Altruism, Trade Policy, and the Optimality of Foreign Aid

There are many studies in the literature that deal with the welfare effects of income transfers between nations in a general equilibrium setting. An important impetus for this extensive literature was the demonstration of the transfer paradox; that the donor country could actually gain from a transfer of income to another, and that the recipient could lose as a result of the gift. The reason for this paradoxical result is that the transfer gives rise to a terms-of-trade effect that may be especially beneficial to the donor and detrimental to the recipient. Subsequently, many papers have established conditions under which this paradox will or will not occur. Early work by Samuelson (1954) was followed by demonstrations of paradoxes by Gale (1974), Ohyama (1974), Brecher and Bhagwati (1982) and Bhagwati, Brecher and Hatta 1983, 1985, and Dixit (1983)) among others.1 More recently, many studies have examined whether or not foreign aid — tied and untied — can be welfare improving for both the donor and the recipient (see, for example, Turunen-Red and Woodland (1988), Kemp and Wong (1993), Schweinberger (1990), Hatzipanayotou and Michael (1995), Lahiri and Raimondos-Moller 1995, 1997, Djajić, Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller 1996a, 1996b, and Lahiri, Raimondos-Møller, Wong and Woodland 1997.2

Donor strategy under the fungibility of foreign aid

We develop a political–economic model of aid fungibility: a part of aid is diverted away from its intended target by lobby groups. The size of this diversion – the degree of aid fungibility – is determined endogenously by the recipient government. The donor can affect the equilibrium degree of fungibility by choosing both the size of aid and the timing of its decision. We derive a condition under which the donor's reaction to fungibility is to reduce the amount of aid. Under this condition, if the donor acts as a follower, both the donor and the target group are better off.

Foreign aid, domestic investment and welfare

This paper examines the welfare implications of temporary foreign aid in a simple two-period, two-country model of trade. Domestic investment is endogenous, providing an important link between aid in period one and the terms of trade in periods one and two. Transfer-induced changes in the terms of trade redistribute present and future income between the donor and the recipient. In the presence of barriers to international borrowing and lending, such redistribution gives rise to the possibility of temporary aid being both potentially and strictly Pareto improving.

Optimal foreign aid and tariffs

This paper investigates the optimal choice of foreign aid when trade policies are decided in a non-cooperative fashion. Three alternative scenarios, depending on the timing of the actions and on whether aid is tied, are analyzed. It is shown that, in the case where aid is decided before tariffs, untied aid can lead to the reduction of the recipient's optimal trade tax. When the donor can tie the aid to a reduction in the recipient's tariff, the optimal aid level is always positive and the world can always achieve a Pareto-efficient equilibrium.

The politics of foreign aid: A median voter perspective

The paper presents a model where the median voter in the donor country determines the support of foreign aid. It is first established that an individual in the donor country is affected by the direct benefits (due to altruism) and costs (due to taxes) of giving aid, and by the indirect benefits or costs of a change in the terms of trade. Then it is shown that the latter effect works through changing both the donor country's average income and its distribution of income. Given the stylized facts of a capital-abundant donor country and relatively capital-poor median voter, it is shown how redistribution-of-income effects soften the impact of terms-of-trade changes on the political support for foreign aid.

Humanitarianism or self-serving hypocrisy? : the provision of aid to South Africa under the Hawke-Keating and Howard governments

General perceptions of foreign aid commonly engender images of humanitarianism and altruism, whereby the humanitarian needs of the recipient of development assistance are of the utmost priority of the aid donor. However, the Australian governments led by Hawke, Keating and Howard often gave humanitarianism a low emphasis, frequently placing Australia’s own foreign policy and economic concerns at the forefront of aid allocation – often unashamedly. This self-interest met through aid meant that most was provided to Australia’s regional neighbourhood, neglecting some of the poorest, most struggling states, including South Africa. Other issues and events, including the Cold War, apartheid, terrorism and HIV/AIDS also affected Australia’s aid policy; mostly, they were used as excuses to limit aid to states like South Africa.

Competition for aid and trade policy

This paper considers the optimal allocation of a given amount of foreign aid between two recipient countries. It is shown that, given consumer preferences, a country following a more restrictive trade policy would receive a smaller share of the aid if the donor country maximises its own welfare in allocating aid. If, on the other hand, the donor country allocates aid in order to maximize the sum of the welfare of the two recipient countries, the result is just the opposite. Finally, we analyze the situation where the recipient countries compete with each other for the given amount of aid. It is shown that this competition tends to lower the level of optimal tariffs in the recipient countries.

Lobbying by ethnic groups and aid allocation

We develop a political-economic model of foreign aid allocation. Each ethnic group in the donor country lobbies the government to allocate more aid to its country of origin, and the government accepts political contributions from lobby groups. Initial per-capita income of the recipients and those of the ethnic groups are shown to be important determinants of the solution of the political equilibrium. We also examine the effects of changes in the degree of corruption, aid fatigue, and ethnic composition, in the donor country on the allocation of aid.

Logic of aid in an intertemporal setting

The paper studies the welfare implications of temporary foreign aid in the context of a simple two-country model of trade. In addition to its usual effects, a transfer of income in one period is assumed to influence the preferences of the recipient country in the following period. The implied changes in the terms of trade over the two periods are consistent with a number of possible outcomes with respect to the intertemporal welfare of the donor, the recipient, and the world as a whole. Particular attention is devoted to the conditions for strict Pareto improvement and the circumstances under which temporary aid transactions are likely to occur.

On the tying of aid to tariff reform

This paper considers the welfare effects of foreign aid that is tied to changes in the recipient's tariff. By constructing a three-country model with tariffs, and by allowing for changes both in the amount of aid and in the tariff rates, we are able to consider the welfare implications of two different rules of aid conditionality: (i) a rule which leaves the donor's welfare unchanged, and (ii) a rule which leaves the recipient government's total revenue unchanged. It is shown that the tying of aid to a tariff reform can, inter alia, be used to ensure Pareto improvement.

Tied aid, unemployment and welfare

The effect of foreign aid on the welfare levels of both the recipient and the donor country has been a much analysed topic for research in both the theory of international trade and development economics. In the development economics literature, concerns have been raised since the 1960s on the possible adverse effect of foreign aid on domestic savings and growth.1 The trade theory literature in this respect is much older and dates back to the 1920s when Professors Keynes and Ohlin debated on the effect of foreign aid on international terms of trade.2 Ever since, the terms of trade effect has been the cornerstone in the analysis of the welfare effect of foreign aid in the trade theory literature.3 After some early confusion, it is now well established that in a Walrasian stable world economy with two countries, a necessary condition for foreign aid to have perverse effects is that there is some distortion in either of the two countries.4 It is also known that, under normality and substitutability of goods, untied aid cannot be strictly Pareto-improving in a tariff distorted world.5

Re-imagining China's future : soft power, cultural presence and the East Asian media market

As various contributors to this volume suggest, the term soft power is multifaceted. In 2002 Joseph Nye, the political scientist who coined the term more than a decade previously, noted that the soft power of a country rests on three resources: a country’s culture, its political values, and its foreign policies (Nye 2002). However, several factors can be drawn together to explain China’s adoption of this concept. First, China’s economic influence has precipitated a groundswell of nationalism, which reached its apex at the Opening Ceremony of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. This global media event provided an international platform to demonstrate China’s new found self-confidence. Second, cultural diplomacy and foreign aid, particularly through Third World channels is seen by the Chinese Communist Party leadership as an appropriate way to extend Chinese influence globally (Kurlantzick 2007). Third, education in Chinese culture through globally dispersed Confucius Institutes is charged with improving international understanding of Chinese culture and values, and in the process renovating negative images of China. Fourth, the influence of Japanese and Korean popular culture on China’s youth cultures in recent years has caused acute discomfit to cultural nationalists. Many contend it is time to stem the tide. Fifth, the past few years have witnessed a series of lively debates about the importance of industries such as design, advertising, animation and fashion, resulting in the construction of hundreds of creative clusters, animation centres, film backlots, cultural precincts, design centres and artist lofts.

Lost in translation : partnerships for authentic education in Papua New Guinea

Pacific Island countries are the recipients of considerable education reform projects, many of which are sponsored by various global donor agencies. These agencies have become partners as part of foreign aid for international development in the region. Research cautions that such projects may have detrimental influences as their designs and delivery ignore the economic, cultural and social contexts of recipient countries. This paper explores issues impacting on the capacity of educators to lead educational change in Papua New Guinea. While initiatives in capacity building are offered, contradictions within the reform processes identify serious questions of policy development, curriculum ownership and local capacity. These contradictions relate to the sustainability of such programs, collaboration and partnerships between the National Department of Education, universities, donor agencies and scholars who advocate for authentic education for Papua New Guinea.

Shifting global powers and international law : challenges and opportunities [Challenges of Globalisation series]

This book examines the influence of emerging economies on international legal rules, institutions and processes. It describes recent and predicted changes in economic, political and cultural powers, flowing from the growth of emerging economies such as China, India, Brazil, South Africa and Russia, and analyses the influence of these changes on various legal frameworks and norms. Its contributors come from a variety of fields of expertise, including international law, politics, environmental law, human rights, economics and finance. The book begins by providing a broad analysis of the nature of the shifting global dynamic in its historical and contemporary contexts, including analysis of the rise of China as a major economic and political power and the end of the period of United States domination in international affairs. It illustrates the impact of these changes on states’ domestic policies and priorities, as they adapt to a new international dynamic. The authors then offer a range of perspectives on the impact of these changes as they relate to specific regimes and issues, including climate change regulation, collective security, indigenous rights, the rights of women and girls, environmental protection and foreign aid and development. The book provides a fresh and comprehensive analysis of an issue with extensive implications for international law and politics.