Applying metaethical and normative claims of moral relativism to (shareholder and stakeholder) models of corporate governance

There has, in recent decades, been considerable scholarship regarding the moral aspects of corporate governance,and differences in corporate governance practices around the world have been widely documented and investigated. In such a context, the claims associated with moral relativism are relevant. The purpose of this paper is to provide a detailed consideration of how the metaethical and normative claims of moral relativism in particular can be applied to corporate governance. This objective is achieved, firstly, by reviewing what is meant by metaethical moral relativism and identifying two ways in which the metaethical claim can be assessed. The possibility of a single, morally superior model of corporate governance is subsequently considered through an analysis of prominent works justifying the shareholder and stakeholder approaches, together with a consideration of academic agreement in this area. The paper then draws on the work of Wong (Moral relativity, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1984, A companion to ethics, Blackwell, Malden, 1993, Natural moralities: A defense of pluralistic relativism,Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006), firstly in providing an argument supporting metaethical moral relativism and secondly regarding values of tolerance and/or accommodation that can contribute to the normative claim. The paper concludes by proposing an argument that it is morally wrong to impose a model of corporate governance where there are differences in moral judgements relevant to corporate governance, or to interfere with a model in similar circumstances, and closes with consideration of the argument’s implications.

Corporate governance in China : the role of the state and ideology in shaping reforms

Examines the political and ideological influences on China's economic reforms since the early 1980s. Discusses the influence of the Chinese Communist Party and Confucianism on economic progress and assesses the effect of reforms. Outlines the requirement for new corporate governance laws to meet the needs of expanding private businesses and considers China's use and adaptation of some Western models of corporate governance. Comments on whether these fit easily with China's business culture. Criticises the shortcomings of China's corporate laws. Looks in particular at the telecommunications industry and at the Company Law 2006.

Rethinking corporate governance and law in China : the theories, rules and practices

Economic reforms have transformed China into a modern economy - this requires greater emphasis on regulating markets and governing corporations to ensure economic growth continues. Yet, legal reforms are not as straightforward as transplanting Western models; more modification to suit Chinese political land cultural considerations needs to be incorporated. Likewise privatisation of the telecommuications sector does not mean that government influence in the new corporations cease. This is not necessarily negative as long as safeguards are in place. Plainly further reforms to the law and governance will be needed. Given that Confucian philosophy continues to play a central role in Chinese society and values, developing laws and governance practices from Confucian principles will arguably be appropriate for modern China.

An analysis of the nature and effectiveness of corporate governance in smaller listed Australian companies

The objective of this thesis is to investigate the corporate governance attributes of smaller listed Australian firms. This study is motivated by evidence that these firms are associated with more regulatory concerns, the introduction of ASX Corporate Governance Recommendations in 2004, and a paucity of research to guide regulators and stakeholders of smaller firms. While there is an extensive body of literature examining the effectiveness of corporate governance, the literature principally focuses on larger companies, resulting in a deficiency in the understanding of the nature and effectiveness of corporate governance in smaller firms. Based on a review of agency theory literature, a theoretical model is developed that posits that agency costs are mitigated by internal governance mechanisms and transparency. The model includes external governance factors but in many smaller firms these factors are potentially absent, increasing the reliance on the internal governance mechanisms of the firm. Based on the model, the observed greater regulatory intervention in smaller companies may be due to sub-optimal internal governance practices. Accordingly, this study addresses four broad research questions (RQs). First, what is the extent and nature of the ASX Recommendations that have been adopted by smaller firms (RQ1)? Second, what firm characteristics explain differences in the recommendations adopted by smaller listed firms (RQ2), and third, what firm characteristics explain changes in the governance of smaller firms over time (RQ3)? Fourth, how effective are the corporate governance attributes of smaller firms (RQ4)? Six hypotheses are developed to address the RQs. The first two hypotheses explore the extent and nature of corporate governance, while the remaining hypotheses evaluate its effectiveness. A time-series, cross-sectional approach is used to evaluate the effectiveness of governance. Three models, based on individual governance attributes, an index of six items derived from the literature, and an index based on the full list of ASX Recommendations, are developed and tested using a sample of 298 smaller firms with annual observations over a five-year period (2002-2006) before and after the introduction of the ASX Recommendations in 2004. With respect to (RQ1) the results reveal that the overall adoption of the recommendations increased from 66 per cent in 2004 to 74 per cent in 2006. Interestingly, the adoption rate for recommendations regarding the structure of the board and formation of committees is significantly lower than the rates for other categories of recommendations. With respect to (RQ2) the results reveal that variations in rates of adoption are explained by key firm differences including, firm size, profitability, board size, audit quality, and ownership dispersion, while the results for (RQ3) were inconclusive. With respect to (RQ4), the results provide support for the association between better governance and superior accounting-based performance. In particular, the results highlight the importance of the independence of both the board and audit committee chairs, and of greater accounting-based expertise on the audit committee. In contrast, while there is little evidence that a majority independent board is associated with superior outcomes, there is evidence linking board independence with adverse audit opinion outcomes. These results suggest that board and chair independence are substitutes; in the presence of an independent chair a majority independent board may be an unnecessary and costly investment for smaller firms. The findings make several important contributions. First, the findings contribute to the literature by providing evidence on the extent, nature and effectiveness of governance in smaller firms. The findings also contribute to the policy debate regarding future development of Australia’s corporate governance code. The findings regarding board and chair independence, and audit committee characteristics, suggest that policy-makers could consider providing additional guidance for smaller companies. In general, the findings offer support for the “if not, why not?” approach of the ASX, rather than a prescriptive rules-based approach.

Corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management in transitional countries – evidence from Chinese listed firms

The objective of this thesis is to investigate whether the corporate governance practices adopted by Chinese listed firms are associated with the quality of earnings information. Based on a review of agency and institutional theory, this study develops hypotheses that predict the monitoring effectiveness of the board and the audit committee. Using a combination of univariate and multivariate analyses, the association between corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management are tested from 2004 to 2008. Through analysing the empirical results, a number of findings are summarised as below. First, board independence is weakened by the introduction of government officials as independent directors on the boards. Government officials acting as independent directors, claim that they meet the definition of independent director set by the regulation. However, they have some connection with the State, which is the controlling shareholder in listed SOEs affiliated companies. Consequently, the effect of the independent director’s expertise in constraining earnings management is mitigated as demonstrated by an insignificant association between board expertise and earnings management. An alternative explanation for the inefficiency of board independence may point to the pre-selection of independent directors by the powerful CEO. It is argued that a CEO can manipulate the board composition and choose the "desirable" independent directors to monitor themselves. Second, a number of internal mechanisms, such as board size, board activities, and the separation of the roles of the CEO and chair are found to be significantly associated with discretionary accruals. This result suggests that there are advantages in having a large and active board in the Chinese setting. This can offset the disadvantages associated with large boards, such as increased bureaucracy, and hence, increase the constraining effects of a large and resourceful board. Third, factor analysis identifies two factors: CEO power and board power. CEO power is the factor which consists of CEO duality and turnover, and board power is composed of board size and board activity. The results of CEO power show that if a Chinese listed company has CEO duality and turnover at the same time, it is more likely to have a high level of earnings management. The significant and negative relationship between board power and accruals indicate that large boards with frequent meetings can be associated with low level of earnings management. Overall, the factor analysis suggests that certain governance mechanisms complement each other to become more efficient monitors of opportunistic earnings management. A combination of board characteristics can increase the negative association with earnings management. Fourth, the insignificant results between audit committees and earnings management in Chinese listed firms suggests that the Chinese regulator should strengthen the audit committee functions. This thesis calls for listed firms to disclose more information on audit committee composition and activities, which can facilitate future research on the Chinese audit committee’s monitoring role. Fifth, the interactive results between State ownership and board characteristics show that dominant State ownership has a moderating effect on board monitoring power as the State totally controls 42% of the issued shares. The high percentage of State ownership makes it difficult for the non-controlling institutional shareholders to challenge the State’s dominant status. As a result, the association between non-controlling institutional ownership and earnings management is insignificant in most situations. Lastly, firms audited by the international Big4 have lower abnormal accruals than firms audited by domestic Chinese audit firms. In addition, the inverse U-shape relationship between audit tenure and earnings quality demonstrates the changing effects of audit quality after a certain period of appointment. Furthermore, this thesis finds that listing in Hong Kong Stock Exchanges can be an alternative governance mechanism to discipline Chinese firms to follow strict Hong Kong listing requirements. Management of Hong Kong listed companies are exposed to the scrutiny of international investors and Hong Kong regulators. This in turn reduces their chances of conducting self-interested earnings manipulation. This study is designed to fill the gap in governance literature in China that is related to earnings management. Previous research on corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management in China is not conclusive. The current research builds on previous literature and provides some meaningful implications for practitioners, regulators, academic, and international investors who have investment interests in a transitional country. The findings of this study contribute to corporate governance and earnings management literature in the context of the transitional economy of China. The use of alternative measures for earnings management yields similar results compared with the accruals models and produces additional findings.

The new governance approach to the devolution of corporate governance

The moral arguments associated with justice, fairness and communitarianism have rejected the exclusivity of cost‐benefit analysis in corporate governance. Particularly, the percepts of new governance (NG) have included distributive aspects in efficiency models focused on maximizing profits. While corporate directors were only assigned to look after the return of investment within the traditional framework of corporate governance (CG), NG has created the scope for them to look beyond the set of contractual liabilities. This article explores how and how far NG notions have contributed to the devolution of CG to create internal strategies focusing on actors, ethics and accountability in corporate self-regulation.

Corporate governance convergence and moral relativism

Research question / issue This paper frames the debate on corporate governance convergence in terms of the morality underlying corporate governance models. The claims and arguments of moral relativism are presented to provide theoretical structure to the moral aspects of corporate governance convergence, and ultimately the normative question of whether convergence should occur. Research findings / insights: The morality underlying different models of corporate governance has largely been ignored in the corporate governance convergence literature. A range of moral philosophies and principles that underlie the dominant corporate governance models are identified. This leads to a consideration of the claims and arguments of moral relativism relating to corporate governance. A research agenda around the claims of Descriptive and Metaethical moral relativism, and which ultimately informs the associated normative argument, is then suggested. Theoretical / Academic implications The application of moral relativism to the debate on corporate governance convergence presents a theoretical structure to the analysis and consideration of its moral aspects. This structure lends itself to further research, both empirical and conceptual. Practitioner / Policy implications The claims and arguments of moral relativism provide a means of analysing calls that are made for a culturally or nationally ‘appropriate’ model of corporate governance. This can assist in providing direction for corporate governance reforms and is of particular relevance for developing countries which have inherited Western corporate governance models through colonialism.

The ethics of corporate governance: A (South)African perspective

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to review the developments in South African corporate governance since the end of apartheid, with a view to identifying themes and points of convergence and/or divergence with other models. Design/methodology/approach – The paper presents a critical review of South African corporate governance in the context of political and economic developments. Where relevant, aspects of corporate governance theory (in particular the stakeholder and shareholder debate) are considered in the South African context. Findings – South African corporate governance can be seen to broadly follow Anglo‐American examples with the notable exception of the stakeholder approach of the two King reports. This approach emphasises the responsibilities of companies to various stakeholders and encourages stakeholder engagement as an integral element of company strategy. There has not, however, been any substantial incorporation of stakeholder interests into formal corporate governance structures such as board structure and financial reporting. Practical implications – The ongoing consideration of corporate governance developments in South Africa is important for its continued development in the country and the region. Originality/value – A review of South African corporate governance is timely given the probable release of the third King report in 2009, together with new company legislation.

Theorising South Africa's corporate governance

South Africa’s principal corporate governance report aspires to an ‘inclusive’ approach to corporate governance, in which companies are clearly advised to consider the interests of a variety of stakeholders. Yet, in common with many other countries, there is little discussion of the theoretical foundations and assumptions implicit in the recommended approach to corporate governance. The purpose of this article is to provide an analysis of corporate governance and the corporate environment in South Africa in terms of existing theory and models of corporate governance, and to provide a critique based on a consideration of traditional African values and the socio-economic necessities of post-apartheid South Africa. The result is the identification of an incompatibility between the current corporate environment in South Africa and the given exposition of African values. Some prospects for change are then identified.

Corporate governance and law reform in Japan: From the lost decade to the end of history?

Japan is in the midst of massive law reform. Mired in ongoing recession since the early 1990s, Japan has been implementing a new regulatory blueprint to kickstart a sluggish economy through structural change. A key element to this reform process is a rethink of corporate governance and its stakeholder relations. With a patchwork of legislative initiatives in areas as diverse as corporate law, finance, labour relations, consumer protection, public administration and civil justice, this new model is beginning to take shape. But to what extent does this model represent a break from the past? Some commentators are breathlessly predicting the "Americanisation" of Japanese law. They see the triumph of Western-style capitalism - the "End of History", to borrow the words of Francis Fukuyama - with its emphasis on market-based, arms-length transactions. Others are more cautious, advancing the view that there new reforms are merely "creative twists" on what is a uniquely (although slowly evolving) strand of Japanese capitalism. This paper takes issue with both interpretations. It argues that the new reforms merely follow Japan's long tradition of 'adopting and adapting' foreign models to suit domestic purposes. They are neither the wholesale importation of "Anglo-Saxon" regulatory principles nor a thin veneer over a 'uniquely unique' form of Confucian cultural capitalism. Rather, they represent a specific and largely political solution (conservative reformism) to a current economic problem (recession). The larger themes of this paper are 'change' and 'continuity'. 'Change' suggests evolution to something identifiable; 'continuity' suggests adhering to an existing state of affairs. Although notionally opposites, 'change' and 'continuity' have something in common - they both suggest some form of predictability and coherence in regulatory reform. Our paper, by contrast, submits that Japanese corporate governance reform or, indeed, law reform more generally in Japan, is context-specific, multi-layered (with different dimensions not necessarily pulling all in the same direction for example, in relations with key outside suppliers), and therefore more random or 'chaotic'.

Security of employee entitlements : corporate governance issues

Following the collapse across the last decade of a number of large organizations such as Enron in the USA and several domestic organizations including Ansett Airlines, HIH Insurance and One.Tel, much discussion has ensued about the need to secure employee entitlements. However, tangible improvements in this area are elusive. Good corporate governance policies would suggest that deferred obligations as well as current debts should not be neglected and that appropriate arrangements be put in place to adequately fund employee entitlements. In this paper we consider recent Australian attempts to introduce better governance of employee entitlements.

Role of corporate governance in mitigating the selective disclosure of executive stock option information

We examine the nature and extent of statutory executive stock option (ESO) disclosures by Australian listed companies over the 2001 to 2004 period, and the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on these disclosures. Our results show a progressive increase in overall compliance from 2001 to 2004. However, despite the improved compliance, the results reveal managements’ continued reluctance to disclose more sensitive ESO information. Factors associated with good internal governance, including board independence, audit committee independence and effectiveness, and compensation committee independence and effectiveness are found to contribute to improved compliance. Similarly, certain external governance factors are associated with improved disclosure, including external auditor quality, shareholder activism (as proxied by companies identified as poor performers by the Australian Shareholders’ Association), and regulatory intervention.

Regulating corporate governance in China and Hong Kong : do Chinese values and ethics have a place in the age of globalization?

Much has been said about the convergence of corporate governance and regulations. The underlying assumptions of this phenomenon are driven by globalisation and the dominance of the Anglo-US model of corporate governance. Since the Asian crisis in 1997, Hong Kong and perhaps to a less extend Mainland China, had amended both Company laws and Stock Exchange Listing Rules obligations, arguably, mirroring provisions and rules in the UK and US. However, there has been a small amount of literature in law drawing from cross cultural management asking the question - is Western governance and regulation appropriate for the East? This paper will approach this issue from a different mindset, instead of drawing distinctions about East and West, a meta-regulatory framework will attempt to incorporate Western ‗hard‘ and ‗soft‘ laws with Asian ethical values. The aim is to combine laws and ethics thereby enhancing corporate governance and, improve compliance of those rules by adapting Chinese ethical values like Confucianism into the regulatory system. The overarching goal of this exercise is to adapt the wisdom of Chinese ethics into regulatory guidelines to suit the modern global market.