'Danger Theory: The Link between AIS and IDS?'

Abstract We present ideas about creating a next generation Intrusion Detection System (IDS) based on the latest immunological theories. The central challenge with computer security is determining the difference between normal and potentially harmful activity. For half a century, developers have protected their systems by coding rules that identify and block specific events. However, the nature of current and future threats in conjunction with ever larger IT systems urgently requires the development of automated and adaptive defensive tools. A promising solution is emerging in the form of Artificial Immune Systems (AIS): The Human Immune System (HIS) can detect and defend against harmful and previously unseen invaders, so can we not build a similar Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for our computers? Presumably, those systems would then have the same beneficial properties as HIS like error tolerance, adaptation and self-monitoring. Current AIS have been successful on test systems, but the algorithms rely on self-nonself discrimination, as stipulated in classical immunology. However, immunologist are increasingly finding fault with traditional self-nonself thinking and a new 'Danger Theory' (DT) is emerging. This new theory suggests that the immune system reacts to threats based on the correlation of various (danger) signals and it provides a method of 'grounding' the immune response, i.e. linking it directly to the attacker. Little is currently understood of the precise nature and correlation of these signals and the theory is a topic of hot debate. It is the aim of this research to investigate this correlation and to translate the DT into the realms of computer security, thereby creating AIS that are no longer limited by self-nonself discrimination. It should be noted that we do not intend to defend this controversial theory per se, although as a deliverable this project will add to the body of knowledge in this area. Rather we are interested in its merits for scaling up AIS applications by overcoming self-nonself discrimination problems.

'Cooperative Automated worm Response and Detection ImmuNe ALgorithm (CARDINAL) inspired by T-cell Immunity and Tolerance'

The role of T-cells within the immune system is to confirm and assess anomalous situations and then either respond to or tolerate the source of the effect. To illustrate how these mechanisms can be harnessed to solve real-world problems, we present the blueprint of a T-cell inspired algorithm for computer security worm detection. We show how the three central T-cell processes, namely T-cell maturation, differentiation and proliferation, naturally map into this domain and further illustrate how such an algorithm fits into a complete immune inspired computer security system and framework.

'Malicious Code Execution Detection and Response Immune System inspired by the Danger Theory'

The analysis of system calls is one method employed by anomaly detection systems to recognise malicious code execution. Similarities can be drawn between this process and the behaviour of certain cells belonging to the human immune system, and can be applied to construct an artificial immune system. A recently developed hypothesis in immunology, the Danger Theory, states that our immune system responds to the presence of intruders through sensing molecules belonging to those invaders, plus signals generated by the host indicating danger and damage. We propose the incorporation of this concept into a responsive intrusion detection system, where behavioural information of the system and running processes is combined with information regarding individual system calls.

An Immune Inspired Approach to Anomaly Detection

The immune system provides a rich metaphor for computer security: anomaly detection that works in nature should work for machines. However, early artificial immune system approaches for computer security had only limited success. Arguably, this was due to these artificial systems being based on too simplistic a view of the immune system. We present here a second generation artificial immune system for process anomaly detection. It improves on earlier systems by having different artificial cell types that process information. Following detailed information about how to build such second generation systems, we find that communication between cells types is key to performance. Through realistic testing and validation we show that second generation artificial immune systems are capable of anomaly detection beyond generic system policies. The paper concludes with a discussion and outline of the next steps in this exciting area of computer security.

An Agent-based Classification Model

The major function of this model is to access the UCI Wisconsin Breast Cancer data-set[1] and classify the data items into two categories, which are normal and anomalous. This kind of classification can be referred as anomaly detection, which discriminates anomalous behaviour from normal behaviour in computer systems. One popular solution for anomaly detection is Artificial Immune Systems (AIS). AIS are adaptive systems inspired by theoretical immunology and observed immune functions, principles and models which are applied to problem solving. The Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA)[2] is an AIS algorithm that is developed specifically for anomaly detection. It has been successfully applied to intrusion detection in computer security. It is believed that agent-based modelling is an ideal approach for implementing AIS, as intelligent agents could be the perfect representations of immune entities in AIS. This model evaluates the feasibility of re-implementing the DCA in an agent-based simulation environment called AnyLogic, where the immune entities in the DCA are represented by intelligent agents. If this model can be successfully implemented, it makes it possible to implement more complicated and adaptive AIS models in the agent-based simulation environment.

Experimenting with Innate Immunity

libtissue is a software system for implementing and testing AIS algorithms on real-world computer security problems. AIS algorithms are implemented as a collection of cells, antigen and signals interacting within a tissue compartment. Input data to the tissue comes in the form of realtime events generated by sensors monitoring a system under surveillance, and cells are actively able to affect the monitored system through response mechanisms. libtissue is being used by researchers on a project at the University of Nottingham to explore the application of a range of immune-inspired algorithms to problems in intrusion detection. This talk describes the architecture and design of libtissue, along with the implementation of a simple algorithm and its application to a computer security problem.

'Cooperative Automated worm Response and Detection ImmuNe ALgorithm (CARDINAL) inspired by T-cell Immunity and Tolerance'

The role of T-cells within the immune system is to confirm and assess anomalous situations and then either respond to or tolerate the source of the effect. To illustrate how these mechanisms can be harnessed to solve real-world problems, we present the blueprint of a T-cell inspired algorithm for computer security worm detection. We show how the three central T-cell processes, namely T-cell maturation, differentiation and proliferation, naturally map into this domain and further illustrate how such an algorithm fits into a complete immune inspired computer security system and framework.

'Malicious Code Execution Detection and Response Immune System inspired by the Danger Theory'

The analysis of system calls is one method employed by anomaly detection systems to recognise malicious code execution. Similarities can be drawn between this process and the behaviour of certain cells belonging to the human immune system, and can be applied to construct an artificial immune system. A recently developed hypothesis in immunology, the Danger Theory, states that our immune system responds to the presence of intruders through sensing molecules belonging to those invaders, plus signals generated by the host indicating danger and damage. We propose the incorporation of this concept into a responsive intrusion detection system, where behavioural information of the system and running processes is combined with information regarding individual system calls.

'Danger Theory: The Link between AIS and IDS?'

Abstract We present ideas about creating a next generation Intrusion Detection System (IDS) based on the latest immunological theories. The central challenge with computer security is determining the difference between normal and potentially harmful activity. For half a century, developers have protected their systems by coding rules that identify and block specific events. However, the nature of current and future threats in conjunction with ever larger IT systems urgently requires the development of automated and adaptive defensive tools. A promising solution is emerging in the form of Artificial Immune Systems (AIS): The Human Immune System (HIS) can detect and defend against harmful and previously unseen invaders, so can we not build a similar Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for our computers? Presumably, those systems would then have the same beneficial properties as HIS like error tolerance, adaptation and self-monitoring. Current AIS have been successful on test systems, but the algorithms rely on self-nonself discrimination, as stipulated in classical immunology. However, immunologist are increasingly finding fault with traditional self-nonself thinking and a new 'Danger Theory' (DT) is emerging. This new theory suggests that the immune system reacts to threats based on the correlation of various (danger) signals and it provides a method of 'grounding' the immune response, i.e. linking it directly to the attacker. Little is currently understood of the precise nature and correlation of these signals and the theory is a topic of hot debate. It is the aim of this research to investigate this correlation and to translate the DT into the realms of computer security, thereby creating AIS that are no longer limited by self-nonself discrimination. It should be noted that we do not intend to defend this controversial theory per se, although as a deliverable this project will add to the body of knowledge in this area. Rather we are interested in its merits for scaling up AIS applications by overcoming self-nonself discrimination problems.

Danger theory: the link between AIS and IDS?

We present ideas about creating a next generation Intrusion Detection System (IDS) based on the latest immunological theories. The central challenge with computer security is determining the difference between normal and potentially harmful activity. For half a century, developers have protected their systems by coding rules that identify and block specific events. However, the nature of current and future threats in conjunction with ever larger IT systems urgently requires the development of automated and adaptive defensive tools. A promising solution is emerging in the form of Artificial Immune Systems (AIS): The Human Immune System (HIS) can detect and defend against harmful and previously unseen invaders, so can we not build a similar Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for our computers? Presumably, those systems would then have the same beneficial properties as HIS like error tolerance, adaptation and self-monitoring. Current AIS have been successful on test systems, but the algorithms rely on self-nonself discrimination, as stipulated in classical immunology. However, immunologist are increasingly finding fault with traditional self-nonself thinking and a new ‘Danger Theory’ (DT) is emerging. This new theory suggests that the immune system reacts to threats based on the correlation of various (danger) signals and it provides a method of ‘grounding’ the immune response, i.e. linking it directly to the attacker. Little is currently understood of the precise nature and correlation of these signals and the theory is a topic of hot debate. It is the aim of this research to investigate this correlation and to translate the DT into the realms of computer security, thereby creating AIS that are no longer limited by self-nonself discrimination. It should be noted that we do not intend to defend this controversial theory per se, although as a deliverable this project will add to the body of knowledge in this area. Rather we are interested in its merits for scaling up AIS applications by overcoming self-nonself discrimination problems.

Real-time alert correlation with type graphs

The premise of automated alert correlation is to accept that false alerts from a low level intrusion detection system are inevitable and use attack models to explain the output in an understandable way. Several algorithms exist for this purpose which use attack graphs to model the ways in which attacks can be combined. These algorithms can be classified in to two broad categories namely scenario-graph approaches, which create an attack model starting from a vulnerability assessment and type-graph approaches which rely on an abstract model of the relations between attack types. Some research in to improving the efficiency of type-graph correlation has been carried out but this research has ignored the hypothesizing of missing alerts. Our work is to present a novel type-graph algorithm which unifies correlation and hypothesizing in to a single operation. Our experimental results indicate that the approach is extremely efficient in the face of intensive alerts and produces compact output graphs comparable to other techniques.

Data Reduction in Intrusion Alert Correlation

Network intrusion detection sensors are usually built around low level models of network traffic. This means that their output is of a similarly low level and as a consequence, is difficult to analyze. Intrusion alert correlation is the task of automating some of this analysis by grouping related alerts together. Attack graphs provide an intuitive model for such analysis. Unfortunately alert flooding attacks can still cause a loss of service on sensors, and when performing attack graph correlation, there can be a large number of extraneous alerts included in the output graph. This obscures the fine structure of genuine attacks and makes them more difficult for human operators to discern. This paper explores modified correlation algorithms which attempt to minimize the impact of this attack.

Articulation and Clarification of the Dendric Cell Algorithm

The Dendritic Cell algorithm (DCA) is inspired by recent work in innate immunity. In this paper a formal description of the DCA is given. The DCA is described in detail, and its use as an anomaly detector is illustrated within the context of computer security. A port scan detection task is performed to substantiate the influence of signal selection on the behaviour of the algorithm. Experimental results provide a comparison of differing input signal mappings.

Dendritic Cells for SYN Scan Detection

Artificial immune systems have previously been applied to the problem of intrusion detection. The aim of this research is to develop an intrusion detection system based on the function of Dendritic Cells (DCs). DCs are antigen presenting cells and key to the activation of the human immune system, behaviour which has been abstracted to form the Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA). In algorithmic terms, individual DCs perform multi-sensor data fusion, asynchronously correlating the fused data signals with a secondary data stream. Aggregate output of a population of cells is analysed and forms the basis of an anomaly detection system. In this paper the DCA is applied to the detection of outgoing port scans using TCP SYN packets. Results show that detection can be achieved with the DCA, yet some false positives can be encountered when simultaneously scanning and using other network services. Suggestions are made for using adaptive signals to alleviate this uncovered problem.