Error analyses reveal contrasting deficits in “theory of mind”: neuropsychological evidence from a 3-option false belief task

Perspective taking is a crucial ability that guides our social interactions. In this study, we show how the specific patterns of errors of brain-damaged patients in perspective taking tasks can help us further understand the factors contributing to perspective taking abilities. Previous work (e.g., Samson, Apperly, Chiavarino, & Humphreys, 2004; Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan, & Humphreys, 2005) distinguished two components of perspective taking: the ability to inhibit our own perspective and the ability to infer someone else’s perspective. We assessed these components using a new nonverbal false belief task which provided different response options to detect three types of response strategies that participants might be using: a complete and spared belief reasoning strategy, a reality-based response selection strategy in which participants respond from their own perspective, and a simplified mentalising strategy in which participants avoid responding from their own perspective but rely on inaccurate cues to infer the other person’s belief. One patient, with a self-perspective inhibition deficit, almost always used the reality-based response strategy; in contrast, the other patient, with a deficit in taking other perspectives, tended to use the simplified mentalising strategy without necessarily transposing her own perspective. We discuss the extent to which the pattern of performance of both patients could relate to their executive function deficit and how it can inform us on the cognitive and neural components involved in belief reasoning.

Bayesian analysis of a mastitis control plan to investigate the influence of veterinary prior beliefs on clinical interpretation

The fundamental objective for health research is to determine whether changes should be made to clinical decisions. Decisions made by veterinary surgeons in the light of new research evidence are known to be influenced by their prior beliefs, especially their initial opinions about the plausibility of possible results. In this paper, clinical trial results for a bovine mastitis control plan were evaluated within a Bayesian context, to incorporate a community of prior distributions that represented a spectrum of clinical prior beliefs. The aim was to quantify the effect of veterinary surgeons’ initial viewpoints on the interpretation of the trial results. A Bayesian analysis was conducted using Markov chain Monte Carlo procedures. Stochastic models included a financial cost attributed to a change in clinical mastitis following implementation of the control plan. Prior distributions were incorporated that covered a realistic range of possible clinical viewpoints, including scepticism, enthusiasm and uncertainty. Posterior distributions revealed important differences in the financial gain that clinicians with different starting viewpoints would anticipate from the mastitis control plan, given the actual research results. For example, a severe sceptic would ascribe a probability of 0.50 for a return of <£5 per cow in an average herd that implemented the plan, whereas an enthusiast would ascribe this probability for a return of >£20 per cow. Simulations using increased trial sizes indicated that if the original study was four times as large, an initial sceptic would be more convinced about the efficacy of the control plan but would still anticipate less financial return than an initial enthusiast would anticipate after the original study. In conclusion, it is possible to estimate how clinicians’ prior beliefs influence their interpretation of research evidence. Further research on the extent to which different interpretations of evidence result in changes to clinical practice would be worthwhile.