements contained in the two questions about the law, the mean knowledge score was 3.26 out of 7. State and specialty were the strongest predictors of legal knowledge. Conclusions Among doctors who practise in the end-of-life field, there are some significant knowledge gaps about the law on withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from adults who lack decision-making capacity. Significant consequences for both patients and doctors can flow from a failure to comply with the law. Steps should be taken to improve doctors’ legal knowledge in this area and to harmonise the law across Australia.

Medical education and law: Withholding/withdrawing treatment from adults without capacity

BACKGROUND Law is increasingly involved in clinical practice, particularly at the end of life, but undergraduate and postgraduate education in this area remains unsystematic. We hypothesised that attitudes to and knowledge of the law governing withholding/withdrawing treatment from adults without capacity (the WWLST law) would vary and demonstrate deficiencies among medical specialists. AIMS We investigated perspectives, knowledge and training of medical specialists in the three largest (populations and medical workforces) Australian states, concerning the WWLST law. METHODS Following expert legal review, specialist focus groups, pre-testing and piloting in each state, seven specialties involved with end-of-life care were surveyed, with a variety of statistical analyses applied to the responses. RESULTS Respondents supported the need to know and follow the law. There were mixed views about its helpfulness in medical decision-making. Over half the respondents conceded poor knowledge of the law; this was mirrored by critical gaps in knowledge that varied by specialty. There were relatively low but increasing rates of education from the undergraduate to continuing professional development (CPD) stages. Mean knowledge score did not vary significantly according to undergraduate or immediate postgraduate training, but CPD training, particularly if recent, resulted in greater knowledge. Case-based workshops were the preferred CPD instruction method. CONCLUSIONS Teaching of current and evolving law should be strengthened across all stages of medical education. This should improve understanding of the role of law, ameliorate ambivalence towards the law, and contribute to more informed deliberation about end-of-life issues with patients and families.

Law autonomy and advance directives

The principle of autonomy underpins legal regulation of advance directives that refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. The primacy of autonomy in this domain is recognised expressly in the case law, through judicial pronouncement, and implicitly in most Australian jurisdictions, through enactment into statute of the right to make an advance directive. This article seeks to justify autonomy as an appropriate principle for regulating advance directives and relies on three arguments: the necessity of autonomy in a liberal democracy; the primacy of autonomy in medical ethics discourse; and the uncontested importance of autonomy in the law on contemporaneous refusal of medical treatment. This article also responds to key criticisms that autonomy is not an appropriate organising principle to underpin legal regulation of advance directives.

Ending the life of the act/omission dispute: Causation in withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining measures

My aim in this paper is to challenge the increasingly common view in the literature that the law on end of life decision making is in disarray and is in need of urgent reform. My argument is that this assessment of the law is based on assumptions about the relationship between the identity of the defendant and their conduct, and about the nature of causation, which, on examination, prove to be indefensible. I then provide a clarification of the relationship between causation and omissions which proves that the current legal position does not need modification, at least on the grounds that are commonly advanced for the converse view. This enables me, in conclusion, to clarify important conceptual and moral differences between withholding, refusing and withdrawing life-sustaining measures on the one hand, and assisted suicide and euthanasia, on the other.

Defending the sanctity of life principle : a reply to John Keown

This article is a response to Professor Keown’s criticism of my paper “Finding a Way Through the Ethical and Legal Maze: Withdrawal of Medical Treatment and Euthanasia” (2005) 13 (3) Medical Law Review 357. The article takes up and responds to a number of criticisms raised by Keown in an attempt to further the debate concerning the moral and legal status of withdrawing life-sustaining measures, its distinction from euthanasia, and the implications of the lawfulness of withdrawal for the principle of the sanctity of life.

Omissions, causation and responsibility

In this paper I discuss a recent exchange of articles between Hugh McLachlan and John Coggon on the relationship between omissions, causation and moral responsibility. My aim is to contribute to their debate by isolating a presupposition I believe they both share, and by questioning that presupposition. The presupposition is that, at any given moment, there are countless things that I am omitting to do. This leads them both to give a distorted account of the relationship between causation and moral or (as the case may be) legal responsibility, and, in the case of Coggon, to claim that the law’s conception of causation is a fiction based on policy. Once it is seen that this presupposition is faulty, we can attain a more accurate view of the logical relationship between causation and moral responsibility in the case of omissions. This is important because it will enable us, in turn, to understand why the law continues to regard omissions as different, both logically and morally, from acts, and why the law seeks to track that logical and moral difference in the legal distinction it draws between withholding life-sustaining measures and euthanasia.

Young children as regenerative tissue donors : considering the need for legal reform in light of divergent ethical approaches

In Australia, young children who lack decision-making capacity can have regenerative tissue removed to treat another person suffering from a severe or life-threatening disease. While great good can potentially result from this as the recipient’s life may be saved, ethical unease remains over the ‘use’ of young children in this way. This paper examines the ethical approaches that have featured in the debate over the acceptability and limits of this practice, and how these are reflected in Australia’s legal regime governing removal of tissue from young children. This analysis demonstrates a troubling dichotomy within the Australia’s laws that requires decision-makers to adopt inconsistent ethical approaches depending on where a donor child is situated. It is argued that this inconsistency in approach warrants legal reform of this ethically sensitive issue.

Me and my body : the relevance of the difference for the distinction between withdrawing life support and euthanasia

In this paper I discuss David Shaw’s claim that the body of a terminally ill person can be conceived as a kind of life-support, akin to an artificial ventilator. I claim that this position rests upon an untenable dualism between the mind and the body. Given that dualism continues to be attractive to some thinkers, I attempt to diagnose the reasons why it continues to be attractive, as well as to demonstrate its incoherence, drawing on some recent work in the philosophy of psychology. I conclude that, if my criticisms are sound, Shaw’s attempt to deny the distinction between withdrawal and euthanasia fails.