Review of order fulfilment models for Catalogue Mass Customization

Mass Customization (MC) is not a mature business strategy and hence it is not clear that a single or small group of operational models are dominating. Companies tend to approach MC from either a mass production or a customization origin and this in itself gives reason to believe that several operational models will be observable. This paper reviews actual and theoretical fulfilment systems that enterprises could apply when offering a pre-engineered catalogue of customizable products and options. Issues considered are: How product flows are structured in relation to processes, inventories and decoupling point(s); - Characteristics of the OF process that inhibit or facilitate fulfilment; - The logic of how products are allocated to customers; - Customer factors that influence OF process design and operation. Diversity in the order fulfilment structures is expected and is found in the literature. The review has identified four structural forms that have been used in a Catalogue MC context: - fulfilment from stock; - fulfilment from a single fixed decoupling point; - fulfilment from one of several fixed decoupling points; - fulfilment from several locations, with floating decoupling points. From the review it is apparent that producers are being imaginative in coping with the demands of high variety, high volume, customization and short lead times. These demands have encouraged the relationship between product, process and customer to be re-examined. Not only has this strengthened interest in commonality and postponement, but, as is reported in the paper, has led to the re-engineering of the order fulfilment process to create models with multiple fixed decoupling points and the floating decoupling point system

Seeing it my way: a case of a selective deficit in inhibiting self-perspective

Little is known about the functional and neural architecture of social reasoning, one major obstacle being that we crucially lack the relevant tools to test potentially different social reasoning components. In the case of belief reasoning, previous studies tried to separate the processes involved in belief reasoning per se from those involved in the processing of the high incidental demands such as the working memory demands of typical belief tasks (e.g., Stone et al., 1998; Samson et al., 2004). In this study, we developed new belief tasks in order to disentangle, for the first time, two perspective taking components involved in belief reasoning: (1) the ability to inhibit one’s own perspective (self-perspective inhibition) and (2) the ability to infer someone else’s perspective as such (other-perspective taking). The two tasks had similar demands in other-perspective taking as they both required the participant to infer that a character has a false belief about an object’s location. However, the tasks varied in the self-perspective inhibition demands. In the task with the lowest self-perspective inhibition demands, at the time the participant had to infer the character’s false belief, he or she had no idea what the new object’s location was. In contrast, in the task with the highest self-perspective inhibition demands, at the time the participant had to infer the character’s false belief, he or she knew where the object was actually located (and this knowledge had thus to be inhibited). The two tasks were presented to a stroke patient, WBA, with right prefrontal and temporal damage. WBA performed well in the low-inhibition false belief task but showed striking difficulty in the task placing high self-perspective inhibition demands, showing a selective deficit in inhibiting self-perspective. WBA also made egocentric errors in other social and visual perspective taking tasks, indicating a difficulty with belief attribution extending to the attribution of emotions, desires and visual experiences to other people. The case of WBA, together with the recent report of three patients impaired in belief reasoning even when self-perspective inhibition demands were reduced (Samson et al., 2004), provide the first neuropsychological evidence that (a) the inhibition of one’s own point of view and (b) the ability to infer someone else’ s point of view, rely on distinct neural and functional processes.

Go or no-go? Developmental improvements in the efficiency of response inhibition in mid-childhood

This experiment used a modified go/no-go paradigm to investigate the processes by which response inhibition becomes more efficient during mid-childhood. The novel task, which measured trials on which a response was initiated but not completed, was sensitive to developmental changes in response inhibition. The effect of inducing time pressure by narrowing allowable response time was also examined. While increasing time pressure did not reduce the inhibitory demands of the task for either age group, older children (aged 9-to-11 years) were able to inhibit their responses at an earlier stage of movement than younger children (aged 5-to-7 years). This shows that as children get older they become more efficient at controlling their behaviour which drives developmental improvements in response inhibition.