Doctors' thinking about the system as a threat to patient safety

‘Systems thinking’ is an important feature of the emerging ‘patient safety’ agenda. As a key component of a ‘safety culture’, it encourages clinicians to look past individual error to recognise the latent factors that threaten safety. This paper investigates whether current medical thinking is commensurate with the idea of ‘systems thinking’ together with its implications for policy. The findings are based on qualitative semistructured interviews with specialist physicians working within one NHS District General Hospital in the English Midlands. It is shown that, rather then favouring a 'person-centred’ perspective, doctors readily identify ‘the system’ as a threat to patient safety. This is not necessarily a reflection of the prevailing safety discourse or knowledge of policy, but reflects a tacit understanding of how services are (dis)organised. This line of thinking serves to mitigate individual wrong-doing and protect professional credibility by encouraging doctors to accept and accommodate the shortcomings of the system, rather than participate in new forms of organisational learning.

Safety and complexity: the inter-departmental threats to patient safety in the operating department

Purpose: Current thinking about ‘patient safety’ emphasises the causal relationship between the work environment and the delivery of clinical care. This research draws on the theory of Normal Accidents to extend this analysis and better understand the ‘organisational factors’ that threaten safety. Methods: Ethnographic research methods were used, with observations of the operating department setting for 18 month and interviews with 80 members of hospital staff. The setting for the study was the Operating Department of a large teaching hospital in the North-West of England. Results: The work of the operating department is determined by inter-dependant, ‘tightly coupled’ organisational relationships between hospital departments based upon the timely exchange of information, services and resources required for the delivery of care. Failures within these processes, manifest as ‘breakdowns’ within inter-departmental relationships lead to situations of constraint, rapid change and uncertainty in the work of the operating department that require staff to break with established routines and work with increased time and emotional pressures. This means that staff focus on working quickly, as opposed to working safely. Conclusion: Analysis of safety needs to move beyond a focus on the immediate work environment and individual practice, to consider the more complex and deeply structured organisational systems of hospital activity. For departmental managers the scope for service planning to control for safety may be limited as the structured ‘real world’ situation of service delivery is shaped by inter-department and organisational factors that are perhaps beyond the scope of departmental management.

Beyond Blame: cultural barriers to medical reporting

The paper explores the attitudes of medical physicians towards adverse incident reporting in health care, with particular focus on the inhibiting factors or barriers to participation. It is recognised that there are major barriers to medical reporting, such as the ‘culture of blame’. There are, however, few detailed qualitative accounts of medical culture as it relates to incident reporting. Drawing on a 2-year qualitative case study in the UK, this paper presents data gathered from 28 semi-structured interviews with specialist physicians. The findings suggest that blame certainly inhibits medical reporting, but other cultural issues were also significant. It was commonly accepted by doctors that errors are an ‘inevitable’ and potentially unmanageable feature of medical work and incident reporting was therefore ‘pointless’. It was also found that reporting was discouraged by an anti-bureaucratic sentiment and rejection of excessive administrative duties. Doctors were also apprehensive about the increased potential for managers and non-physicians to engage in the regulation of medical quality through the use of incident data. The paper argues that the promotion of incident reporting must engage with more than the ubiquitous ‘culture of blame’ and instead address the ‘culture of medicine’, especially as it relates to the collegial and professional control of quality.