New Directions in Commercial Secrecy and Encryption Protocols

Secure transmission of bulk data is of interest to many content providers. A commercially-viable distribution of content requires technology to prevent unauthorised access. Encryption tools are powerful, but have a performance cost. Without encryption, intercepted data may be illicitly duplicated and re-sold, or its commercial value diminished because its secrecy is lost. Two technical solutions make it possible to perform bulk transmissions while retaining security without too high a performance overhead. These are: 1. a) hierarchical encryption - the stronger the encryption, the harder it is to break but also the more computationally expensive it is. A hierarchical approach to key exchange means that simple and relatively weak encryption and keys are used to encrypt small chunks of data, for example 10 seconds of video. Each chunk has its own key. New keys for this bottom-level encryption are exchanged using a slightly stronger encryption, for example a whole-video key could govern the exchange of the 10-second chunk keys. At a higher level again, there could be daily or weekly keys, securing the exchange of whole-video keys, and at a yet higher level, a subscriber key could govern the exchange of weekly keys. At higher levels, the encryption becomes stronger but is used less frequently, so that the overall computational cost is minimal. The main observation is that the value of each encrypted item determines the strength of the key used to secure it. 2. b) non-symbolic fragmentation with signal diversity - communications are usually assumed to be sent over a single communications medium, and the data to have been encrypted and/or partitioned in whole-symbol packets. Network and path diversity break up a file or data stream into fragments which are then sent over many different channels, either in the same network or different networks. For example, a message could be transmitted partly over the phone network and partly via satellite. While TCP/IP does a similar thing in sending different packets over different paths, this is done for load-balancing purposes and is invisible to the end application. Network and path diversity deliberately introduce the same principle as a secure communications mechanism - an eavesdropper would need to intercept not just one transmission path but all paths used. Non-symbolic fragmentation of data is also introduced to further confuse any intercepted stream of data. This involves breaking up data into bit strings which are subsequently disordered prior to transmission. Even if all transmissions were intercepted, the cryptanalyst still needs to determine fragment boundaries and correctly order them. These two solutions depart from the usual idea of data encryption. Hierarchical encryption is an extension of the combined encryption of systems such as PGP but with the distinction that the strength of encryption at each level is determined by the "value" of the data being transmitted. Non- symbolic fragmentation suppresses or destroys bit patterns in the transmitted data in what is essentially a bit-level transposition cipher but with unpredictable irregularly-sized fragments. Both technologies have applications outside the commercial and can be used in conjunction with other forms of encryption, being functionally orthogonal.

Don’t expect me to vote for you just because I like you, even if you do make me feel warm inside: a comparison of the validity of non-ipsative measures of party support

The inclusion of non-ipsative measures of party preference (in essence ratings for each of the parties of a political system) has become established practice in mass surveys conducted for election studies. They exist in different forms, known as thermometer ratings or feeling scores, likes and dislikes scores, or support propensities. Usually only one of these is included in a single survey, which makes it difficult to assess the relative merits of each. The questionnaire of the Irish National Election Study 2002 (INES2002) contained three different batteries of non-ipsative party preferences. This paper investigates some of the properties of these different indicators. We focus in particular on two phenomena. First, the relationship between non-ipsative preferences and the choices actually made on the ballot. In Ireland this relationship is more revealing than in most other countries owing to the electoral system (STV) which allows voters to cast multiple ordered votes for candidates from different parties. Second, we investigate the latent structure of each of the batteries of party preferences and the relationships between them. We conclude that the three instruments are not interchangeable, that they measure different orientations, and that one –the propensity to vote for a party– is by far preferable if the purpose of the study is the explanation of voters’ actual choice behaviour. This finding has important ramifications for the design of election study questionnaires.