Gender and East Asian Welfare States: from Confucianism to Gender Equality

How can we understand the gender logic underpinning the welfare states/systems of East Asia? Does the comparative literature, which has largely been concerned with western Welfare states, whether in The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Esping-Andersen 1990), or in gender-based analysis of the male breadwinner model (Lewis 1992, 2001, 2006), have anything to offer in understanding the gender assumptions underpinning East Asian welfare states? Are the welfare systems of East Asian countries distinctive, with Confucian assumptions hidden beneath the surface commitment to gender equality? We will use the (mainly western) comparative literature, but argue that Confucian influences remain important, with strong assumptions of family, market and voluntary sector responsibility rather than state responsibility, strong expectations of women’s obligations, without compensating rights, a hierarchy of gender and age, and a highly distinctive, vertical family structure, in which women are subject to parents-in-law. In rapidly changing economies, these social characteristics are changing too. But they still put powerful pressures on women to conform to expectations about care, while weakening their rights to security and support. Nowhere do welfare states’ promises bring gender equality in practice. Even in Scandinavian countries women earn less, care more, and have less power than men. We shall compare East Asian countries (Japan, Korea, Taiwan where possible) with some Western ones, to argue that some major comparative data (e.g. OECD) show the extreme situation of women in these countries. Some fine new qualitative studies give us a close insight into the experience of mothers, including lone and married mothers, which help us to understand how far the gender assumptions of welfare states are from Scandinavia’s dual earner model. There are signs of change in society as well as in economy, and room for optimism that women’s involvement in social movements and academic enquiry may be challenging Confucian gender hierarchies.

Narratives great and small: neighbourhood change, place and identity in Notting Hill

The area of Notting Hill in west London has been subject to much media coverage in recent years, which, along with substantial gentrification, has given rise to an image of the area as the epitome of fashionable London. This study investigates the views of those marginal to gentrification and mediated representation on their feelings about the local area, its image and their changing neighbourhoods. Many participants in the research resented some of the more recent changes in Notting Hill and the area's representation in the media. However, in contrast to expectations, most of the more working-class respondents involved in the research did not articulate much emotional attachment to the area. They were more concerned with what might be termed the material aspects of life in Notting Hill: convenience, facilities, safety and so on. In contrast, the more middle-class respondents frequently spoke of their regret of the changes to the area, such as the loss of independent shops, and the reduction in diversity. Paradoxically, the loss of working-class landscapes seems a relatively middle-class worry. The symbolically important landscapes described by working-class respondents were related to more immediate, material issues, in which gentrification was only a relatively minor concern. The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com

Religious fundamentalism and utopianism in the 21st century

Why is it so difficult to respond to religious fundamentalism from within a liberal paradigm? This paper explores a core problem within religious fundamentalism, stemming from its relationship to the phenomenon of utopianism. This is a complex relationship, which occurs on several different levels, including the content of fundamentalist visions (religious fundamentalisms contain utopian visions of the good life), and its structural paradigm (utopianism and fundamentalism both stem from discontent with the now, challenge cornerstones of their contemporaneous world, and desire radically different alternatives). Of greatest concern is an attachment to perfection, which permits a malign form of utopianism to propel religious actors into a politics of ‘divinely sanctioned’ violence.