Error analyses reveal contrasting deficits in “theory of mind”: neuropsychological evidence from a 3-option false belief task

Perspective taking is a crucial ability that guides our social interactions. In this study, we show how the specific patterns of errors of brain-damaged patients in perspective taking tasks can help us further understand the factors contributing to perspective taking abilities. Previous work (e.g., Samson, Apperly, Chiavarino, & Humphreys, 2004; Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan, & Humphreys, 2005) distinguished two components of perspective taking: the ability to inhibit our own perspective and the ability to infer someone else’s perspective. We assessed these components using a new nonverbal false belief task which provided different response options to detect three types of response strategies that participants might be using: a complete and spared belief reasoning strategy, a reality-based response selection strategy in which participants respond from their own perspective, and a simplified mentalising strategy in which participants avoid responding from their own perspective but rely on inaccurate cues to infer the other person’s belief. One patient, with a self-perspective inhibition deficit, almost always used the reality-based response strategy; in contrast, the other patient, with a deficit in taking other perspectives, tended to use the simplified mentalising strategy without necessarily transposing her own perspective. We discuss the extent to which the pattern of performance of both patients could relate to their executive function deficit and how it can inform us on the cognitive and neural components involved in belief reasoning.

When “happy” means “sad”: neuropsychological evidence for the right prefrontal cortex contribution to executive semantic processing

The contribution of the left inferior prefrontal cortex in semantic processing has been widely investigated in the last decade. Converging evidence from functional imaging studies shows that this region is involved in the “executive” or “controlled” aspects of semantic processing. In this study, we report a single case study of a patient, PW, with damage to the right prefrontal and temporal cortices following stroke. PW showed a problem in executive control of semantic processing, where he could not easily override automatic but irrelevant semantic processing. This case thus shows the necessary role of the right inferior prefrontal cortex in executive semantic processing. Compared to tasks previously used in the literature, our tasks placed higher demands on executive semantic processing. We suggest that the right inferior prefrontal cortex is recruited when the demands on executive semantic processing are particularly high.