Self-archiving publications

This chapter discusses the historical development, current practice and future prospects of the self-archiving of research papers in open-access repositories (so-called 'e-print archives'). It describes how the development of interoperable e-print repositories in a number of subject communities has shown that self-archiving can benefit academic researchers (and potentially others) by enabling quick and easy access to the research literature and therefore maximising the impact potential of papers. Realising that the possible benefits are high and the technical entry barriers low, many organisations such as universities have recently tried to encourage widespread self-archiving by setting up institutional repositories. However, major barriers to self-archiving remain - most of them cultural and managerial. There are concerns about quality control, intellectual property rights, disturbing the publishing status quo, and workload. Ways in which these issues are currently being addressed are discussed in this chapter. A number of self-archiving initiatives in different countries have been set up to address the concerns and to kick-start e-print repository use. However, issues remain which require further investigation; those discussed in this chapter include discipline differences, definitions of 'publication', versioning problems, digital preservation, costing and funding models, and metadata standards. The ways in which these issues are resolved will be important in determining the future of self-archiving. Possible futures are discussed with particular reference to journal publishing and quality control. If widely adopted, self-archiving might come to assume a central place in the scholarly communication process, but a great deal of restructuring of the process needs to take place before this potential can be realised.

RoMEO Studies 8: self-archiving: the logic behind the colour-coding used in the Copyright Knowledge Bank

Purpose – The purpose of this research is to show how the self-archiving of journal papers is a major step towards providing open access to research. However, copyright transfer agreements (CTAs) that are signed by an author prior to publication often indicate whether, and in what form, self-archiving is allowed. The SHERPA/RoMEO database enables easy access to publishers' policies in this area and uses a colour-coding scheme to classify publishers according to their self-archiving status. The database is currently being redeveloped and renamed the Copyright Knowledge Bank. However, it will still assign a colour to individual publishers indicating whether pre-prints can be self-archived (yellow), post-prints can be self-archived (blue), both pre-print and post-print can be archived (green) or neither (white). The nature of CTAs means that these decisions are rarely as straightforward as they may seem, and this paper describes the thinking and considerations that were used in assigning these colours in the light of the underlying principles and definitions of open access. Approach – Detailed analysis of a large number of CTAs led to the development of controlled vocabulary of terms which was carefully analysed to determine how these terms equate to the definition and “spirit” of open access. Findings – The paper reports on how conditions outlined by publishers in their CTAs, such as how or where a paper can be self-archived, affect the assignment of a self-archiving colour to the publisher. Value – The colour assignment is widely used by authors and repository administrators in determining whether academic papers can be self-archived. This paper provides a starting-point for further discussion and development of publisher classification in the open access environment.

Seeing it my way: a case of a selective deficit in inhibiting self-perspective

Little is known about the functional and neural architecture of social reasoning, one major obstacle being that we crucially lack the relevant tools to test potentially different social reasoning components. In the case of belief reasoning, previous studies tried to separate the processes involved in belief reasoning per se from those involved in the processing of the high incidental demands such as the working memory demands of typical belief tasks (e.g., Stone et al., 1998; Samson et al., 2004). In this study, we developed new belief tasks in order to disentangle, for the first time, two perspective taking components involved in belief reasoning: (1) the ability to inhibit one’s own perspective (self-perspective inhibition) and (2) the ability to infer someone else’s perspective as such (other-perspective taking). The two tasks had similar demands in other-perspective taking as they both required the participant to infer that a character has a false belief about an object’s location. However, the tasks varied in the self-perspective inhibition demands. In the task with the lowest self-perspective inhibition demands, at the time the participant had to infer the character’s false belief, he or she had no idea what the new object’s location was. In contrast, in the task with the highest self-perspective inhibition demands, at the time the participant had to infer the character’s false belief, he or she knew where the object was actually located (and this knowledge had thus to be inhibited). The two tasks were presented to a stroke patient, WBA, with right prefrontal and temporal damage. WBA performed well in the low-inhibition false belief task but showed striking difficulty in the task placing high self-perspective inhibition demands, showing a selective deficit in inhibiting self-perspective. WBA also made egocentric errors in other social and visual perspective taking tasks, indicating a difficulty with belief attribution extending to the attribution of emotions, desires and visual experiences to other people. The case of WBA, together with the recent report of three patients impaired in belief reasoning even when self-perspective inhibition demands were reduced (Samson et al., 2004), provide the first neuropsychological evidence that (a) the inhibition of one’s own point of view and (b) the ability to infer someone else’ s point of view, rely on distinct neural and functional processes.

Error analyses reveal contrasting deficits in “theory of mind”: neuropsychological evidence from a 3-option false belief task

Perspective taking is a crucial ability that guides our social interactions. In this study, we show how the specific patterns of errors of brain-damaged patients in perspective taking tasks can help us further understand the factors contributing to perspective taking abilities. Previous work (e.g., Samson, Apperly, Chiavarino, & Humphreys, 2004; Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan, & Humphreys, 2005) distinguished two components of perspective taking: the ability to inhibit our own perspective and the ability to infer someone else’s perspective. We assessed these components using a new nonverbal false belief task which provided different response options to detect three types of response strategies that participants might be using: a complete and spared belief reasoning strategy, a reality-based response selection strategy in which participants respond from their own perspective, and a simplified mentalising strategy in which participants avoid responding from their own perspective but rely on inaccurate cues to infer the other person’s belief. One patient, with a self-perspective inhibition deficit, almost always used the reality-based response strategy; in contrast, the other patient, with a deficit in taking other perspectives, tended to use the simplified mentalising strategy without necessarily transposing her own perspective. We discuss the extent to which the pattern of performance of both patients could relate to their executive function deficit and how it can inform us on the cognitive and neural components involved in belief reasoning.